Journal of Politics in Latin America

Contracting, Contesting, and Co-Optation: Civil Society Organizations' Strategies under New Institutional Arrangements in Brazil

Brian Wampler and Michael Touchton

Abstract: Civil society has exploded in Latin America as democratization has continued over the last 30 years. Civil society organizations (CSOs) are thought to improve governance and oversight and to increase social capital. Nonetheless, we have limited knowledge about what motivates CSOs' political strategies, which include participating in formal political institutions, attending demonstrations, and providing services. We build knowledge here by evaluating data from a unique survey of nine hundred CSOs across seven Brazilian cities. Our findings showcase several parallel processes: poorer CSOs continue to rely on the state and actively participate in political processes despite protesting at greater rates than wealthier CSOs; therefore, we contend that institutional and political process arguments better explain poorer CSOs' behavior. We also argue that relatively wealthy CSOs' disengagement reflects greater resource mobilization, more professionalization, and an increase in social capital. Our results show that multilayered explanations improve our understanding of CSO behavior and state-society relations in Brazil and Latin America.

Dr. Brian Wampler is Chair and Professor of Political Science at Boise State University, Idaho, USA. His research focuses on citizen participation and new democratic institutions in Brazil, Latin America and across the globe.
E-mail: <bwampler@boisestate.edu>

Dr. Michael Touchton is an assistant professor of Political Science at Boise State University, Idaho, USA. His research lies at the intersection of states and markets in Latin America and around the world.
E-mail: <miketouchton@boisestate.edu>

1 Introduction

The ongoing mobilization of citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) profoundly marks national and local politics across Latin America and the developing world. In the twenty-first century, citizens and CSOs) now have access to an expanded repertoire of political activities that they can employ to influence public officials, private corporations, and their fellow citizens (Oxhorn 2011). These political activities include protesting and engaging in contentious politics; being involved in campaigns and elections, party politics, and clientelistic exchanges; forming community organizations; lobbying government officials; and working within incremental policy-making decisions (Escobar and Álvarez 1992; Fox 2007; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003; Abers and Keck 2013; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). Citizens and CSOs are now able to link themselves to each other and to a wider array of organizations by taking advantage of new democratic institutions, the partial protection of basic liberties, expanded educational opportunities, and decreased transportation and communication costs (Avritzer 2002 and 2009; Pires 2011). Citizens form and join CSOs to advance both narrow and broad interests, from improving public security to challenging extractive industries to installing infrastructure in their respective streets to improving basic education and health care (Jacobi 1989).

In this article, we ask how CSOs engage the state, public officials, and new democratic institutions. We draw from an original survey of 863 CSO leaders across seven Brazilian cities to evaluate three distinct strategies: engaging in contentious politics, entering into direct contact with public officials (elected and civil servants), and participating directly in participatory policy-making institutions. The data we use in this article enables us to better explain why certain CSOs are likely to pursue specific strategies. This in turn provides us with a window into the broader issue of how Brazilian state-society relations are being reconstituted as a result of the civil liberty protections often afforded to protestors, the expansion of contracting and outsourcing, and the implementation of a wide architecture of participatory institutions.

We employ a pluralistic and expansive understanding of civil society, which we define as the sphere of social and political associational activity separate from the state, the market, and the family (Cohen and Arato 1992). Jeffrey Alexander argues that "civil society is a sphere of solidarity in which individual rights and collective obligations are tensely intertwined" (Alexander 2006: 53). "Bonds of solidarity" thus help organized groups to forge ongoing alliances in order to pressure government

officials, public and private corporations, and their fellow citizens in pursuit of their political and policy goals. "Civil society organization" is an umbrella concept that incorporates a wide range of collective groups; social movements, community-based organizations, and "third-sector" organizations are all prominent within this category. These organizations have diverse sets of interests – organizing communities and potential allies, establishing a coherent political and policy agenda, and working to achieve social change (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). The umbrella concept of the CSO allows us to recognize the diversity of organizational type and interest as well as explain strategic choices in each area.

Three interrelated political processes now frame civil society organizing in Brazil. First, the return of representative democracy in the mid-1980s and the subsequent extension of basic protections permitted many CSOs to engage in contentious political activity.[1] Second, the expansion of participatory institutions now allows CSOs to have unprecedented contact with public officials as well as their fellow CSO leaders in public policy-making processes. Third, Brazil moved toward a neodevelopmentalist state and invested much more heavily in social welfare policies during the country's economic expansion between 2000 and 2009 (Sugiyama 2012; Montero 2014). These political processes influence CSOs' political and organizational opportunities and, in turn, the strategies they use to pursue their interests.

Our analysis reflects two distinct types of CSO activities. First, "community-based" CSOs from poorer cities – whose leaders have lower socioeconomic status (SES – as measured by income, level of formal education, and race) and do not hold government contracts to provide social services – are most likely to engage the state through direct contact with public officials, be involved in participatory institutions, and use contentious protest. It is noteworthy that CSOs from the poorest communities engage in a wide range of political activities. Surprisingly, they also appear to have a more diverse set of political strategies than CSOs from wealthier cities and those with leaders that have higher SES. We argue that the renewal of civil society, the creation of a new party system, and the establishment of new democratic institutions explain why relatively resource-poor organizations are now using a diverse set of strategies (Heller 2012; Sandbrook et al. 2007).

Second, third-sector CSOs in relatively wealthy cities – whose leaders have relatively high SES and hold government contracts to provide

---

1   Of course, we must bear in mind that rights protection varies across regional, state, municipal, and class lines in Brazil and that rights are not fully guaranteed in many circumstances.

social services – are less engaged with participatory institutions, have limited formal contacts with public officials, and eschew protest activities. These organizations meet the profile of third-sector associations, which typically provide social services through government contracts (Bresser-Pereira and Spink 1998; Bresser-Pereira and Grau 1999; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). Third-sector CSOs tend to be nonpartisan but often leverage their professional and technical know-how to shape and implement public policies. We anticipate the leaders of these organizations will be able to use preexisting networks (e.g., they went to the same high school or university) to engage public officials and to mobilize resources.

The broad field of "social movements" includes many smaller organizations that work toward similar goals. Thus there may be, writ large, a health "movement" or a housing "movement" that is comprised of many CSOs. Although CSOs in such movements may come together for specific public demonstrations or strategic planning, they have their own political and policy agendas at the local level. CSOs themselves can also include a range of organizational types, such as community-based organizations, service-providers, national organizations, and/or advocacy think tanks. Our challenge is to identify these CSOs and explain their strategic choices, given the increasing number of options at CSOs' disposal in Brazil.

We draw from an original survey of 863 CSO leaders across seven Brazilian cities to create a series of statistical models of CSO activities. We find that the combination of three factors most accurately explains CSOs' political/policy strategies. First, at the macrolevel, the wealth of the city influences CSOs' strategies. Wealthier cities have greater levels of public resources to spend on social service contracts, a broader middle class, and a more robust administrative structure to support the proliferation of participatory institutions. The results of our regression analyses indicate the wealth of the city has a significant effect on the strategic actions CSOs take.

Second, at the individual level, we find that CSO leaders' socioeconomic status also significantly affects CSOs' strategies. In our models we use household income as our proxy for socioeconomic status and our central individual-level explanatory variable.[2] Thus, the individual characteristics of CSO leaders are important because of the leaders' formal and

---

2　Household income is highly correlated with education level (0.86) and race (0.81).

professional training, their personal networks, and the intangible aspects of social status that are related to power in Brazil.

Third, at the mesolevel, we examine whether CSOs hold a contract to deliver state services. This is a mesolevel factor because it implies that CSOs are (a) formally registered with the state, (b) have the infrastructure and skills to provide social services, and (c) have political leaderships that can secure government contracts. It thus falls between the individual characteristics of CSO leadership at the microlevel and city wealth at the macrolevel. The results of our regression analysis show that holding a government contract also has a significant effect on CSOs' strategic actions.

Table 1 captures distinct patterns of CSOs' political and policy activities. We find that the level of wealth in a CSO's city, the level of wealth of a CSO's leadership, and whether a CSO has a government service-delivery contract are strongly associated with a CSO's political strategy.[3] The final column in Table 1 classifies the type of organizations associated with each political strategy.

In this article we show how the protections provided by the reestablishment of democratic rule, the creation of participatory institutions, and the expansion of the welfare state best explain why CSOs select specific political activities to pursue their political interests. These theoretical frameworks map onto the micro-, meso-, and macrolevel causal mechanisms we identify as crucial for explaining CSO behavior based on variation in the CSOs and the sociopolitical context in which they operate. Although this article focuses on seven Brazilian cities, we argue that our approach is sufficiently broad that our insights can be applied to patterns of political organizing across the region.

The paper proceeds as follows: First, we briefly describe the expansion and changes to Brazil's civil society during the 1980s and 1990s. Second, we focus on the changes in the political opportunities and institutional structures that altered the terrain of civil society organizing. Third, we present the Brazilian context, discuss our data, and describe the strategies we use to analyze our data. Fourth, we report and discuss our results with respect to broad debates in the field.

---

3   It is important to note that the cities included in the survey do not represent the poorest parts of the country. The cities in our sample are not representative of the largest cities in the country either.

Table 1: Brazilian Civil Society Organizations' Characteristics, Strategies, and Type

	CSO Charac-teristics	Informal contact with public officials	Participation in formal policy-making processes	Involve-ment in Protest Politics	Type
	Leaders have High SES, NO contracts	8 (Lowest)	8 (Lowest)	7 (Low)	Religious, Social, Rights-based
	Leaders have High SES, Active con-tract	6 (Middle)	7 (Low)	8 (Lowest)	Third Sector
Wealthier Cities	Leaders have Low SES, NO contracts	7 (Low)	2 (High)	2 (High)	Community-based, Politically disconnected
	Leaders have Low SES, Active con-tract	4 (Middle)	6 (Middle)	5 (Middle)	Community-based, Politically connected
	Leaders have high SES, NO contracts	5 (Middle)	3 (High)	4 (Middle)	Religious, Social, Rights-based
	Leaders have high SES, Active con-tract	1 (Highest)	5 (Middle)	6 (Middle)	Third Sector
Poorer Cities	Leaders have low SES NO contracts	3 (High)	1 (Highest)	1 (Highest)	Community-based, Politically disconnected
	Leaders have Low SES: Active con-tract	2 (High)	4 (Middle)	3 (High)	Community-based, Politically connected

Note: The relative positions of CSOs in each column are based on cross-tabulation of frequencies for each set of CSO characteristics and the strategies CSOs pursue. We then rank CSOs possessing one of the eight possible combinations of character traits against each other according to how much they pursue each political strategy. The result is a 1–8 ranking for each strategy relative to other CSOs with different characteristics.

Source: Authors' own compilation.

2   Setting the Stage

Four interrelated processes best explain the heterogeneity of Brazil's civil society today: (i) the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s; (ii) the creation of a new party system, especially the predominance of

two reform-oriented parties (the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) and the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira – PSDB)) at the center of presidential contests; (iii) the establishment of a new democratic architecture; and (iv) the expansion of social policy provisions in the years 2000–2009, which followed the economic stabilization of the 1990s (Kinzo 1996).

First, the renewal of civil society during the 1970s and 1980s ushered in new ways of conducting politics (Dagnino 1994 and 1998; Avritzer 2002; Dagnino and Tatagiba 2007). Specifically, the growth of new social movements and new forms of labor organizing contributed to new forms of engagement (Álvarez 1990; Avritzer 2002). For example, the liberation theology movement and Paulo Freire's critical pedagogy influenced citizens to organize around demands for civil, political, and social rights. Citizens also began to use democratic procedures within their organizations, including deliberative processes and elections. The expansion of civil society also fostered the creation of new political alliances and groups. These alliances potentially circumvented the clientelistic relationships of the past and offered groups new opportunities to pursue their interests. Furthermore, the increasing density and diversity of civil society allowed these groups to engage public officials in unprecedented ways (Avritzer 2002; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Wolford 2010).

Second, the creation of a new party system, especially the growth of two reformist political parties (the PT and the PSDB), was directly relevant in generating new forms of participation and engagement (Keck 1992; Hunter 2010). The PT not only built itself on the infrastructure of new social movements and labor organizations but also linked itself to progressive sectors of the middle class, thus incorporating new interests into the PT coalition. The PSDB grew out of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – MDB) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro – PMDB) (political parties formed in opposition to the military dictatorship) and its original political base consisted of São Paulo's middle classes. Thus, the two dominant political parties created in postdictatorship Brazil (occupying the presidency from 1994–2014) emerged from an effort to reform the basic political and social institutions that govern the country.[4]

---

4   Of course, both parties have changed their positions since the mid-1990s. The PSDB established the highly successful economic growth model, and the PT changed its position to be closer to the PSDB model while still focusing on social policies and redistribution.

Third, Brazil's establishment of a new constitutional order dramatically increased the number of citizens formally engaged with the state (Avritzer 2009; Abers and Keck 2009). Brazil's 1988 Constitution is a broad, sweeping document that includes a wide range of rights and a new distribution of authority. It offered concessions to conservative political groups (Hagopian 1996) as well as to newly organized civil society groups (Avritzer 2002). The 1988 Constitution introduced two specific changes that are pertinent to our research: First, it mandated an extensive municipalization of authority and resources. Second, the legislation that accompanied the new constitution required municipalities to establish specific types of participatory institutions and permitted local governments to experiment with other new forms of participation. As a result, the surface area of the state broadened, thus allowing citizens a greater number of entry points into the state (Heller and Evans 2011).

Fourth, Brazil's economic stabilization during the 1990s and subsequent economic expansion during 2000–2009 made new revenues available and allowed the government to increase overall spending levels. Elected officials at the federal and subnational levels also used these new resources to expand social-service delivery. Some of the results of this shift have been a real reduction in extreme poverty, a broadening of the working class, and an increase in access to basic consumer goods (World Bank 2014; UNDP 2010 and 2013). While income and asset inequality remain quite high, economic expansion increased the middle class's absolute wealth and created a much larger working class. Relevant to our argument here is that economic growth created a group of professionalized CSOs, which are led by individuals with much-higher-than-average income and education levels and represent relatively wealthy constituencies.

3   Organizing under a Democratic, Social Welfare State

Citizens and civil society organizations, as the political opportunity literature on social movements has shown, modify their strategies in response to changes in the social, political, or institutional environment (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tilly 2004). Tarrow argues that

> differences in patterns of state building produced differences in
> the opportunity structures of social movements […]. Tocqueville's
> underlying message was that state-building creates an opportunity

structure for collective action of which ordinary people take advantage (Tarrow 1998: 55–56).

We argue that the reestablishment of representative democracy, the implementation of new participatory institutions, and the expansion of social-service spending altered the opportunity structure for political engagement, thus inducing CSOs to utilize a wide range of activities in pursuit of their political and policy goals.

The first analytical pillar of our argument is that the return to representative democracy was accompanied by an increased protection of basic civil liberties, including the right to hold public demonstrations. Political protest is an integral part of political organizing in Brazil as excluded groups have traditionally used contentious politics as a way to place their interests on the public agenda (Álvarez 1990; Escobar and Álvarez 1992; Wampler 2007). As a result, an increase in public demonstrations following the democratic transition is not surprising, because contentious politics often accompany democratic state building. In this sense, democracy frees ordinary citizens to use disruptive, direct action to ensure public officials and their fellow citizens hear protesters' demands (Tarrow 1998). Politically marginalized citizens have long used contentious politics to expand their rights, gain the attention of public officials and their fellow citizens, and access scarce public resources. Extensive use of contentious politics allowed new political coalitions to develop, pushed new leaders into the centers of political power, and highlighted the ability of outside groups to successfully promote significant institutional reform during recent transitions to and the establishment of democratic regimes during the 1980s, the 1990s, and the period 2000–2009 (Yashar 2005; Baiocchi 2005; Grindle 2002; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011).[5]

The second analytical pillar of our argument is that new democratic institutions are part of a larger democratic state-building effort designed to overcome perceived deficiencies with representative democracy such as passive voters with little information, the lack of accountability among elected officials, a limited public sphere, and misallocations of scarce public resources (Avritzer 2002; Stepan 1989; Castañeda 1993; O'Don-

---

5   The ability of citizens and CSOs to exercise these rights still varies widely across the country as well as among different socioeconomic classes (Abers and Keck 2013; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). Wealthier middle-class individuals holding demonstrations in central areas of large cities have greater protection than poorer citizens organizing protests far away from media outlets (Arias 2009). Nevertheless, Brazilian protesters are generally better protected under the democratic regime than they were prior to the transition.

nell 1994; Fung and Wright 2003; Wampler 2007; Barczak 2001; Pateman 1970 and 2012). Specifically, participatory institutions are designed to enhance the quality of democracy and improve the basic delivery of public goods to those groups historically excluded from all but the most minimal levels of state resources (Touchton and Wampler 2014). The establishment of participatory democracy is best conceptualized as a new moment of democratic state building, whereby intermediary bodies are established to further decentralize where, when, and by whom binding decisions are made.

Democratic state-building through participatory institutions is not uniform across Latin America or within each country due to the fragmentation of local and national states' capacities, the diversity of rules that guide participatory institutions, the repertories of strategies available to CSOs, and elected officials' interests (Goldfrank 2007; Migdal 2001; Scott 1998; Van Cott 2008; Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2007; Fedozzi 2001).

In Brazil the three most common participatory institutions include the widely established public policy management councils (*conselhos*), policy conferences (*conferências*), and participatory budgeting (*orçamento participativo*). There are now at least 65,000 municipal-level councils and hundreds of thousands of elected citizens that participate in these councils (Victora et al. 2011). One-quarter of medium-sized and large municipalities continue to use participatory budgeting as a policy-making and democratic tool. Presidents Lula and Dilma invested heavily in the national conference system, inducing more than 6 million people to participate over the past decade.

Table 2: Participatory Institutions in Brazil

	Numbers	Participants	Voice	Vote	Key authority
Participatory Budgeting	100+ mid-sized and large municipalities	Hundreds of thousands citizens engaged	Yes	Yes	Focus on public works
Public Policy Management Councils	65,000 councils	Hundreds of thousands citizens elected to office	Yes	Yes	Monitor government programs
National conferences	74 conferences since 2002	6 million over past decade	Yes	Partial-Broad topics	Propose general policy guidelines

Source: Authors' own compilation.

The establishment of participatory governance is now transforming when, where, and how contentious politics can be used, thereby encour-

aging us to modify Tarrow's definition of how contentious politics develop.

> Collective action becomes contentious when it is used by people *who lack regular access to institutions*, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities (Tarrow 1998: 3. Italics added).

Although participatory institutions now provide regular institutional access for large numbers of Brazilians, the Brazilian masses continue to use contentious politics as part of their political engagement repertory. This suggests that while regular access to participatory institutions increases the political opportunities available to citizens, it does not remove customary avenues of engagement.

The third analytical pillar of our argument is that Brazil's return to a neodevelopmentalist state was accompanied by an expansion of the social welfare state (Montero 2014; Sugiyama 2012). Federal, state, and municipal governments greatly expanded the number of social contracts they were able to provide. For many Brazilian CSOs, their mantra during the 1970s and 1980s was "autonomy," which reflected CSOs' efforts to maintain a healthy distance between themselves and public officials. Importantly, the overarching theme shifted to "partnership" or "cogovernance" during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century as CSOs sought to align themselves with the state and elected governments in order to secure public contracts.

In terms of accessing state contracts, middle-class CSO leaders have policy and personnel networks as well as professional skills that allow them to gain access to the expanded public resources. Thus, a combination of meritocracy (expert knowledge), know-how (ability to provide services and to "win" complex service-delivery contracts), and personnel networks (ties to political appointees, elected officials, and high-level civil servants) permits these CSOs to gain access to resources that sustain their organizations.

Conversely, social movements and CSOs whose leaders have lower SES must pursue a much more overtly politicized set of strategies in order to secure funding. These CSO leaders often lack professional skills, but instead have access to elected officials and to the poor. These CSOs are also more likely to be susceptible to co-optation because they are much more economically insecure than middle-class organizations.

In sum, Brazil's current democratic regime induces civil society leaders to play multiple formal and informal roles, acting as legislative aides, campaign workers, service delivery providers, party activists, elected representatives in participatory institutions, and community organiz-

ers. The boundaries between these roles are fluid, which means that in some venues community leaders represent the state; in other venues, a political party; and in others, the interests of their community organizations or social movements. There is now a blurring of the interests CSO leaders purportedly represent in any given venue, which is why it is vital to study cogovernance venues as one institutional process embedded in broader economic and political contexts. Within democratic regimes, especially when there are competitive local elections, the cooperation of CSOs and public officials is widespread, making it necessary to conceptualize contentious politics as one political tool in a broader repertoire of political strategies employed by CSOs to pursue their political, policy, and organizing goals.

4   What Explains Connections between the State and Civil Society?

We administered a survey to CSO leaders in seven Brazilian municipalities in 2009 and 2010 to collect data on the connections between the state and civil society.[6] One of the cities selected, Belo Horizonte, is the state capital of Minas Gerais and has a population of roughly 2.5 million residents. The other six cities are midsized, with populations between 100,000 and 250,000 people. We opted to study a greater number of midsized cities because we know much less about the interactions between the state and civil society there than we know about those in the large capital cities. These cities include Juiz De Fora, Lages, Montes Claros, Sorocaba, Uberlândia, and Vitória Da Conquista. We limited our sample to one southern city (Lages), one city in the state of São Paulo (Sorocaba), one city in the state of Bahia (Vitória Da Conquista), and three cities from the state of Minas Gerais (Juiz De Fora, Montes Claros, Uberlândia). We selected these specific cities because they exhibit considerable variation based on wealth, regional and state politics, local party system, and the configuration of civil society. We argue this variation increases the chances that any relationships we find in the data using all

---

seven of these cities will reflect the average experience of many similar Brazilian municipalities.

Our survey captures civil society leaders' activities and attitudes. These leaders are the crucial conduits linking the state to citizens and CSOs in each city. First, we obtained each city's lists of registered organizations. Then we contacted each organization and surveyed its president or another leader. The sample is comprised entirely of CSO leaders who are engaged in participatory organizations or civil society organizations that register with the municipal government to remain eligible for state contracts (*convenios*).[7] Our survey population thus includes a wide variety of professional organizations as well as local voluntary associations.

The survey asks questions about the structure of the CSO, its connection to the state, its connection to civil society, and the demographics of its leadership. For example, the survey requests information regarding whether the CSO elects or appoints its leaders, whether they have a contract to provide services with an outside organization (e.g., the state, a private firm, another nonprofit), how frequently the CSO meets. We also ask questions concerning the frequency with which the CSO has contact with local government representatives and participatory democratic institutions and about what activities the CSO pursues (e.g., street protests, council meeting attendance). A total of 863 CSO activists responded to the survey in our seven-city sample. The resulting database represents one of the largest, broadest cross-sectional surveys of CSOs in Latin America and therefore offers unique opportunities to test hypotheses and examine the conventional wisdom surrounding state–civil society relations.

We specify seven logit models with standard errors clustered on the city to explain CSOs' connection with the state and the form of political participation they use to pursue their interests. In each case we present the dependent variable from each set of models, discuss the independent variables and our specific hypotheses connecting them to the dependent variable, and then present the estimation results for each individual model. We report the raw coefficients for relationships between the inde-

---

7   In each city we contacted the municipal government to secure lists of CSOs formally registered with the municipal state. CSOs are registered with the different public policy councils, the policy conferences, and with specific departments. We attempted to contact approximately 1,200 CSOs from all seven cities. We then surveyed all 863 CSOs that responded to our initial contact. In five of the seven cities, we employed student research assistants to administer surveys to CSO leaders in person in the leaders' respective neighborhoods. We administered the survey via telephone in Belo Horizonte and Lages.

pendent and dependent variable and include the odds ratio for each variable in the Technical Appendix (see Tables 3a–7a). We construct the first set of models to answer questions about whether CSOs have contact with municipal councils, legislative assemblies, and/or members of the mayor's cabinet.

4.1   Dependent Variable 1: Contact with the State

Our data captures the range of contact CSOs had with municipal, state, and federal institutions in the form of participatory democratic institutions, the municipal legislative council, the state legislature, and the mayor's office for the two months prior to responding to the survey. We use the responses to generate four dichotomous variables with scores of 1 indicating that participation or contact has occurred and 0 indicating that it has not. Out of the entire sample, 77 percent of CSOs attended participatory council meetings, 65 percent attended national conferences, 48 percent contacted the municipal legislature, and 63 percent contacted the mayor's office.

We use CSO leaders' formal participation in state institutions and informal contact with different government officials to measure overall engagement between the state and civil society. Explaining the frequency with which CSO leaders participate in formal policy-making bodies and contact different branches of the state can help us understand the motivation behind CSO activities and also provides an indication of the current configuration of state–civil society relations in Brazil.

4.2   Key Independent Variable: The City's Wealth

We first want to know whether a city's wealth accounts for CSOs' political activities. We hypothesize that CSOs in relatively wealthy cities are likely to engage the state less than CSOs in relatively poor cities, thus revealing a wealth dimension to clientelistic exchanges. For instance, CSOs in poorer municipalities rely on state institutions and public and party officials to secure scarce resources in order to help their community members get access to basic services. In contrast, CSOs in wealthy municipalities have more resources, are more professionalized, and have more connections with civil society than in poorer cities. They will therefore find it less necessary to rely on the state for support. Though state support may offer benefits, it may also carry a cost that CSOs in wealthier cities do not need to pay.

We use the log of each municipality's local GDP/capita as the first proxy for access to resources. We recognize, however, that this is an

incomplete proxy for the wealth of a CSO's membership or the re-sources CSOs themselves might have. Brazilian cities feature populations representing diverse economic experiences. Wealthy cities contain many poor neighborhoods and poor cities contain wealthy neighborhoods. Accounting for the particular submunicipal context in which a CSO operates is important to assess whether a CSO's relative wealth impacts its behavior. We therefore use the household income of the survey re-spondents as an additional proxy for our CSOs' economic contexts. Although this measure provides more refined information about CSOs' submunicipal economic environments, it still requires two different as-sumptions about the CSO leaders' household incomes. First, we assume that leaders with higher incomes are associated with "professional" or third-sector NGOs and thus work on behalf of an issue or community without necessarily being a potential recipient of the public good. Sec-ond, we assume that low-income respondents are working with a "com-munity-based organization" in which they seek to secure public goods that would directly benefit their communities.

4.3   Key Independent Variable:
The CSO Administrator's Household Income

We collect data on the monthly household income of each CSO adminis-trator that responded to our surveys. This variable takes on the values of different salary bands corresponding to the following monthly household income levels: (1) up to USD 250, (2) USD 251 to USD 500, (3) USD 501 to USD 1,000, (4) USD 1,001 to USD 1,750, (5) USD 1,751 to USD 2,650, and (6) above USD 2,651. Our data show that 16 percent fall within salary band 1; 22 percent, in band 2; 34 percent, in band 3; 12 percent, in band 4; 8 percent, in band 5; and 8 percent, in band 6.

4.4   Control Variables

The Mayor's Party: New forms of democratic participation and the strengthening of civil society have been the centerpiece of the PT's na-tional agenda over the last decade. PT mayors and CSOs often share a pro-poor bias and are thus likely to cooperate at greater rates, on aver-age, than CSOs and non-PT mayors. Furthermore, poorer populations targeted by CSOs and the PT are almost always disengaged from politics. Incorporating the poor and politically disengaged into the city's policy-making architecture would theoretically increase the likelihood of poorer citizens voting in city elections. These new voters would most likely vote

for left-wing parties who propose downward redistribution of city reve-
nue. Conventional wisdom therefore suggests that left-wing mayors
would champion CSO programs not only because their downwardly
redistributive, poverty reducing policy platforms are popular with many
CSOs, but also because they want to bring new left-wing voters to the
polls.

In general, we expect PT mayors to have greater opportunities to
support state-society interaction and CSO engagement than non-PT
mayors both through resources from the national government and the
party and through a greater motivation to align with ideological policy.
We anticipate CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors will have greater
interaction with the state, will be more likely to elect their leaders than
CSOs operating in municipalities with non-PT mayors, and will be less
likely to use protest as a form of political participation. If the "protest"
part of our assumption is correct, it suggests that the PT's longtime base
will change their political strategies when the PT is in power, thus raising
the likelihood of co-optation. We use a dichotomous variable to test
whether CSOs in municipalities with PT mayors (coded 1; accounts for
percent) behave systematically differently from CSOs in municipalities
with non-PT mayors (coded 0; accounts for 54 percent).

4.5   Whether CSOs Hold Government Contracts

We collect data on whether CSOs are contracted to provide services for
an external entity. This entity is almost always one tier of Brazil's federal
system, but it could also be a foreign government, a domestic charitable
organization, or an international nonprofit – even the Catholic Church.

We hypothesize that CSOs with state contracts are likely to have
more interaction with the state due to such contracts. We also think that
CSOs with government contracts are less likely to protest against the
state; this may be due to having a contract with the state in some cases,
but may also be due to the professionalization that comes with having a
contract to provide services. The direct responsibilities to fulfill contracts
become relatively more important compared to some of the CSOs' other
long-term missions. For example, a contract creates a financial incentive
to focus on providing services and may not leave time for political pro-
test. Simply put, a contract for service delivery can transform CSOs from
crusaders into managers. Furthermore, CSOs that receive contracts are
likely to be the most professionalized and the most focused on service
delivery and are most likely to pursue their missions through means
beyond public protests in the first place.

We employ a dichotomous variable to ascertain whether CSOs are under contract (coded 1; accounts for 46 percent) or not (coded 0; accounts for 54 percent).

4.6   Whether the CSO Elects its Leadership

We expect CSOs' organizational structure to impact their contact with the state and their form of political participation. Broadly speaking, some CSOs elect their leaders, whereas others appoint them from their membership. Elected leaders may have different incentives driving their behavior than appointed leaders. For example, an elected leader may have a strong incentive to mobilize CSO membership for a protest because public protest is a highly visible way to demonstrate a leader's commitment to action on behalf of the organization. Additionally, organizations that elect their leaders may have a natural affinity with democratically elected state representatives. These similarities may lead to greater contact between CSOs with elected leaders and the state than between CSOs with appointed leaders and the state. Similarly, elected CSO leaders may be ambitious and interested in using their positions to network with public officials, gain experience with the state, and/or expand their career opportunities. Finally, internal CSO elections allow ordinary participants to hold their leaders accountable, as candidates for CSO leadership positions must demonstrate their engagement in a variety of policy venues – possibly beyond protest activities.

To test these hypotheses, we use a dichotomous variable to determine whether CSOs elect their leaders (coded 1; accounts for 14 percent) or appoint their leaders (coded 0; accounts for 86 percent).

4.7   Contact with Other State Entities

We anticipate that CSOs inclined to work with one state entity will have a greater chance of contacting and attempting to work with another state entity. This may occur if a CSO's initial state contact does not produce the expected outcomes, thus leading the CSO to solicit help from another state entity or patron. The CSO could also pursue contacts with multiple state entities at once to generate better outcomes as a client or simply because the first state entity is not able to resolve a CSO's problem or provide it with a service.

We code a variable that measures the number of state entities a CSO reports having had contact with during the six months prior to our survey (not including the branch of the state for the DV in Tables 3 and 4). The minimum amount of contact is 0 and the maximum is 5. The

mean number of entities with which CSOs interact is 1.57 and the stand-
ard deviation is 0.46.

Table 3: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010

Independent Variables	Coeff. for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Coeff. for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	-0.24** (0.00)	-0.20** (0.03)	-0.19** (0.02)	-0.18** (0.0005)
Mayor's Party	-0.51 (0.29)	-0.39 (0.33)	-0.44 (0.35)	-0.37 (0.31)
CSO Contract	0.68** (0.11)	0.76** (0.08)	0.55** (0.10)	0.74** (0.03)
Elected Leaders	0.10* (0.04)	0.13* (0.05)	0.02** (0.001)	0.13** (0.03)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	0.17** (0.04)	0.17** (0.03)	0.19* (0.08)	0.18** (0.04)
Constant	1.37 (0.74)	2.15** (0.62)	1.66 (0.79)	1.30* (0.38)
Log Likelihood	-316.49	-274.07	-288.61	-301.93
Wald X^2 (4)	163	167	164	164
N	840	823	854	825
Pseudo R^2	0.34	0.26	0.29	0.39

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the
State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using CSO Admin-
istrators' Household Incomes)

Independent Variables	Coeff. for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Coeff. for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Administrator's Household Income	-0.35** (0.07)	-0.27** (0.05)	-0.25** (0.03)	-0.37** (0.06)
Mayor's Party	-0.49 (0.29)	-0.46 (0.28)	-0.45 (0.29)	-0.25 (0.18)
CSO Contract	0.59** (0.10)	0.64** (0.06)	0.61** (0.10)	0.64** (0.12)
Elected Leaders	0.03** (0.01)	0.21** (0.03)	0.04** (0.01)	0.13 ** (0.02)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	0.19* (0.08)	0.18** (0.04)	0.23** (0.05)	0.21* (0.09)
Constant	1.20 (0.85)	1.73 (0.87)	1.41 (0.90)	1.44* (0.67)

Independent Variables	Coeff. for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Coeff. for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Log Likelihood	-308.83	-325.37	-296.48	-319.27
Wald X^2 (4)	167	168	166	160
N	851	836	853	848
Pseudo R^2	0.33	0.27	0.26	0.31

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

4.8   Results for *Formal Policy Making, Informal contact with state officials* as Dependent Variables

First, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that both formal and informal CSO contact with participatory democracy *decreases* as the city in which CSOs are located gets wealthier. Similarly, CSO engagement with the state *decreases* as CSO administrator household income increases. The direction of these relationships is consistent across model specifications and statistically significant in each case. The relationships hold for CSO contact with other branches of the state as well: the odds of CSOs having recent contact with public officials decrease as city wealth and CSO administrator household income increase – in some cases, by almost 40 percent per unit increase. This suggests that compared to CSOs from municipalities with a mean level of logged GDP/capita, those with logged GDP/capita of one standard deviation above the mean are estimated to have on average up to 32 percent less contact with the state when holding all other variables constant at their means. This finding provides support for the resource mobilization argument: CSOs become less dependent on the state as the wealth of their community grows (Buechler 1993; Jenkins 1983).

Second, the results in Tables 3 and 4 show that CSOs with elected leaders are more likely to have contact with participatory democracy and other state entities than are CSOs with appointed leaders. This is important because it suggests that CSO members expect leaders to show evidence of their organizations' progress and represent members' interests to the state. The willingness of elected CSO leaders to interact with the state (controlling for the CSO leaders' SES) might reflect high expectations and accountability as CSO leaders who fail to showcase their efforts through interaction with the state may be voted out of office. This is updated evidence for the "participatory publics" argument, which draws attention to the use of democratic practices inside of CSOs (Avritzer 2002; Wampler and Avritzer 2004).

Third, the results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate having a contract increases the likelihood of contact with the state by approximately five times relative to organizations without a contract. This suggests that contracts not only provide CSOs with payments for services but also create and strengthen connections between the state and civil society. We create an interaction term for CSO leaders' income and for whether the CSO has a state contract. The results of the estimation presented in Table 5 show that CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and state contracts are more likely to engage with the state than are CSOs with only wealthy leaders.

Table 5: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010 (Using an Interaction between CSO Administrators' Household Incomes and State Contracts)

Independent Variables	Coeff. for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Coeff. for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Coeff. for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Administrator's Household Income *Contract (Conditional Coeff. for High Income, with contract)	-0.11** (0.02)	-0.18** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.04)	-0.20** (0.03)
Administrator's Income	-0.31 (0.22)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.46* (0.22)	-0.20 (0.18)
CSO Contract	0.73** (0.18)	0.70** (0.16)	0.62** (0.18)	0.87** (0.21)
Mayor's Party	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.15)
Elected Leaders	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.07** (0.02)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	0.01 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	1.58* (0.70)	1.70* (0.74)	1.94 (1.36)	1.15* (0.39)
Log Likelihood	-341.85	-310.50	-328.73	-274.09
Wald X^2 (4)	170	177	164	168
N	843	839	851	851
Pseudo R^2	0.34	0.36	0.38	0.42

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

We also evaluate CSO assessments of learning following state contact and participation in state institutions. The results in Table 5a of the Technical Appendix help corroborate some of our arguments about wealth and CSOs' reliance on the state. CSOs from wealthier cities and

with wealthier administrators are less likely to feel that attending educational workshops is beneficial than are CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer leaders. Thus the CSOs with potentially fewer resources have more contact with the state and they express satisfaction with regard to that contact – at least in the form of claiming to have gained beneficial knowledge of how government works by attending workshops. In contrast, CSOs with potentially more resources are, on average, less likely to have contact with the state and less likely to find that contact beneficial in terms of workshops.

Our data reveals a general trend where CSOs in wealthier cities and with wealthier leaders are distant from formal politics. It appears that wealthier CSOs already have the resources, knowledge, and connections to pursue their interests without relying on the state. CSOs in wealthy areas and with wealthy leaders are likely to be more professionalized and perhaps have organizational advantages, which means that they do not need the state as much as CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer leaders do. However, the relationships we find in the data could also stem from state officials' attempts to shield themselves and their agencies from pressure. Under this conceptual framework public officials might reasonably expect CSOs with more resources to make greater demands, deploy greater resources, and use greater connections in government to pursue their interests compared to CSOs with relatively fewer options. Interactions with well-resourced CSOs may therefore present public officials with more political trouble than benefits.

5   Forms of Participation: What Explains Public Protests?

Finally, we assess what drives CSOs to participate in public demonstrations. Public demonstrations represent a visible but blunt form of political participation. Mass protest can also potentially have an outsize impact relative to its cost due to the high visibility of demonstrations and the large voting blocs the poor represent in Brazil, where other forms of participation are relatively closed to poorer citizens.

5.1   Dependent Variable: CSO Participation in Protests

We collect data on whether CSOs organized or participated in a public demonstration in the previous six months. The variable is coded 1 if such participation occurred in the six months prior to the survey (42 percent of CSOs) and 0 if it did not (58 percent of CSOs) did not. We

specify two additional models to identify the determinants of protest participation among CSOs.

5.2 Key Independent Variable: Wealth of Cities and CSO Administrators

Citizens and CSOs in poorer cities are likely to rely on the state more than CSOs in wealthier cities. As a result, politicians may be vulnerable to public pressure because their ability to retain office in these cities often depends on maintaining majority support of the poor – the largest group of Brazilian voters. CSOs in poorer cities or communities will therefore be more likely to use public protest to participate and to put political pressure on the state than CSOs in wealthier cities and communities. However, CSOs in poor cities, whose leaders have low SES, may protest because they lack other means to express their grievances, not necessarily because they are more dependent on public services. Our point here is that much like with CSO-state interaction above, more professional CSOs have different ways of engaging public officials and do not need to use mass protest to achieve their goals.

Table 6: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Participation in Protests in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010

Independent Variables	Coefficient (SE)	Coefficient (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	-0.46**	
	(0.01)	
Administrator's Household Income		-0.22**
		(0.01)
Mayor's Party	0.06	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)
CSO Contract	-0.12**	-0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Elected Leaders	0.11*	0.07*
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Contact with the State	-0.05**	-0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.18**	2.33**
	(0.36)	(0.29)
Log Likelihood	-310.53	-321.78
Wald X^2 (4)	173	162
N	839	824
Pseudo R^2	0.34	0.36

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

We find several important connections between CSOs' characteristics and their likelihood of protesting. First, the probability of protesting decreases as city wealth and CSO leader household income increase. This

is similar to our finding with regard to contact with the state, in the sense that CSOs with access to more resources do not need to use public demonstrations to pursue their goals. Relatively well-resourced CSOs may see such protests as inefficient types of political participation and use them only as a last resort when its resources, knowledge base, and connections fail. In contrast, CSOs in poorer cities and with poorer leaders may have fewer options and may thus find protests attractive due to the attention they generate and the familiarity they have with this form of participation. Our results draw connections between wealth, contact with the state, and participation in protests. The implication is that CSOs in poorer cities are still using one of two strategies that have maintained them for decades: protest or clientelism (Roniger 2004). These organizations have not abandoned political contestation, because it remains a viable means for them to pressure the state and because the new democratic institutions may not be working as well as they should be.

Second, we find that CSOs with contracts are less likely to protest than are CSOs without contracts. This provides added support for the argument that CSOs in the poorer cities still use protest or clientelism. The results also suggest that civil society has undergone a process of professionalization and that the state has possibly co-opted CSOs through the offer contracts, as CSOs with contracts are engaged in participatory democratic institutions, not street protests.

The government contract and wealth variables let us assess whether wealth, professionalization, or co-optation drives CSO strategies with regard to political participation. We interact CSO administrator household income with CSO contract to determine whether wealthy CSOs with contracts are less likely to protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders and contracts, (ii) CSOs with poor leaders but without contracts, (iii) or CSOs with wealthy leaders but without contracts. The model below allows us to generate estimates for different configurations of CSO administrator household income and CSO contracts.

CSOs with relatively wealthy leaders and contracts are less likely to protest than (i) CSOs with poor leaders and contracts, (ii) CSOs with wealthy leaders but without contracts, and (iii) CSOs with poor leaders but without contracts. This provides some evidence of professionalization, rather than of co-optation in terms of contracts, likely CSO resources, and participation in protests. CSOs whose administrators have household incomes one standard deviation above the mean and who have state contracts are the least likely to have attended a protest, all else being equal.

Table 7: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010)

Independent Variables	Uncond. Coeff. (SE)	High Income, Contract	High Income, No Contract	Low Income, Contract	Low Income, No Contract
Contract*Administrator's Household Income (logged)	-0.76 ** (0.10)	-0.84** (0.05)		-0.65** (0.03)	
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Mayor's Party	0.09 (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07* (0.03)
CSO Contract	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Contact with the State	0.10 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.06* (0.02)
Elected Leaders	0.21 (0.15)	0.17 (0.14)	0.09* (0.04)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.25* (0.10)
Constant	1.07 ** (0.22)	0.51 (0.55)	1.45* (0.63)	0.66 (0.48)	1.59* (0.51)
Log Likelihood	-285.30	-271.06	-254.93	-307.21	-312.75
Wald X^2 (4)	154	133	147	149	169
N	817	143	215	120	339
Pseudo R^2	0.37	0.45	0.34	0.32	0.51

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

CSOs whose administrators' incomes are one standard deviation above the mean but do not have state contracts are the next least likely to have attended a protest. CSOs with relatively poor administrators but that have contracts are the next least likely to protest, which is a 16 percent lower probability than the CSOs most likely to protest – those without contracts and with relatively poor administrators. The diminished likelihood of political protest by poorer CSOs with contracts suggests that state co-optation may also be present in Brazil's new participatory environment.

6   Robustness Checks

We perform a series of robustness checks to assess the stability of our results and thoroughly test our hypotheses.[8] First, we create new interaction terms to assess whether the mayor's party exerts a different level of influence on relatively wealthy CSOs compared to relatively poor CSOs.

---

8   These models are available in the Technical Appendix.

None of these interaction terms have a statistical impact on CSOs' interaction with the state or the likelihood of CSOs participating in a protest. We also assess whether a left-leaning council majority influences the behavior of CSOs by coding a variable to indicate a left-leaning council majority relative to a non-left-leaning council majority – again with no results. This implies the mayor's party has little impact on CSO behavior in our sample – no matter how we construct the variables in our models. We also use CSO administrator education levels as a proxy for CSO memberships' relative education and wealth to check our primary models' measures. CSOs' frequency of state contact and protest decrease as the respondent's education increases. Our results for all models thus remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. Finally, the low correlations among the independent variables in Table 8 of the Technical Appendix suggest there are no concerns about multicollinearity in our models.[9]

7   Conclusions

This article captures how Brazil's recent political reforms frame the interactions between the state and civil society. The extension of civil liberties protection under representative democracy, the establishment of participatory institutions, and the growth of state services provided by CSOs all influence how Brazilian CSOs engage with the state. Our results reflect politics throughout Latin America, where civil society organization has expanded among poor and middle-class communities (Oxhorn 2011; Schönwälder 2010). Democratization, institutional reform, and the growth of the middle class offers CSOs new opportunities to pursue their interests in ways distinct from earlier civil society mobilizations under authoritarian governments (Fox 1996; Rueschemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In this case, Brazilian civil society has been "thickening" over the last 20 years as it has been in many other middle-income Latin American democracies, such as Argentina (Friedman and Hochstetler 2002), Chile (Oxhorn 1995), Colombia (Romero 2002; Hurtado, Kawachi, and Sudarsky 2011), Costa Rica (Carneiro, Matos, and Husted 2015), Mexico (Haynes 2013), and Uruguay (Burt, Amilivia, and Lessa 2013). CSOs in these countries now have new opportunities, which are also likely conditioned by their particular representational environment – as Friedman and Hochstetler found in their comparison of Brazil and Argentina (2002).

---

9   Our variables' variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all under 5 as well.

Our empirical findings suggest that in Brazil CSOs in poor cities and those in wealthy cities but with low-income leaders pursue a combination of direct contact with public officials, participatory democracy, and contentious demonstrations. CSOs from relatively poor cities and with relatively poor leaders engage with the state at greater rates than CSOs in relatively rich areas and with richer leaders even though conventional wisdom suggests they would not do so (White 1999; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager 2005). This set of results reflects scholarship on contentious politics in a new moment, where the state is newly and heavily involved in the political life of the poor (Tarrow 1998). Direct involvement in new democratic institutions does not decrease the likelihood of direct action (protests and contentious activities). Rather, it relies on government contracts (outsourcing), which has the larger effect of decreasing CSOs' likelihood of using protest as a political strategy.

Our results also suggest that CSOs in wealthier cities and with wealthier leaders are evolving into third-sector organizations that provide services or distance themselves from the state as private financial resources become more prevalent through economic growth. This finding illuminates the importance of opportunities within Brazil's neodevelopmentalist state, which leads middle-class CSO participants to use their expert knowledge and technical skills to engage public officials in new ways rather than resorting to contentious politics. CSOs in poorer communities are not necessarily abandoning clientelism or contentious politics, but they are moving beyond a narrow set of choices in order to pursue their interests. Although the state has expanded and engages with the poor in some areas, the poor continue to seek the state out to make their voice heard and gain voting power at the same time.

Finally, these results support scholarship on the reconfiguration of civil society in Latin America following democratization (Brysk 2000; Booth and Richard 1998; Wampler and Avritzer 2004). New repertoires of political action are now available to CSOs, including involvement in party politics, campaigns and elections, incremental policy making, contentious politics, and economic boycotts, inter alia. Opportunities to engage in collective action are more readily available in the current democratic environment, especially in comparison to the extreme difficulties experienced under military dictatorships. New challenges for collective action correspond to the broad diversity of activities CSOs find necessary to achieve their goals. For instance, CSOs must mobilize citizens, engage in incremental policy making, work on campaigns and elections (but not get too close to party officials), and develop broader social and policy networks. Achieving these goals has gained relevance in recent

decades as CSOs build stronger connections between democratic states and society. Understanding how and why CSOs build these connections is thus critical to understanding how democracy works – particularly at the local level. We argue that Brazilian CSO strategies depend on the interaction between a political community's wealth, the protection of basic civil liberties, the proliferation of new democratic institutions, and the outsourcing of state contracts. In this respect, our research describes and explains important connections between Brazilian democracy and civil society. It also provides a framework for exploring these connections elsewhere in Latin America and, potentially, around the world.

References

Abers, Rebecca, and Margaret Keck (2013), *Practical Authority: Agency and Institutional Change in Brazilian Water Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abers, Rebecca, and Margaret Keck (2009), Mobilizing the State: The Erratic Partner in Brazil's Participatory Water, in: *Politics & Society*, 37, 2, 289–314.

Alexander, Jeffrey (2006), *The Civil Sphere*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Álvarez, Sonia (1990), *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Arias, Enrique (2009), *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Avritzer, Leonardo (2009), *Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Avritzer, Leonardo (2002), *Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2005), *Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porto Alegre*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, Patrick Heller, and Marcelo Silva (2011), *Bootstrapping Democracy: Transforming Local Governance and Civil Society in Brazil*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

Barczak, Monica (2001), Representation by Consultation? The Rise of Direct Democracy in Latin America, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43, 3, 37–60.

Booth, John, and Patricia Richard (1998), Civil Society, Political Capital, and Democratization in Central America, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 60, 3, 780–800.

Bresser-Pereira, Luiz, and Nuria Grau (1999), Entre o Estado e o merca-do: o público não-estatal, in: *O público não-estatal na reforma do Estado*, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getulio Vargas, 15–48.

Bresser-Pereira, Luiz, and Peter Spink (1998), *Reforma do Estado e Administração Pública Gerencial*, Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Brysk, Allison (2000), Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 11, 3, 151–165.

Buechler, Steven (1993), Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory, in: *The Sociological Quarterly*, 34, 2, 217–235.

Burt, Jo-Marie, Gabriela Amilivia, and Francesca Lessa (2013), Civil Society and the Resurgent Struggle against Impunity in Uruguay (1986–2012), in: *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 7, 2, 306–327.

Carneiro, Jorge, Nancy Matos, and Bryan Husted (2015), Free Markets and Social Inclusion: Toward a Common Goal, in: *Journal of Business Research*, 68, 2, 173–176.

Castañeda, Jorge (1993), *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left and the Cold War*, New York: Random House.

Cohen, Jean, and Andrew Arato (1992), *Political Theory and Civil Society*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cornwall, Andrea, and Vera Schatten Coelho (eds) (2007), *Spaces for Change? The Politics of Citizen Participation in New Democratic Arenas*, London: Zed Books.

Dagnino, Evelina (1998), The Cultural Politics of Citizenship, Democracy and the State, in: Sonia Álvarez and Evelina Dagnino (eds), *Cultures of Politics/Politics of Cultures: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements*, Boulder: Westview Press, 33–61.

Dagnino, Evelina (1994), Os Movimentos Sociais e a Emergência de Uma Nova Noção de Cidadania, in: Evelina Dagnino (ed.), *Anos 90: Política e Sociedade no Brasil*, São Paulo: Brasiliense, 103–115.

Dagnino, Evelina, and Luciana Tatagiba (2007), *Democracia, sociedade civil e participação*, Chapecó: Argos 26.

Escobar, Arturo, and Sonia Álvarez (eds) (1992), *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Fedozzi, Luciano (2001), *Orçamento participativo. Reflexões sobre a experiência de Porto Alegre*, Tomo Editorial.

Fox, Jonathan (2007), The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability, in: *Development in Practice*, 17, 4–5, 663–671.

Fox, Jonathan (1996), How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural Mexico, in: *World Development*, 24, 6, 1089–1103.

Friedman, Elisabeth, and Kathryn Hochstetler (2002), Assessing the Third Transition in Latin American Democratization: Representational Regimes and Civil Society in Argentina and Brazil, in: *Comparative Politics*, 35, 1, 21–42.

Fung, Archon, and Erik Wright (2003), Thinking about Empowered Participatory Governance, in: Archon Fung and Erik Wright (eds), *Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance*, (= The Real Utopias Project 4), New York: Verso.

Goldfrank, Benjamin (2007), The Politics of Deepening Local Democracy: Decentralization, Party Institutionalization, and Participation, in: *Comparative Politics*, 39, 2, 147–168.

Grindle, Merilee (2002), Despite the Odds: The Political Economy of Social Sector Reform in Latin America, in: Christopher Abel and Colin M. Lewis (eds), *Exclusion and Engagement: Social Policy in Latin America*, London: University of London, 83–111.

Hagopian, Frances (1996), *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Haynes, Jeffrey (2013), *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World: Politics and New Political Movements*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Heller, Patrick (2012), Democracy, Participatory Politics and Development: Some Comparative Lessons from Brazil, India and South Africa, in: *Polity*, 44, 4, 643–665.

Heller, Patrick, and Peter Evans (2011), Taking Tilly South: Durable Inequalities, Democratic Condensation, and Citizenship in Southern Metropolis, in: Michael Hanagan and Chris Tilly (eds), *Contention and Trust in Cities and States*, New York: Springer, 305–323.

Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Margaret Keck (2007), *Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in State and Society*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Hunter, Wendy (2010), *The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2009*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hurtado, David, Ichiro Kawachi, and John Sudarsky (2011), Social Capital and Self-rated Health in Colombia: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, in: *Social Science & Medicine*, 72, 4, 584–590.

Jacobi, Pedro (1989), *Movimentos Sociais e Políticas Públicas – Demandas por Saneamento Básico e Saúde, 1974–1984*, São Paulo: Cortez.

Jenkins, J. Craig (1983), Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, in: *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9, 527–553.

Keck, Margaret (1992), *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kinzo, Maria D'Alva (1996), Eleição presidencial de 1994 no Brasil: Fernando Henrique e o Plano Real, in: *América Latina, o Desafio da Democracia Nos Anos 90*, Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade/ UFRGS – Associação de Universidades Grupo Montevideo.

Lavalle, Adrián, Arnab Acharya, and Peter Houtzager (2005), Beyond Comparative Anecdotalism: Lessons on Civil Society and Participation from São Paulo, Brazil, in: *World Development*, 33, 6, 951–964.

McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (1996), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly (2003), Dynamics of Contention, in: *Social Movement Studies*, 2, 1, 99–102.

Migdal, Joel (2001), *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Montero, Alfred (2014), *Brazil: Reversal of Fortune*, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 5, 1, 55–69.

Oxhorn, Philip (2011), *Sustaining Civil Society: Economic Change, Democracy, and the Social Construction of Citizenship in Latin America*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Oxhorn, Philip (1995), *Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Pateman, Carole (2012), Participatory Democracy Revisited, in: *Perspectives on Politics*, 10, 1, 7–19.

Pateman, Carole (1970), *Participation and Democratic Theory*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pires, Roberto (2011), *Efetividade das instituições participativas no Brasil: estratégias de avaliação*, Brasilia: IPEA.

Romero, Mauricio (2002), Paz, reformas y cambios en la sociedad civil colombiana, in: A. Panfichi (ed.), *Sociedad civil, esfera pública y democratización en América Latina: Andes y Cono Sur*, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú: Fondo de Cultura Económica, Lima, Perú, 331–354.

Roniger, Luis (2004), Political *Clientelism*, Democracy, and Market Economy, in: *Comparative Politics*, 36, 3, 353–375.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992), *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sandbrook, Richard, Marc Edelman, Patrick Heller, and Judith Teichman (2007), *Social Democracy in the Global Periphery: Origins, Challenges, Prospects,* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schönwälder, Gerd (2010), *Linking Civil Society and the State: Urban Popular Movements, the Left, and Local Government in Peru, 1980–1992*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Scott, James C. (1998), *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Stepan, Alfred C. (ed.) (1989), *Democratizing Brazil: Problems of Transition and Consolidation*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Sugiyama, Natasha (2012), *Diffusion of Good Government: Social Sector Reforms in Brazil*, South Bend: Notre Dame University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney (1998²), *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles (2004), *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Touchton, Michael, and Brian Wampler (2014), Improving Social Well-Being through New Democratic Institutions, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 47, 10, 1442–1469.

UNDP see United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Development Programme (2013), *Human Development Report*, New York: United Nations.

United Nations Development Programme (2010), *Brasil: Ponto a Ponto*, New York: United Nations.

Van Cott, Donna Lee (2008), *Radical Democracy in the Andes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Victora, Cesar, Mauricio L. Barreto, Maria do Carmo Leal, Carlos A. Monteiro, Maria Ines Schmidt, Jairnilson Paim, and Francisco I. Bastos (2011), Health Conditions and Health-Policy Innovations in Brazil: The Way Forward, in: *The Lancet*, 377, 9782, 2042–2053.

Wampler, Brian (2007), *Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Wampler, Brian, and Leonardo Avritzer (2004), Participatory Publics: Civil Society and New Institutions in Democratic Brazil, in: *Comparative Politics*, 36, 3, 291–312.

White, Sarah (1999), NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of Representing the Poor, in: *Development and Change*, 30, 2, 307–326.

Wolford, Wendy (2010), Participatory Democracy by Default: Land Reform, Social Movements and the State in Brazil, in: *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 37, 1, 91–109.

World Bank (2014), *Brazil: Country Program Evaluation*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, online: <http://documents.worldbank.org/cura ted/en/2014/10/20352049/brazil-country-program-evaluation-fy 2004-11-evaluation-world-bank-group-program> (10 January 2015).

Yashar, Deborah (2005), *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Contratante, contestando, e cooptação: Estratégias de Organizações da Sociedade Civil sob novos regimes institucionais

Resumo: A sociedade civil aumentou nos últimos 30 anos na América Latina num processo paralelo a construção das regimes democráticas. As organizações da sociedade civil (OSCs) são, frequentemente, colocados como uma opção para promover as melhorias na governança, na controle social e na aumenta do capital social. Mas, temos um conhecimento limitado sobre o que motiva as estratégias políticas das OSCs, que incluem a participação em instituições políticas formais, atendendo manifestações, e prestação de serviços. Neste artigo, nós estamos contribuindo ao conhecimento sobre sociedade civil baseado numa pesquisa de novecentos OSCs em sete cidades brasileiras. No artigo, nos mostramos vários processos paralelos: As OSCs mais pobres continuam a participar ativamente em varios processos políticos, incluindo as instituições participativas, as campanhas eleitoras e na politica de protestas portanto, Também argumentamos que a retirada das OSC relativamente ricas reflete uma maior mobilização de recursos, mais profissionalização, e um aumento do capital social que e' independente das novas instituições participativas. Nossos resultados mostram que as explicações de várias camadas melhoram a nossa compreensão do comportamento das OSCs e estado-sociedade relações no Brasil e na América Latina.

Palavras chaves: Brasil, a sociedade civil, a participação, os movimentos sociais, a reforma institucional, a democratização

Technical Appendix

Table 3a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the Odds Ratios for each dependent variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	0.78** (0.00)	0.81** (0.03)	0.92** (0.02)	0.91** (0.0005)
Mayor's Party	0.56 (0.29)	0.74 (0.33)	0.62 (0.35)	0.74 (0.31)
CSO Contract	5.15** (0.68)	6.24** (0.33)	4.23** (0.59)	6.10** (0.47)
Elected Leaders	1.07** (0.11)	1.15* (0.08)	1.001** (0.10)	1.14** (0.03)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.28** (0.04)	1.28** (0.03)	1.36* (0.08)	1.24** (0.04)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

PT mayors may privilege the expansion of civil society relative to mayors from other parties and may therefore encourage CSO-state interaction and promote CSO contracts among wealthy *and* poor CSOs. We want to know if CSOs in relatively wealthy cities with PT mayors have more interaction with the state than under other political circumstances. Similarly, we want to know if CSOs in relatively poor cities protest less when the mayor is from the PT (and thus potentially supports pro-poor policies) than when there is a non-PT mayor in office. Table 3a.1 presents the results of estimation using these variables.

Table 3a.1: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the results of adding an interaction term to Model 1 to determine whether PT mayors in wealthy municipalities have more interaction with the state. We find no statistical connection between PT mayors interacted with city wealth and contact with the state.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Mayor's Party* Administrator's Income (Logged)	1.06 (0.22)	1.05 (0.21)	0.96 (0.30)	1.16 (0.31)
Mayor's Party	0.81 (0.05)	0.85 (0.21)	0.65 (0.20)	1.11 (0.13)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	1.34* (0.04)	1.37* (0.15)	1.31** (0.07)	1.46* (0.18)
CSO Contract	4.01** (0.23)	5.16** (0.40)	3.98** (0.77)	5.38** (0.59)

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Elected Leaders	1.13*	1.10*	1.09**	1.05**
	(0.15)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.33)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.26**	1.20**	1.41*	1.27**
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.13)
Constant	1.25	2.15	1.79**	1.34
	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.24)	(0.51)
Log Likelihood	-283.70	-307.43	-264.36	-321.92
Wald X^2 (4)	160	168	155	159
N	855	849	854	830
Pseudo R^2	0.35	0.31	0.39	0.34

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3a.2: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We also assess the above possibilities using a variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning council majority. We find no statistically significant results using this variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Council Partisanship*Administrator's Household Income (Logged)	1.08	1.01	0.97	1.06
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.18)
Council Partisanship	0.79	0.82	0.85	0.71
	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.30)
Administrator's Income	1.10**	1.09*	1.10**	1.08**
	(0.18)	(0.30)	(0.17)	(0.21)
CSO Contract	4.37**	6.26**	4.92*	5.68**
	(0.48)	(0.31)	(0.60)	(0.54)
Elected Leaders	1.17**	1.14**	1.08**	1.19*
	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.33)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.13**	1.12**	1.17**	1.14**
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	1.41	2.09	1.52	1.35
	(0.45)	(0.38)	(0.62)	(0.21)
Log Likelihood	-290.14	-315.29	-288.74	-303.67
Wald X^2 (4)	169	173	177	173
N	843	850	847	852
Pseudo R^2	0.30	0.24	0.29	0.30

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3a.3: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. We substitute the administrator's level of education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO interaction with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary models.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Coun- cil Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Munici- pal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Administrator's Education	0.89**	0.84**	0.85**	0.81**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Mayor's Party	0.55	0.72	0.67	0.68
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.35)
CSO Contract	5.07**	5.93**	4.69**	5.85**
	(0.65)	(0.37)	(0.62)	(0.40)
Elected Leaders	1.07**	1.09*	1.02**	1.08**
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.17)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.41**	1.26**	1.37*	1.32**
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.35)	(0.28)
Constant	1.48	1.77	1.52	1.31
	(0.65)	(0.80)	(0.83)	(0.47)
Log Likelihood	-296.91	-322.15	-313.02	-326.57
Wald X^2 (4)	160	166	161	162
N	851	830	836	833
Pseudo R^2	0.27	0.22	0.31	0.30

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 3a.4: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. Our results for all models remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table presents the results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Coun- cil Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Munici- pal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	0.83**	0.82**	0.85**	0.81**
	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Mayor's Party	0.64	0.57	0.63	0.60
	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.47)	(0.35)
CSO Contract	4.55**	6.13**	4.75**	5.81**
	(0.46)	(0.31)	(0.69)	(0.27)
Elected Leaders	1.16**	1.10*	1.13**	1.03**
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.34)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.21**	1.23**	1.41*	1.45**
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.12)
Constant	1.42	1.91	1.47	1.25
	(0.78)	(0.32)*	(0.44)	(0.58)
Log Likelihood	-301.83	-310.53	-327.04	-315.49
Wald X^2 (4)	169	179	173	172

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a City Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
N	693	687	661	682
Pseudo R²	0.34	0.30	0.41	0.32

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using CSO administrators' household incomes). This table presents the odds ratios for each dependent variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Administrator's Household Income	0.69** (0.07)	0.75** (0.05)	0.71** (0.03)	0.64** (0.06)
Mayor's Party	0.60 (0.29)	0.56 (0.28)	0.53 (0.29)	0.80 (0.18)
CSO Contract	4.67** (0.10)	5.02** (0.06)	4.86** (0.10)	5.06** (0.12)
Elected Leaders	1.02** (0.01)	1.10** (0.03)	1.03** (0.01)	1.09** (0.02)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	0.10** (0.08)	1.16** (0.04)	1.19** (0.05)	1.16* (0.09)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the results of adding an interaction term to Model 3 to determine whether PT mayors in poorer municipalities use protest less because they have an affinity with the PT at the national level. We find no statistical connection between PT mayors interacted with city wealth and the use of protest.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Mayor's Party*Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.91 (0.33)
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	1.07 (0.30)
Mayor's Party	1.06 (0.39)
CSO Contract	0.97 (0.48)
Contact with the State	1.01 (0.55)
Elected Leaders	1.17 (0.32)

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Constant	2.00**
	(0.26)
Log Likelihood	-331.28
Wald X^2 (4)	165
N	827
Pseudo R^2	0.38

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.2: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We also assess the above possibilities using a variable recording a left-leaning council majority vs. a non-left leaning council majority. We find no statistically significant results using this variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Council Partisanship*Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.92
	(0.39)
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	1.06
	(0.44)
Council's Partisanship	1.08
	(0.42)
CSO Contract	1.07
	(0.54)
Contact with the State	1.03
	(0.52)
Elected Leaders	1.12
	(0.36)
Constant	2.15**
	(0.27)
Log Likelihood	-320.63
Wald X^2 (4)	164
N	835
Pseudo R^2	0.32

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 4a.3: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). We substitute the administrator's level of education for their salary and use it in otherwise-identical models of CSO interaction with the state. Results are similar to those obtained using our primary models.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Contract*Administrator's Education	0.95*
	(0.21)
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.93
	(0.34)
Mayor's Party	1.20
	(0.54)
CSO Contract	0.95
	(0.42)
Contact with the State	0.91*
	(0.25)
Elected Leaders	1.19*
	(0.12)

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Constant	1.54**
	(0.13)
Log Likelihood	-321.37
Wald X^2 (4)	157
N	843
Pseudo R^2	0.32

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

One might reasonably believe these professional organizations with mostly salaried employees are distinct from volunteer organization in terms of their resources, connections and professionalism. We have no quarrel with the general argument on this count and we remove the professional organizations from the dataset to determine if the results of estimation change in their absence. We find the results, presented in the technical appendix, are similar without the professional organizations, indicating there are no systematic differences between professional and non-professional CSOs in our dataset. Our results also remain broadly similar when any one city is removed from the dataset providing evidence the results are not driven by one particular Brazilian municipality.

We also want to know what explains whether CSOs value their interaction with the state and pursue external opportunities for training in support of their mission. We collected data on whether CSOs report learning valuable information or improving their understanding of how government works from attending workshops, conferences or meetings with state officials. We believe wealthier CSOs have relatively more professional experience and knowledge of how to pursue their organizations' missions than poorer CSOs. Thus, these wealthy CSOs may not feel like they learn a lot from their contact with the state or their attendance of workshops, conferences, etc. because they already have this information. The perceived educational value of interacting with the state provides another opportunity for us to assess why CSOs pursue particular strategies of participation and forms of interaction. We therefore specify a second broad model to explain the determinants of CSO learning.

The dependent variable reflects CSO administrators' assessments of how much they learned about government through attendance of state-supported educational/information workshops forums. These workshops take on different forms, but they most often offer a combination of a political history of the new policymaking venues and basic policymaking information. The sessions are typically geared toward individuals with high school or less education in order to help them gain the necessary knowledge to better engage incremental policymaking processes. It is coded "0" if the respondent did not believe attending educational meetings increased knowledge of how government works or how best to pursue their groups' interests and "1" if attendance increased knowledge in these areas. 19% of respondents believed attendance did not increase knowledge while 81% believed it did.

Model 2. CSO Learning from Participation= $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ (The CSO Administrator's Salary (logged))+ β_2 (The Mayor's Party)+ β_3 (CSO on Contract) + β_4 (CSO Elected Leaders)+ β_5 (Contact with other State Entities) +ε

Key Independent Variable: The CSO Administrator's Household Income
We believe CSOs from wealthier communities will be less likely to report beneficial educational experiences from attending workshops for the same reasons relatively

wealthy CSO administrator's will have less contact with the state. These relatively wealthy, professional, knowledgeable organizations have the resources, connections and education to use the state. They may report relatively small knowledge gains from the workshops because they already have more of the information to begin with, thus making attending workshops a less productive experience. Table 5a presents the results of estimation using CSO learning as the dependent variable.

Table 5a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Contact with the State in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010(Using an interaction between CSO administrators' household incomes and State Contracts). This table presents the odds ratios for each dependent variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio for Attending a Policy Council Meeting (SE)	Odds Ratio for Attending a National Conference (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Municipal Chamber (SE)	Odds Ratio for Contact with Mayor's Cabinet (SE)
Administrator's Household Income*Contract	0.94** (0.02)	0.87** (0.03)	0.90** (0.04)	0.84** (0.03)
Administrator's Income	0.77 (0.22)	0.81 (0.20)	0.69 (0.22)	0.70 (0.18)
CSO Contract	2.23** (0.18)	2.57** (0.16)	2.10** (0.18)	3.42** (0.21)
Mayor's Party	0.94 (0.13)	0.91 (0.10)	0.94 (0.10)	0.83 (0.15)
Elected Leaders	1.03** (0.02)	1.03** (0.02)	1.01** (0.01)	1.05** (0.02)
Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.02 (0.02)	0.93 (0.04)	0.96 (0.02)	1.05 (0.01)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

Table 5a.1: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Learned "Valuable Information" from interaction with the State (2010)

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	0.87** (0.05)	
Administrator's Household Income		0.76** (0.08)
Mayor's Party	1.003 (0.61)	1.005 (0.50)
CSO Contract	1.03** (0.03)	1.05** (0.03)
Had Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.06** (0.02)	1.12* (0.13)
Constant	1.51** (0.09)	1.23** (0.06)
Log Likelihood	-290.85	-294.37
Wald X^2 (4)	163	150
N	819	792
Pseudo R^2	0.24	0.26

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$.

Table 6a: Logit Analysis of Civil Society Organizations' Participation in Protests in Seven Brazilian Municipalities, 2010. This table presents the odds ratios for each variable.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	0.75**	
	(0.01)	
Administrator's Household Income		0.68**
		(0.01)
Mayor's Party	1.01	1.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)
CSO Contract	0.95**	0.92**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Elected Leaders	1.07*	1.03*
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Contact with the State	0.98**	0.95**
	(0.01)	(0.01)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 6b: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Learned "Valuable Information" from interaction with the State (2010). Our results for all models remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table presents the results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)
Per Capita GDP (Logged)	0.85**	
	(0.12)	
Administrator's Household Income		0.89**
		(0.06)
Mayor's Party	1.08	1.04
	(0.57)	(0.49)
CSO Contract	1.09*	1.07*
	(0.05)	(0.13)
Had Contact with Other Parts of the State	1.14**	1.10*
	(0.08)	(0.12)
Constant	1.58**	1.30**
	(0.06)	(0.04)
Log Likelihood	-284.35	-293.12
Wald X^2 (4)	142	163
N	608	599
Pseudo R^2	0.21	0.25

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 7a: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). This table presents the odds ratio for attending or organizing protests.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)
Contract*Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.73** (0.10)	0.62** (0.05)		0.85** (0.03)	
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.97 (0.05)	0.95 (0.04)	0.94 (0.05)	0.95 (0.04)	0.98 (0.04)
Mayor's Party	1.05 (0.08)	1.06 (0.07)	0.97* (0.02)	1.02 (0.05)	1.04* (0.03)
CSO Contract	1.03 (0.03)	1.02 (0.04)	0.99 (0.04)	0.97 (0.04)	0.98 (0.03)
Contact with the State	1.04 (0.06)	1.02 (0.04)	0.96* (0.04)	1.06 (0.08)	0.91* (0.02)
Elected Leaders	1.10 (0.15)	1.07 (0.14)	1.05* (0.04)	0.98* (0.02)	1.18* (0.10)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 7a.4: Logit Analysis of Whether Civil Society Organizations in Seven Brazilian Municipalities Attend or Organize Protests (2010). Finally, our results for all models remain broadly similar with or without professional CSOs in the dataset. This table presents the results of estimation without professional CSOs in the dataset.

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio (SE)
Contract*Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.88** (0.06)
Administrator's Household Income (logged)	0.93 (0.53)
Mayor's Party	1.08 (0.45)
CSO Contract	1.02 (0.56)
Contact with the State	1.07 (0.55)
Elected Leaders	1.14* (0.26)
Constant	2.17** (0.14)
Log Likelihood	-308.34
Wald X^2 (4)	176
N	625
Pseudo R^2	0.32

Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the city. *p < .05; **p < .01.

Table 8: Correlation Chart of Independent Variables in Tables I, II, III, IV and V

	City GDP	Admin Salary	Mayor's Party	Contract	Elected Leaders	Contact with State
City GDP	1.00					
Admin salary	0.17	1.00				
Mayor's Party	0.11	0.06	1.00			
Contract	0.22	0.29	0.26	1.00		
Elected Leaders	0.21	0.13	-0.02	0.09	1.00	
Contact with the State	-0.20	-0.17	0.18	0.31	0.24	1.00

Journal of Politics in Latin America

Political Corruption and Partisan Engagement: Evidence from Brazil

Matthew S. Winters and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro

Abstract: In long-standing democracies, the partisan attachments of most citizens are stable and not responsive to short-term political events. Recent studies from younger democracies, however, suggest that partisanship may be more malleable in these contexts. In this paper we develop hypotheses about how political corruption might affect voter attachment to the parties of corrupt officials or to the party system as a whole. Using data from an original survey experiment in Brazil, we show that prompts about political corruption shift patterns of partisan attachment for highly educated respondents – specifically, that corruption associated with one political party reduces nonpartisanship and significantly increases identification with other political parties. In contrast, we find that information on corruption has no consistent measurable effect on partisanship for less educated respondents. We conclude by discussing the implications of malleable partisanship for democratic accountability.

Dr. Matthew S. Winters is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and affiliate faculty at the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He received his PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. His research focuses on the political economy of foreign aid and economic development, and he also does research on comparative political behavior, in particular voter attitudes toward corruption. Personal website: <https://sites.google.com/site/mswinters1/>
E-mail: <mwinters@illinois.edu>

Dr. Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro is the Stanley J. Bernstein assistant professor of Political Science at Brown University. She holds a PhD from Columbia University and has been a visiting scholar at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Madrid. Her work focuses on accountability and the quality of democracy in Latin America. Her book *Curbing Clientelism in Argentina: Politics, Poverty, and Social Policy* (2014) was recently published with Cambridge University Press. Her ongoing projects examine citizen attitudes towards corruption and mechanisms of state oversight in Brazil and Argentina. Personal website: <https://vivo.brown.edu/display/rweitzsh>
E-mail: <rebecca_weitz-shapiro@brown.edu>

Introduction

Can individual political events change partisan attachment? The dominant view of partisanship as an "unmoved mover" suggests not: in most of the literature, partisanship is seen as a stable personal attribute rather than a pliable attitude that varies over time. This scholarly understanding has been shaped predominantly by the study of US politics and public opinion. What is true of citizens in the United States, however, may not be true of citizens elsewhere – especially those in countries with shorter democratic histories. The political parties in these countries, as compared to those in long-standing democracies, are likely to be younger, less institutionalized, and less deeply familiar to citizens. Individual attachment to these parties, consequently, may be shallower and more malleable.

Building on a nascent literature that examines partisan identity as an outcome variable in younger democracies (Brader and Tucker 2008; Baker et al. 2010; Chong et al. forthcoming; Lupu 2013; Klăsnja and Tucker 2013), we examine whether citizens' partisan identities are responsive to priming about political corruption. Corruption is a highly salient issue for voters in many young democracies. Whereas observers once treated corruption as innocuous or even beneficial (Huntington 1968), it is now well established that corruption is linked to lower economic growth, decreased investment, and greater income inequality (see Lambsdorff 2006). These pernicious effects are commonly highlighted by national media outlets and international organizations like Transparency International, while public opinion surveys reveal widespread citizen discontent with corruption (e.g., Transparency International 2013).

Existing work on how voters respond to corruption falls into two main categories. The first body of literature is mostly case-driven and explores how citizens' disgust with systemic corruption serves as a catalyst for major political upheaval, from the impeachment or resignation of individual presidents (Pérez-Liñán 2007) to the collapse of entire party systems (Pharr 2000; Della Porta and Vannucci 2007; Chang, Golden, and Hill 2010). The second body of literature uses survey data to examine how corruption prompts changes in individual attitudes like system support (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Seligson 2006) and individual behavior like protest participation (Gingerich 2009) or vote choice (Chong et al. forthcoming). In the latter body of literature, recent experimental and quasi-experimental work provides strong evidence that voters punish individual politicians involved in malfeasance (Ferraz and

Finan 2008; Pereira, Melo, and Figuereido 2008; Chong et al. forthcoming).[1]

We build on both approaches to examine whether information about corruption can affect citizens' partisan attachments, an important individual-level change that can have system-level consequences.[2] Using original survey experimental evidence from Brazil, we show that priming respondents to associate major political parties with corruption leads to greater engagement with the political system among the most highly educated. Compared to those who have not been primed with information about corruption, highly educated respondents are less likely to describe themselves as *non*partisan and more likely to declare a partisan attachment to smaller political parties. Existing findings about the effects of corruption on *voting* behavior would not predict these results. Thus, our findings point to the importance of treating partisanship as an outcome distinct from voting behavior and suggest a heretofore unidentified pathway through which negative political information may increase political engagement for at least some voters. The effect of this priming, however, is limited to the highly educated group as we find less evidence of changing patterns of partisanship among less well-educated respondents.

1   The Presumptive Stability of Partisan Attachment

Partisanship is commonly understood as a stable individual characteristic. Originating in the Michigan School of the 1960s and based largely on studies of US politics, the dominant view of partisanship depicts it as an "unmoved mover" formed in adolescence that goes on to affect a wide range of individual attitudes and behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960).[3] While not all scholars would go so far as to place partisanship in the same category as "kinship and ethnic ties" (Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010), even revisionist scholars who treat partisanship as a "running tally" (Fiorina 1981) concur that partisan identity is slow moving (see Fiorina

---

1   Some recent work also explores factors that may mitigate dissatisfaction with corruption (e.g., Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013).

2   In a similar vein, Chong et al. (forthcoming) show that allegations of corruption can have collateral costs for political parties.

3   Despite the large body of empirical literature that examines partisanship outside of the United States, most of the theoretical discussion is driven and dominated by the study of the United States.

(2002) and Johnston (2006) for summaries of the debate). In long-standing democracies with entrenched parties, identification persists to a great extent even when a party performs poorly in office (e.g., in terms of managing the economy) (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).[4] The limited experimental work on this topic is broadly consistent with this view. Attempts by Cowden and McDermott (2000) to manipulate students' partisan attachments through short-term role playing, for example, produce null results.[5]

Given the strong findings on the stability of partisan identity, the vast majority of literature studying partisanship has examined the *effects* of partisanship on other outcomes. Building on the large body of empirical work from the long-standing democracies of the United States and Western Europe, recent studies outside of these countries have found evidence that strong partisan identities can be formed and that partisanship can predict political behaviors in other contexts, too. Authors studying Brazil (Samuels 2006; Baker et al. 2010) and Mexico (McCann and Lawson 2003) find relatively high levels of partisan attachment and a fair degree of stability in partisan identification. Using survey experiments, Brader and Tucker (2012) and Samuels and Zucco (2014) provide evidence that voter partisanship in developing democracies has meaningful effects on outcomes like policy preferences.

At the same time, many newer democracies have characteristics that should undermine the strength of party attachment. Where parties are young or democratic elections a recent phenomenon, the creation of long-standing attachments from childhood is impossible for many citizens.[6] Party proliferation and turnover – either over time or at any given

---

4   In fact, rather than updating their beliefs, there is ample evidence in the United States that partisans are likely to seek out information from news sources that tend to confirm their preexisting party evaluations (e.g., Iyengar and Hahn 2009), to evaluate the same policies or economic conditions differently if they are endorsed by or associated with their preferred party (Bartels 2002; Druckman and Bolsen 2011; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), and even to act in accordance with incorrect, partisan-induced views (Prior, Sood, and Khanna 2013).

5   Gerber, Huber, and Washington (2010), on the other hand, are able to increase levels of party identification by providing an instrumental reason to become a partisan (i.e., reminding nonaffiliated voters that only registered partisans can vote in party primaries). Running a field experiment in the US state of Connecticut, they find that latent partisans in the treatment condition were more likely to identify with the party to which they were closest.

6   Some countries that experienced prolonged periods of nondemocracy nonetheless have parties that substantially predate the most recent democratic period.

moment – may weaken citizens' incentives to learn about and develop psychological attachments to particular parties. Similarly, legislative weakness in some new democracies undermines the importance of parties and party labels (Fish 2006; Carey and Reynolds 2007).

In a context where some or all of these characteristics are present, we should be cautious in applying the US model of partisan stability. Where partisan attachments are more malleable, the likelihood that individuals will declare themselves partisans of given parties is more likely to be affected by recent political events. In Brazil, Baker et al. (2010) find that declared partisanship within a six-wave panel study experiences short-term shifts in response to the performance of national and, to some extent, subnational officials. In a field experiment in Mexico, Chong et al. (forthcoming) show that distributing information about high levels of municipal corruption decreases identification with the party of the incumbent politician. Relatedly, studies from Eastern Europe and Latin America have shown that rates of expressing partisan identification increase among survey respondents who receive more information about parties' policy positions (Brader and Tucker 2008; Lupu 2013). Taken together, these studies suggest that changes in the information environment can alter individual partisanship in new democracies in the short and medium term.

2   Possible Patterns of Partisan Change

How might individuals' declared partisanship change after they are exposed to negative political information? In this section, we review likely ways in which individuals might change their expressed partisan identities after being primed to think about corruption in conjunction with a particular party.[7] We then describe how individual shifts in partisanship might be reflected in the aggregate.

The possible pathways of partisan change depend on how individuals would have expressed their partisan leanings in the absence of prim-

---

The Peronist party in Argentina is a classic example (Lupu and Stokes 2009; Calvo and Murillo 2012).

7   This project is motivated by the desire to examine how real-world political information about corruption affects expressions of partisanship in the short term. The design of our experiment involves a hypothetical politician. Therefore, respondents do not receive factual information about existing parties, although they are still primed with exposure to an association between a particular political party and the idea of corruption. We use the language of information and priming in this section.

ing. Before hearing about a corrupt politician, a given individual might be (a) a sympathizer with the party of that politician, (b) a sympathizer of another party, or (c) a nonpartisan. Table 1 summarizes the range of reactions for these three types of individuals confronted with information linking a partisan politician to corruption. For the purposes of fully enumerating an individual's choice set, we include in Table 1 some outcomes that we do not think are particularly likely.

Table 1: How Different Types of Partisans Might React to Information about a Corrupt Politician

Partisanship before Receiving Information	Possible Responses to Information about a Corrupt Politician from Party X
(a) Partisan of Party X	Remain a partisan of Party X
	Abandon Party X and become a partisan of a new party
	Abandon Party X and become a nonpartisan
(b) Partisan of Party Y	Remain a partisan of Party Y
	Abandon Party Y and become a nonpartisan
	Abandon Party Y and become a partisan of Party X
	Abandon Party Y and become a partisan of a new party
(c) Nonpartisan	Remain a nonpartisan
	Become a partisan of Party X
	Become a partisan of a new party

Source: Authors' own compilation.

From these reactions, we highlight three likely outcomes of interest. Although it is not impossible, we think it is unlikely that revealed corruption would drive citizens to affiliate themselves with the corrupt party, and so we do not speculate further on that possibility.

Persistent Partisanship/Nonpartisanship. It may be the case that the partisanship of sympathetic voters in situation (a) is sufficiently strong that negative information does not alter their partisan identity. This is what we would expect in settings like the United States, where partisanship is a social identity. Persistent partisanship is even more likely in situation (b), where sympathizers of some other party hear negative information linked to a party with which they do not identify. Negative information about this other party is highly unlikely to prompt individuals to identify with the corrupt party, although it might drive voters to reassess their own party and perhaps thus declare partisanship with a third party. Relatedly, persistent nonpartisanship in situation (c) seems likely and results when a nonpartisan maintains a lack of party preference after being exposed to negative information about a given party.

Switch to Nonpartisanship. In either situation (a) or (b), information about corruption may drive individuals to embrace a new nonpartisan identity. This shift is most likely to occur among people who otherwise would consider themselves copartisans with the party of the corrupt politician (a) but who begin to feel a new distaste for that party. It is also possible that supporters of other parties may respond to information about corruption by minimizing their engagement with the political system as a whole, even if they would have previously identified with a party (b); a dislike of the party system as a whole drives these citizens into nonpartisanship.

Identification with Other Parties. A link between corruption and one political party may inspire copartisan or nonpartisan individuals to identify with a new political party toward which they now feel relatively greater sympathy.[8] In situation (a) negative information decreases a voter's support for her or his previously most preferred political party to the extent that the voter identifies with a new party. In situation (c) negative information is enough to inspire a former nonpartisan to newly identify with a party not linked to corruption.[9]

At a systemic level, these individual-level pathways map to a set of possible outcomes for the overall distribution of partisanship in the population at large.[10] In our empirical analysis below, we examine shifts

---

8   Both Turner (1999) and Lupu (2013) argue for the importance of comparative fit. Though they focus on ideology, valence issues like corruption might also contribute to comparative fit.

9   Gingerich (2009) finds increasing political engagement in the form of protest activity is a common response to exposure to corruption in Bolivia. Similarly, using 2008 AmericasBarometer data from Brazil, we find that personal experience with corruption is positively associated with a variety of measures of political engagement (results not reported).

10   In our empirical analysis, randomization and a between-subject experimental design allow us to confidently assess the causal effect of corruption priming on the overall distribution of partisanship among respondents. We cannot, however, observe pathways at the individual level, because we do not collect a pretreatment measure of partisanship. Given the small number of questions in the survey, a pretreatment measure of partisanship might create a bias for subjects to persist in expressing their pretreatment partisan identity in a posttreatment question. Separately, it is possible for some pathways to be effectively "cancelled out" by other pathways. For instance, if nonpartisans respond to information about corruption in Party X by affiliating with Party Y, and if partisans of Party Y respond to that same information by becoming nonpartisans, our empirical approach will not identify any change in the aggregate partisan composition. Some pathways are more likely than others, however, and we use these to develop our three main hypotheses.

in aggregate partisanship in response to a prime about corruption; there-fore, we specify three alternative (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses at the macrolevel:

> H1: *Decreased Copartisanship*: Defining copartisanship as sympathy with the party associated with corruption, we expect that the pro-portion of people identifying with that party will decrease when they are exposed to information linking that party to corruption. The most robust result from various survey and field experiments on corruption is that politicians lose electoral support (or intend-ed support) when corrupt behavior is revealed (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Chong et al. forthcoming; De Figueiredo, Hidalgo, and Kasahara 2013; Klăsnja and Tucker 2013). To the extent that dec-larations of partisanship and vote choice result from similar cog-nitive processes, we expect similar results.
>
> H2: *Increased Other Partisanship*: After hearing about corruption as-sociated with Party X, citizens may feel relatively greater sympathy with other parties, increasing the overall rate of affiliation with those parties. This movement could come from individuals who formerly sympathized with the party linked to corruption or from individuals who formerly identified themselves as nonpartisans and are sufficiently disenchanted by one party's links to corrup-tion that they now feel greater affinity with a competing political party.
>
> H3: *Increased Party Alienation*: After hearing that Party X has been linked to corruption, some individuals who would otherwise be copartisans might feel newly alienated from the implicated party but not sufficiently sympathetic with any other party to identify themselves as a partisan. Separately, other individuals who might have identified with a political party not linked to corruption may be turned off from partisan politics in general. Both individual-level processes reflect a form of political disengagement and should result in an increase in the share of the population that de-scribes itself as nonpartisan. This hypothesis receives support from studies of vote choice in the wake of corruption. Both Chong et al. (forthcoming) (in Mexico) and de Figuereido, Hidal-go, and Kasahara (2013) (in Brazil) find higher levels of absten-tion – another form of political disengagement – among voters randomly exposed to information about actual corruption by a mayor and/or mayoral candidates.

2.1   Who Updates Partisan Identification in Response to Information about Corruption?

Although exposure to information about corruption might lead to shifts in partisan attachment for anyone in the population, we argue that these effects are likely to be most acute among highly educated citizens. Drawing a link between an individual partisan politician who is described as corrupt and one's own identification with a party at large is a relatively complex cognitive task. Therefore, being primed to think about a corrupt partisan politician is most likely to affect the partisan sentiment of citizens who are attentive to the frame about corruption, are able to keep that framing in mind for a relatively long period, and can then make the association when asked to express their partisan identity.[11] Highly educated individuals are the most likely to maintain access to such associations and to connect particular information about corruption with their attitudes toward the political system writ large. As Druckman and Nelson (2003) observe in the literature on framing effects, experts are the respondents who most often "possess the knowledge and ability to connect the considerations suggested by the frame to their opinions" (Druckman and Nelson 2003: 731).

Our expectation is consistent with other results that examine partisan identity or political attitudes more broadly. Gerber, Huber, and Washington (2010: fn. 24), for instance, find that their field experimental treatment of informing people about the value of registering with a party leads to larger positive shifts in partisanship among the most educated respondents (although the difference from the overall effect is not statistically significant). Results in the literature on framing and political attitudes reveal stronger framing effects among more knowledgeable people after controlling for prior attitudes.[12] Chong and Druckman (2007) argue that this is because knowledge "increases the likelihood that the consid-

---

11   With regard to recall, in a separate survey from Brazil using a similar vignette, we find that rates of correct recall of information contained in the prompt are highly correlated with educational attainment. Among those with the lowest levels of education, only 50 percent of respondents could correctly answer a question about the prompt, whereas the rate rose to 74 percent among those with the highest level of education.

12   While the more educated may be more responsive to frames, the literature on motivated reasoning (e.g., Taber and Lodge 2006) finds evidence that more politically sophisticated respondents defend their preexisting beliefs on contentious policy issues more strongly than others. The results that we present here might shed light on the types of issues for which new information leads to greater responsiveness among highly educated and sophisticated citizens.

erations emphasized in a frame will be available or comprehensible to the individual'' (see also Zaller 1992; Druckman 2004).[13]

Our empirical framework parallels the real world delay between hearing some piece of information at a specific point in time and then thinking about one's partisan identity in the medium or longer term. In our survey we describe a hypothetical local politician as either corrupt or not. We give this politician a partisan identity, but we do not describe the overall performance of the political party in the local arena nor the performance of a party leader or national figure associated with the political party. We thus prime the respondent to think about corruption in conjunction with a particular party only through reference to an individual partisan politician. In the context of our survey, highly educated people should be more likely to recall the partisan affiliation of the politician in the prompt, to recall the association with corruption, and to have these factors in mind when reflecting on their partisan identity later in the survey.[14]

3   Understanding and Operationalizing Partisanship in Brazil

Brazil is a particularly compelling site in which to examine the link between local political corruption and partisan attachment. Although strictly speaking a federal country since the 1891 Constitution, subnational

---

13   Both Brader and Tucker (2008) and Lupu (2013) find that more sophisticated respondents are somewhat *less* likely to change their partisan attachment after being exposed to information about parties in a survey environment. In those studies, however, the authors provide respondents with publicly available information about party platforms and/or alliances. Knowledgeable voters are more likely to already be aware of macrolevel party behavior and therefore less likely to update their preferences in response to this information. In our study, we describe a hypothetical local politician about whom the respondents have no prior information. Our results here, which demonstrate more responsiveness among more educated respondents, are consistent with other work that shows greater responsiveness among more educated voters to new information on valence issues like corruption (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2014) and economic growth (Alt, Lassen, and Marshall 2014).

14   An alternative hypothesis that might also predict more movement among more educated respondents would be that these respondents are simply more sensitive to social desirability bias and thus less likely to give responses that indicate support for corruption (a socially stigmatized practice). As we discuss in more detail below, a number of patterns in the data are inconsistent with this hypothesis.

governments gained substantial power in the years immediately following the country's most recent transition to democracy in 1985.[15] Municipal governments are responsible for the provision of a variety of basic services, including in core areas like health, and they spend an increasingly large portion of total government revenue (Falleti 2010). Holding municipal political office can be an important stepping stone in a political career.

Although the country experienced a long dictatorship in the second half of the twentieth century (1965–1985), the Brazilian Congress remained open during that period and the military allowed controlled competition between one proregime and one antiregime party. After democratization, these parties lost influence and two new parties came to dominate national politics – the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a leftist worker's party that first emerged in 1980 led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and the Partido do Social Democracia do Brasileira (PSDB), a centrist party that held the presidency from 1995 to 2002. The dominant narrative about Brazilian politics for much of the current democratic period has depicted parties as quite weak, both legislatively and in terms of their ability to engender individual loyalty among citizens (Weyland 1996; Ames 2002; although see Figueiredo and Limongi 2000 and Desposato 2006, among others, for evidence on the relative strength of parties in the legislative arena).

The recent literature on Brazil questions that portrayal. Baker et al. (2010) show that partisan identity is relatively stable over time, especially for the PT. Similarly, Samuels (2006) and Samuels and Zucco (2014) show the strength of PT partisanship as a social identity and demonstrate that PT (and to some extent PSDB) partisans react to party cues, shifting their opinions in order to conform with those of their party. This new wave of scholarship, however, still acknowledges that partisan attachment and identity in Brazil do not have the strength they enjoy in longstanding democracies. Partisan identification, for example, is far more limited in Brazil than in the United States according to recent surveys: responses to two-stage party identification questions suggest that less than 35 percent of citizens in Brazil identify with a political party compared to 60 percent in the United States.[16]

In 2010 we carried out a nationally representative in-person survey with 2,000 respondents in Brazil. The survey presented respondents with

---

15   The 1988 Constitution invested municipalities with substantial powers in a number of areas.

16   These numbers are based on AmericasBarometer data (Brazil) and the ANES (US).

a vignette describing a hypothetical incumbent mayor running for reelection.[17] We employed random assignment to vary across vignettes the hypothetical mayor's party affiliation along with certain aspects of his past performance in office.[18] Some respondents learn that it is well known that the mayor takes bribes while others learn that it is well known that the mayor does not take bribes.[19] We analyze how the survey prime linking major political parties and corruption affects respondents' declared partisan attachments.

The vignette reads as follows:

> Imagine a person named Gabriel {or Gabriela}, who is a person like you, living in a neighborhood like yours, but in a different city in Brazil. The mayor of Gabriel's city is running for reelection in October. He is a member of the PT {or PSDB}. In Gabriel's city, it is well known that the mayor never takes bribes {or frequently takes bribes} when giving out government contracts. The mayor has completed few {or many; or omit the entire sentence} public works projects during his term in office. In this city, the election for mayor is expected to be very close.

The experimental vignette was followed immediately by a question that asked the respondent the likelihood (on a four-point scale) that Gabriel (or Gabriela) would vote for the named mayor.[20] We then asked a series

---

17 In doing so, we follow a long tradition of survey experimental work that asks respondents to evaluate hypothetical politicians (e.g., Terkildsen 1993; Tomz 2007; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012). As Tomz and Weeks (2013) note, having respondents abstract from actual politicians allows for better testing of general hypotheses.

18 The vignettes varied information about politician performance simultaneously along two dimensions: one described the mayor's past involvement in corruption, whereas the other varied information provided about a mayor's provision of public works projects. The treatments were orthogonal to one another. We focus here on the information about corruption.

19 In providing their responses, it is possible that those surveyed react to either the positive or the negative information. In emphasizing the effects of negative information, we follow the convention in the corruption literature (Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Muñoz, Anduiza, and Gallego 2013). In the appendix, we use data from another survey experiment to show that respondents tend to behave as if a politician is *not* corrupt unless they are exposed to explicit information about corruption.

20 The results of this analysis (discussed in Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013) are reproduced in the appendix. We use a third person vignette in order to attenuate social desirability bias among respondents exposed to a prompt that mentions corruption. In a separate survey conducted in the United States in 2012, we used the vignette from Brazil but randomly varied the third-person language

of additional questions about mayoral performance and eventually a question about partisan attachment. The time elapsed within the survey between the vignette and the question on partisan identification should attenuate any effect the corruption information has on respondents' self-reported partisan identification and therefore bias against a significant finding.

Partisanship. Respondents were shown a list of 27 parties and asked to select the party to which they felt closest.[21] This one-stage question results in a higher rate of partisanship than that elicited by a two-stage question. About 44 percent of respondents did not express a preference for any party; results from other surveys place the percentage of nonpartisans in the population at somewhere between 50 and 60 percent (Samuels 2006) or 65 and 70 percent (Ames et al. 2013; LAPOP n.d.). Of the total sample, about 32 percent of respondents support the PT; about 7 percent, the PMDB; about 7 percent, the PSDB; and about 16 percent, another party.

Education. At the individual level, we expect the effect of the treatment to be strongest among highly educated respondents. We therefore subset out analyses to compare respondents with some tertiary education to those with completed secondary education or less. About 15 percent of our sample has some tertiary education or more.

4   Partisanship Changes in Response to Corruption Prompts for the Highly Educated

To understand how linking corruption information to a political party affects declarations of partisanship, we examine differences in the distribution of expressed partisan identities across the corrupt and not-corrupt conditions in our experiment.[22] The randomized design allows us to attribute changes in this distribution to the corruption prime in the

---

with second-person language. We did not find any significant differences in response patterns between the two versions.

21   Brader and Tucker (2008) use three alternative measures of partisanship: two that are two-stage questions and one that is very similar to our question. They do not find any distinct patterns in treatment effects across alternative measures of partisanship.

22   In this discussion, we use the language "partisan attachment" interchangeably with "declared partisan attachment." A survey allows us to observe the latter, although the former is the phenomenon of theoretical interest. We return to this issue in the discussion of our results.

treatment vignettes; the other characteristics of respondents are orthogonal to this information.[23] As described above, we expect to see stronger effects among highly educated respondents and therefore subset our analyses accordingly.

Table 2 presents the results for our three theoretical outcomes of interest: copartisanship, other partisanship, and nonpartisanship. For each panel of the table, we use a χ^2 test to examine whether the distribution of outcomes in the corrupt condition is statistically distinguishable from the distribution of outcomes in the not-corrupt condition.

Table 2: Distribution of Partisan Declarations under Different Experimental Conditions and across Different Subgroups

	Copartisanship	Other Partisanship	Nonpartisanship
Not Corrupt	0.22 (214)	0.34 (340)	0.44 (433)
Corrupt	0.20 (197)	0.37 (361)	0.42 (412)

Note: Panel A: All Respondents. N = 1,957; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses. χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 1.71 (p < 0.43).

	Copartisanship	Other Partisanship	Nonpartisanship
Not Corrupt	0.21 (176)	0.35 (292)	0.44 (367)
Corrupt	0.20 (170)	0.36 (299)	0.44 (369)

Note: Panel B: Respondents with Completed Secondary Education or Less. N = 1,673; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses. χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 0.19 (p < 0.92).

	Copartisanship	Other Partisanship	Nonpartisanship
Not Corrupt	0.25 (38)	0.32 (48)	0.43 (66)
Corrupt	0.20 (27)	0.47 (62)	0.33 (43)

Note: Panel C: Respondents with Some Tertiary Education or More. N = 284; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses. χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 7.13 (p < 0.03).

Source: Authors' own calculation and compilation.

In the overall data and among the subset of less educated respondents, we see little evidence of any difference between the two conditions. Among the less educated respondents, in particular, the distribution of

---

23   In the appendix, we demonstrate balance on observable characteristics across the corrupt and not-corrupt treatment groups.

declared partisanship is nearly identical in the corrupt and not-corrupt conditions.[24] This suggests that the majority of our respondents do not update their partisan identification after being primed to think about corruption in conjunction with a particular party. Among the highly educated group, however, the corruption treatment has a number of interesting effects on declared partisanship.

Panel C focuses on the most educated respondents in the sample. It shows a decrease in copartisanship (consistent with hypothesis 1) and an increase in other partisanship (consistent with hypothesis 2) among this group. Specifically, Table 2 reveals that the share of highly educated respondents sympathizing with the party named in the vignette drops from 25 percent in the not-corrupt condition to 20 percent in the corrupt condition, while the share of respondents declaring a partisan identity with a party *other* than the one named in the vignette rises by 15 percentage points (from 32 to 47 percent). In contrast to hypothesis 3 (which anticipates that corruption information increases party alienation) our results instead document increased party engagement among this group. When compared with the control condition, in the corruption condition, nonpartisanship drops from 43 percent to 33 percent. Highly educated respondents who might otherwise be copartisans or nonpartisans in the clean condition appear to instead say they identify with parties not named in the vignette in the corrupt condition.

Figure 1 presents our results for the most educated respondents only. It illustrates the substantial increase in other partisanship and the marked decrease in nonpartisanship that result from exposure to the corruption prime. The comparatively limited change in the number of copartisans suggests that the bulk of the increased rate of other partisanship is a result of decreased nonpartisanship among educated respondents in the corruption conditions. Our results are consistent with a world in which few highly educated partisans are swayed by negative information about their preferred political party and where negative information about one party leads many highly educated nonpartisans to feel

---

24   For this group, the corrupt treatment has a statistically significant effect on the share of respondents who either fail to answer or say that they do not know if they are close to a party. The share of less educated respondents who decline to answer or say that they do not know goes from 1.5 percent in the clean condition to 3.3 percent in the corrupt condition (p < 0.02). As discussed in section 4.1 below, the corruption prompt depresses vote intention for *both* groups of respondents.

greater sympathy with one of the other parties in the system.[25] As a result, the association of a particular political party with corruption seems to drive new partisan identification and to *increase* engagement with the partisan political system among highly educated respondents in Brazil.[26]

Figure 1: Partisan Shifts: Highly Educated Respondents

In the appendix, we show the robustness of these results to several additional tests of the data. First, we run a multinomial probit model in which we use a corruption treatment indicator and an interaction between that indicator and a variable indicating whether or not the respondent belongs to the high education group. This allows us to predict whether or not a respondent expressed copartisanship with the politician in the vignette, other partisanship, or nonpartisanship (the omitted category). Using the parametric model allows us to include basic sociodemographic controls. The results show the same overall pattern as presented

---

25   Lupu (2013) finds that partisanship increases when voters have an increased capacity to differentiate between political parties. To the extent that our respondents are prompted to think about corruption in conjunction with one party, that might assist them in differentiating that party from other parties.

26   A scenario in which nonpartisans react to the corruption prime by declaring a partisan identity is more plausible than the alternative possibility in which respondents who would otherwise declare themselves partisans of different parties are exposed to the not-corrupt prime and then opt to declare themselves nonpartisans.

above: among highly educated respondents, the corruption information treatment increases the share of other-party identifiers relative to non-partisans. The multinomial probit model allows us to run an explicit test on the difference in the treatment effect between the two groups – for which we find a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.03$). Second, we run the multinomial probit model only among the respondents who heard about a PT mayor and then again only among the respondents who heard about a PSDB mayor. We find that the differences in treatment effects persist across the two types of vignettes, although the difference is significant only for the PSDB vignettes. Third, we present the cross-tabulated results using a more exhaustive set of categories that underlie our coding of the outcome variable, disaggregating the larger parties that compose the "other party" category. The patterns for our high education respondents are again consistent with the patterns shown here: the respondents in this group who hear about a corrupt politician from either of the two parties used in the treatment are less likely to describe themselves as nonpartisan and more likely to express support for a third party. Regarding the PT vignettes, apart from leading to gains in identification with other parties, the corruption treatment leads the PT to lose support from highly educated respondents. These gains for other parties outweigh the PT losses, which explains the net positive effect on partisan engagement. Among the PSDB vignettes, corruption information does not change identification with this party among the highly educated, but other parties still gain identifiers. Among our low-education respondents, when we disaggregate results by party, the results are somewhat more ambiguous than those presented in Table 2. In the PT treatment, among less educated respondents, we see the same pattern as in the overall data: information about corruption does not shift reported party identification. Within the PSDB vignettes, corruption information does shift the distribution of partisanship, as our respondents move away from both the PT and the PSDB and toward the third largest party in the country, the PMDB. In terms of rates of partisan identification, however, these shifts mostly cancel out – that is, in contrast to the most educated respondents, the corruption prompt does not appear to increase overall partisan engagement among the least educated. We discuss these patterns in greater detail in the appendix.

4.1   Alternative Explanations and External Validity

As argued above, we believe that the existence of a treatment effect conditional on having at least some tertiary education reflects the cognitive demands of linking a prompt about a corrupt partisan politician to

one's broader views about political parties. Here, we address two alternative explanations for why the treatment effect might be limited to this group. First, it might be the case that highly educated citizens simply are more likely to condemn corruption than is the population at large. Second, highly educated citizens may be more susceptible to social desirability bias and therefore more likely to give the "right" answer to survey questions on sensitive topics like corruption, regardless of their true opinions. We find a number of patterns in the data that are inconsistent with these two alternatives.

Beginning with the former, if it is the case that our results are driven by different attitudes toward corruption across education levels, we should be able to observe those differences in responses to other questions in the survey. The most obvious candidate is a question that asked respondents how likely they were to vote for the mayor described in the vignette. As this question was asked immediately after the vignette, directly about the mayor described therein, and without explicit reference to the mayor's partisanship, it placed fewer cognitive demands on respondents than the question about partisanship. Table 3 reports the results for this question for the whole sample and then divides them according to education. The results do not provide any evidence that more educated respondents have more negative attitudes toward corruption. On a four-point scale of how likely respondents are to reelect the mayor (where 4 is very likely), noncorrupt mayors score an average of 3.23 among respondents with completed secondary education or less, while corrupt mayors only manage 1.68. Among highly educated respondents, the average likelihood of voting is 3.19 for non-corrupt mayors and 1.79 for corrupt mayors. Thus, the size of the punishment for corruption is slightly higher among the less educated (1.55 versus 1.40), which is the opposite of what an explanation focused on different preferences implies.

Table 3: Survey Responses on Vote Intention

Outcome: Vote Choice	Whole Sample (N=1,974)	Completed Secondary or Less (N=1,687)	Some Tertiary or More (N=287)
Not Corrupt	3.23	3.23	3.19
Corrupt	1.70	1.68	1.79
Difference	1.53	1.55	1.40
p-value on H_0: No Difference	*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.01*

Source: Authors' own calculation and compilation.

This strongly suggests that the differences in partisan change we observe in our survey are not the result of different attitudes toward political corruption. It also speaks to the importance of thinking about changing partisan affiliation as a response to political corruption that is analytically distinct from electoral punishment of the corrupt actor.

The second alternative explanation is that, in the context of a survey, highly educated people have a stronger desire to communicate their disapproval of corruption than less educated respondents regardless of any underlying difference in views between these two groups – that is, the highly educated might be particularly susceptible to social desirability bias on the sensitive issue of corruption. The results reviewed in the previous paragraph, however, speak against this possibility. If social desirability bias were to explain the different patterns of partisan change across education groups, we would expect the highly educated to be particularly likely to claim that they would not vote for a corrupt politician. As the results displayed in Table 3 illustrate, this is not the case.

In addition, the responses to the question on partisanship itself do not offer support for this alternative explanation. If the responses of the highly educated mostly reflected a desire to give socially conforming answers in the context of a survey, we would expect these respondents to be particularly reluctant to reveal sympathy with a party of a mayor identified as corrupt. However, as described above, the corruption condition has little effect on the share of declared copartisans among the highly educated; instead, it leads to a significant decrease in nonpartisanship and an increase in other partisanship. Neither result is consistent with response patterns motivated by a desire to appeal to an interviewer.

Although we can dismiss these alternative explanations, the question remains as to the extent to which changes in declared partisan attachment in a survey are likely to reflect changes in genuine party attachment in response to real world information. As always, we should exercise caution in extrapolating from the relatively controlled context of a survey experiment to the views and behavior of citizens in the real world (Barabas and Jerrit 2010). Given the limited information surveys provide on electoral contests and the relatively close proximity between receiving information and being asked about partisan leanings, our survey experiment might best replicate cases in which information about political corruption gains the public's attention and receives ongoing attention in the press (e.g., Chang, Golden, and Hill 2010).[27] In Brazil,

---

27   In a field experiment in Mexico, Chong et al. (forthcoming) expose treated individuals to information about corruption in a public information flier and then find a follow-up effect on partisan identity a few weeks later. This suggests

the use of federal audits aimed at uncovering corruption and the practice of publicizing the names of candidates accused of corruption mean that these high information settings are increasingly common.

The external validity of our survey is also buttressed by the fact that our results are consistent with other previously identified characteristics of partisanship and partisan change in Brazil. Baker et al. (2010) use a six-wave panel study in two medium-sized Brazilian cities to document changes in partisanship over time. Their findings emphasize the fluidity of the "nonpartisan" category: across the six waves of their study, the level of nonpartisanship ranges between 50 and 62 percent in one of the cities and 46 and 64 percent in the other. Comparing between two waves of the survey, they show that some 20 percent of declared nonpartisans in one wave of the survey profess a party affiliation in the other wave – though they document far less movement between parties. Based on a nationally representative sample, our results provide further evidence of the importance of shifts in and out of the nonpartisan category (what Baker et al. 2010 call "bounded partisanship") and the limited shifts between partisan groupings. In addition, using a survey experiment allows us to identify a probable cause of such shifts – that is, the priming of respondents to associate a particular political party with corruption.[28]

5   Changing Partisanship in Brazil and the Implications for Accountability

The notion that partisanship is an ingrained social identity that is relatively unresponsive to short-term political events is well established in the literature on voters in the United States. Recent work presents mixed evidence on the applicability of this view to other countries. Our paper advances our understanding of partisanship in younger democracies by providing experimental evidence from Brazil that priming subjects with short-term political information can cause changes in citizens' declared partisan identity. In particular, a prompt about corruption tied to a politician from a particular political party can decrease the likelihood that

---

that in some cases, even a single exposure to a real-world treatment analogous to the one included in our survey might have a demonstrable effect on partisanship.

28   Our work also builds on Samuels' (2006) finding that attitudes toward a party's most prominent national leader are correlated with partisanship in Brazil. Our results suggest that the negative portrayal of subnational politicians can also affect partisan attachments.

respondents will describe themselves as nonpartisan and increase the likelihood that they will declare themselves sympathizers of other parties. This effect is found only among the highly educated – those people most likely to recall and be able to access the association in the prompt when considering their own partisan sympathies at some later time. Importantly, this does not reflect different preferences over corruption across respondents with different levels of education.

Our finding that some citizens' declared partisan identities are responsive to short-term political performance contributes to an emerging consensus that the declaration of partisan identity is malleable in less established democracies (Brader and Tucker 2008; Baker et al. 2010; Chong et al. forthcoming; Klăsnja and Tucker 2013; Lupu 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2014).[29] Nonetheless, these studies do exhibit variation in the details of who changes their partisanship and in what way. In the survey examined here, we find that changes are concentrated among the highly educated, whereas some other studies find that movement in partisan identification is widespread or even that changes in expressed partisan identification are concentrated among the less educated. Whereas we find that negative performance information brings nonpartisans into new engagement with the party system, other studies find that negative performance information causes people to shift into nonpartisanship. Thus, while the variety of results emerging in the literature demonstrate the malleability of partisanship in younger democracies, they also give us reason to continue to work to understand precisely among which groups and under what conditions partisan sentiment will shift in these democracies.

What are the implications of our results for our understanding of political accountability in Brazil today? There are two broad schools of thought on the relationship between strong party identity and democratic accountability.[30] On the one hand, there are those scholars who have traditionally portrayed strong, responsible parties as a democratic asset that can organize and channel societal demands. In this light, strong partisan identity is valuable because it both originates in and contributes

---

29   Baker et al. (2010) explicitly compare their results to those found in Britain and Germany in Zuckerman, Dasović, and Fitzgerald (2007) and note that partisan identities are less stable in Brazil.

30   See Baker et al. (2010) for a similar description of the existing literature and the tensions therein in a comparative context. See also Tilley and Hobolt (2011).

to strong parties.[31] Academics studying relatively young democracies in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; McCann and Lawson 2003) and the post-Soviet space (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Smyth 2006) have lamented weak partisanship as a deterrent to democratic consolidation and accountability. As McCann and Lawson (2003: 60) argue, "when citizens lack firm, enduring dispositions […] it is difficult for them to hold leaders accountable."

On the other hand, there are those scholars that have depicted strong party identification as blind loyalty, which distorts citizens' ability to objectively evaluate relevant political information. To the extent that strong partisans "have already decided who is right and who is wrong" (Mutz 2006: 128), strong partisanship could actually decrease accountability. In the United States, researchers have shown that partisanship colors voter perceptions of politician and government performance levels across a range of areas (Wilcox and Wlezien 1996; Bartels 2002; Johnston, Hagen, and Hall 2004; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012) and have called attention to the risks of partisan-motivated reasoning (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2012). The cross-national literature that highlights the differences between partisan "winners" and "losers" also offers evidence of the more forgiving nature of copartisans outside of the United States.[32]

Where does Brazil fall within this spectrum? This study and several other recent studies (Baker et al. 2010; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2014) provide evidence that short-term performance information can change partisan attachment for at least some groups of Brazilian citizens. At the same time, it is clear that for some Brazilians, partisan attachments help them organize and order their understanding of politics (Samuels and Zucco 2014). Together, these results suggest that mass partisanship in Brazil today may occupy a middle ground: parties are strong enough to serve as meaningful cues to citizens, but parties can also expect their fortunes to rise and fall with their accomplishments. The results of the October 2014 presidential election perhaps reflect this dynamic, as Brazil's incumbent PT president Dilma Rousseff was just barely reelected in

---

31   In the US context, this vision was articulated by the 1950 APSA Committee on Political Parties, and it has since appeared elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Burnham 1970: ch. 5; Broder 1971).

32   For example, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) find that being in a corrupt country has less of a negative effect on government evaluations for "winners" as opposed to "losers." See also Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz (2013) and Klašnja and Tucker (2013).

the face of growing corruption scandals and a slowdown in economic growth.

Finally, our results are particularly encouraging with respect to the spate of new information-provision reforms enacted in Brazil in recent years. Federal audits of municipal accounts, the publication of the names of political candidates accused of wrongdoing in the judiciary, and a new right to information law means that credible information about political performance is more easily available now than ever before. Our findings suggest that the revelation of malfeasance through such venues may serve the double purpose of facilitating punishment of poor-performing politicians while, at least for some citizens, increasing engagement in Brazil's political system.

References

Alt, James E., David D. Lassen, and John Marshall (2014), *Information, Source Credibility and Political Sophistication: Experimental Evidence on Economic Voting*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.

Ames, Barry (2002), Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies, in: Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 185–221.

Ames, Barry, Fabiana Machado, Lucio Renno, David Samuels, Amy Erika Smith, and Cesar Zucco (2013), *The Brazilian Electoral Panel Studies (BEPS): Brazilian Public Opinion in the 2010 Presidential Elections*, IDB Technical Note No. 508.

Anderson, Christopher J., and Yuliya V. Tverdova (2003), Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 47, 1, 91–109.

Anduiza, Eva, Aina Gallego, and Jordi Muñoz (2013), Turning a Blind Eye: Experimental Evidence of Partisan Bias in Attitudes towards Corruption, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 46, 12, 1664–1692.

Baker, Andy, Barry Ames, Lucio R. Renno, and Anand Sokhey (2010), *The Sources and Dynamics of Mass Partisanship in a New Democracy*, paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, 2–5 September, Washington, DC.

Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit (2010), Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid?, in: *American Political Science Review*, 104, 2, 226–242.

Bartels, Larry M. (2002), Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, in: *Political Behavior*, 24, 2, 117–150.

Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook (2012), *When and How Partisan Identification Works*, paper prepared for presentation

at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans (cancelled).

Brader, Ted, and Joshua A. Tucker (2012), Follow the Leader: Party Cues, Policy Opinion, and the Power of Partisanship in Three Multiparty Systems, in: *Comparative Politics*, 44, 4, 403–420.

Brader, Ted, and Joshua A. Tucker (2008), *Reflective and Unreflective Partisans? Experimental Evidence on the Links between Information, Opinion, and Party Identification in Russia, Poland, and Hungary*, Department of Political Science, New York: New York University.

Broder, David S. (1971), *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America*, New York: Harper and Row.

Burnham, Walter Dean (1970), *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics*, New York: Norton.

Calvo, Ernesto, and M. Victoria Murillo (2012), When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 46, 7, 851–882.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (1960), *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley.

Carey, John M., and Andrew S. Reynolds (2007), The Role of Political Parties in the Governance of New Democracies, in: *Party Politics*, 13, 2, 255–274.

Chang, Eric, Miriam Golden, and Seth J. Hill (2010), Legislative Malfeasance and Political Accountability, in: *World Politics*, 62, 2, 177–220.

Chong, Alberto, Ana De La O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon (forthcoming), Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice and Party Identification, in: *Journal of Politics*.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman (2007), Framing Theory, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 103–126.

Cowden, Jonathan, and Rose McDermott (2000), Short Term Forces and Partisanship, in: *Political Behavior*, 22, 3, 197–222.

de Figueiredo, Miguel F. P., F. Daniel Hidalgo, and Yuri Kasahara (2013), *When Do Voters Punish Corrupt Politicians? Experimental Evidence from Brazil*, Department of Political Science, Berkeley: University of California.

Della Porta, Donatella, and Alberto Vannucci (2007), Corruption and Anti-corruption: The Political Defeat of 'Clean Hands' in Italy, in: *West European Politics*, 30, 4, 830–853.

Desposato, Scott (2006), The Impact of Electoral Rules on Legislative Parties: Lessons from the Brazilian Senate and Chamber of Deputies, in: *Journal of Politics*, 68, 4, 1018–1030.

Druckman, James N. (2004), Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the (Ir)relevance of Framing Effects, in: *American Political Science Review*, 98, 671–686.

Druckman, James N., and Toby Bolsen (2011), Framing, Motivated Reasoning, and Opinions about Emergent Technologies, in: *Journal of Communication*, 61, 4, 659–688.

Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson (2003), Framing and Deliberation, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 47, 728–744.

Falleti, Tulia G. (2010), *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ferraz, Claudio, and Frederico Finan (2008), Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, in: *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123, 2, 703–745.

Figueiredo, Argelina C., and Fernando Limongi (2000), Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil, in: *Comparative Politics*, 32, 2, 151–170.

Fiorina, Morris P. (2002), Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, in: *Political Behavior*, 24, 2, 93–115.

Fiorina, Morris P. (1981), Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 25, 3, 543–567.

Fish, M. Steven (2006), Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?, in: Andreas Schedler (ed.), *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 181–197.

Gerber, Alan S., Gregory A. Huber, and Ebonya Washington (2010), Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experiment, in: *American Political Science Review*, 104, 4, 720–744.

Gingerich, Daniel (2009), Corruption and Political Decay: Evidence from Bolivia, in: *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 4, 1, 1–34.

Green, Donald P., Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler (2002), *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Iyengar, Shanto, and Kyu S. Hahn (2009), Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, in: *Journal of Communication*, 59, 1, 19–39.

Johnston, Richard (2006), Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of Preferences, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 329–351.

Johnston, Richard, Michael G. Hagen, and Kathleen Hall (2004), *The 2000 Presidential Election and the Foundations of Party Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Klăsnja, Marco, and Joshua Tucker (2013), The Economy, Corruption, and the Vote: Evidence from Experiments in Sweden and Moldova, in: *Electoral Studies*, 32, 3, 536–543.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, and Martin P. Wattenberg (1992), Decaying Versus Developing Party Systems: A Comparison of Party Images in the United States and West Germany, in: *British Journal of Political Science*, 22, 2, 131–149.

Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2006), Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*, Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 3–51.

LAPOP (n.d.), *The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)*, online: <www.LapopSurveys.org> (13 January 2015).

Lavine, Howard, Christopher Johnston, and Marco Steenbergen (2012), *The Ambivalent Partisan: How Critical Loyalty Promotes Democracy*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Lupu, Noam (2013), Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 57, 1, 49–64.

Lupu, Noam, and Susan C. Stokes (2009), The Social Bases of Political Parties in Argentina, 1912–2003, in: *Latin American Research Review*, 44, 1, 58–87.

Mainwaring, Scott (1998), Party Systems in the Third Wave, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 9, 3, 67–81.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully (1995), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

McCann, James A., and Chappell Lawson (2003), An Electorate Adrift? Public Opinion and the Quality of Democracy in Mexico, in: *Latin American Research Review*, 38, 3, 60–81.

Muñoz, Jordi, Eva Anduiza, and Aina Gallego (2013), *Why Do Voters Forgive Corrupt Politicians? Implicit Exchange, Noise, and Cynicism*, Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Mutz, Diana C. (2006), *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative Versus Participatory Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pepinsky, Thomas B., R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani (2012), Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 56, 3, 584–600.

Pereira, Carlos, Marcus André Melo, and Carlos Mauricio Figueiredo (2008), The Corruption-Enhancing Role of Re-Election Incentives? Counterintuitive Evidence from Brazil's Audit Reports, in: *Political Research Quarterly*, 62, 4, 731–744.

Pérez-Liñan, Anibal (2007), *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pharr, Susan J. (2000), Officials' Misconduct and Public Distrust: Japan and the Trilateral Democracies, in: Susan J. Pharr, and Robert D. Putnam (eds), *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Democracies?*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 173–201.

Prior, Markus, Gaurav Sood, and Kabir Khanna (2013), *You Cannot Be Serious: Do Partisans Believe What They Say?*, Department of Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Samuels, David (2006), Sources of Mass Partisanship in Brazil, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48, 2, 1–27.

Samuels, David, and Cesar Zucco (2014), The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 58, 1, 212–225.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2006), The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, in: *World Development*, 34, 2, 381–404.

Smyth, Regina (2006), *Candidate Strategies and Electoral Competition in the Russian Federation: Democracy Without Foundation*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Taber, Charles S., and Milton Lodge (2006), Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 56, 3, 568–583.

Terkildsen, Nadya (1993), When White Voters Evaluate Black Candidates: The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 37, 4, 1032–1053.

Tilley, James, and Sara B. Hobolt (2011), Is the Government to Blame? An Experimental Test of How Partisanship Shapes Perceptions of Performance and Responsibility, in: *Journal of Politics*, 73, 2, 316–330.

Tomz, Michael (2007), Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach, in: *International Organization*, 61, 4, 821–840.

Tomz, Michael, and Jessica Weeks (2013), Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace, in: *American Political Science Review*, 107, 4, 849–865.

Transparency International (2013), *Global Corruption Barometer 2013*, online: <www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report> (12 September 2014).

Turner, John C. (1999), Some Current Issues in Research on Social Identity and Self-Categorization Theories, in: Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears, and Bertjan Doosje (eds), *Social Identity: Context, Commitment, Content*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 6–34.

Weyland, Kurt G. (1996), *Democracy without Equity: Failures of Reform in Brazil*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Wilcox, Nathaniel, and Christopher Wlezien (1993), The Contamination of Responses to Survey Items: Economic Perceptions and Political Judgments, in: *Political Analysis*, 5, 1, 181–213.

Winters, Matthew S., and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2014), Partisan Protesters and Non-Partisan Protests in Brazil, in: *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 6, 1, 137–150, online: <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/733/731> (2 February 2015).

Winters, Matthew S., and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro (2013), Lacking Information or Condoning Corruption When Do Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?, in: *Comparative Politics*, 45, 4, 418–436.

Appendix

Portuguese Version of the Vignette

Bolded brackets indicate the randomized components of the vignette.

> Imagine que existe uma pessoa chamada Gabriel/Gabriela (leia conforme o sexo do entrevistado), que é uma pessoa como você, que vive num bairro como o seu, mas numa cidade diferente do Brasil. O Prefeito da cidade onde Gabriel/Gabriela mora está concorrendo à reeleição em Outubro. Ele é um membro **do PT {do PSDB}**. Na cidade de Gabriel/Gabriela todo mundo sabe que esse Prefeito **frequentemente {nunca}** aceita suborno (dinheiro por fora) para fechar contratos com fornecedores da Prefeitura. **{**Esse Prefeito realizou **várias {poucas}** obras e implantou **vários {poucos}** projetos no seu mandato atual. E na cidade, acredita-se que a eleição para Prefeito será bem concorrida.**}**

Partisanship Question

13) (MOSTRAR DISCO DE PARTIDOS) De qual partido político você se sente mais próximo? (ESTIMULADA) (RU)

	RU	
DEM	1	
PCB	2	
PCO	3	
PC do B	4	
PDT	5	
PHS	6	
PMDB	7	
PMN	8	
PP	9	
PPS	10	PROSSIGA
PR	11	
PRB	12	
PRP	13	
PRTB	14	
PSB	15	
PSC	16	
PSDB	17	
PSDC	18	
PSOL	19	

	RU	
PSL	20	
PSTU	21	
PT	22	
PTB	23	
PTC	24	
PT do B	25	
PTN	26	
PV	27	
Nenhum deles (Não estimular)	97	
Não sabe (Não estimular)	98	
Recusa (Não estimular)	99	

Balance Check

To check that the randomization of the vignettes produced balance across treatment groups on pretreatment covariates, we ran two multinomial logit models where the 12 categories of treatment assignment defined the outcome variable. We compared a null model with no predictors to a model with predictors for gender, age, education, social class; indicators for employment status; an indicator for being Catholic; an indicator for being religious; an indicator for being nonwhite; indicators for being a likely PSDB or PT voter; and indicators for being a PSDB or PT partisan. If the specified model fits the data better than the null model, this would indicate a lack of balance on pretreatment characteristics.

A likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the two models are indistinguishable ($p < 0.93$), meaning that no meaningful correlations are detected across the treatment conditions and respondent characteristics. This shows that the randomization produced balance on pretreatment characteristics across treatment groups.

Because of the length of the coefficient table for a multinomial logit model with 12 outcome categories, we have not included it here. The results are available upon request from the authors.

Results from Corruption Experiment

In our previous work, we examine how the treatments affect respondents' willingness to say that Gabriel(a) will vote for the politicians described in the vignettes. We reproduce below the main table from that study.

The table shows that corruption information reduces the proportion of respondents who say that Gabriel(a) will vote to reelect the mayor. This happens regardless of the information about public goods provision.

	(1) All Vi-gnettes	(2) Competent Vignettes	(3) Incompetent Vignettes	(4) Vignettes without Competence Information
Not Corrupt	0.78 (0.01) N=989	0.88 (0.02) N=329	0.62 (0.03) N=331	0.83 (0.02) N=329
Corrupt	0.19 (0.01) N=985	0.28 (0.02) N=328	0.13 (0.02) N=328	0.16 (0.02) N=329
Difference	0.58 (0.02)	0.59 (0.03)	0.49 (0.03)	0.66 (0.03)
p-value on H_0: No Difference	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Cells report proportion of respondents in each treatment condition who said that Gabriel(a) would be willing to vote for the incumbent mayor.

Assumptions about Corruption under No Information

In a survey run in May 2013, we replicated our experiment with a version of the vignette that includes no information about corruption.

That "pure control" condition reads as follows:

Imagine that you live in a neighborhood similar to your own but in a different city in Brazil. Let's call the mayor of that hypothetical city in which you live Carlos. Imagine that Mayor Carlos is running for reelection. During the four years that he has been mayor, the municipality has experienced a number of improvements, including good economic growth and better health services and transportation.

We can compare that to an otherwise similar vignette in which the following sentence is added:

Also, it is well known in the city that Mayor Carlos has not taken any bribes when awarding city contracts.

And to an otherwise similar vignette in which the following sentence about corruption is added:

Also, it is well known in the city that Mayor Carlos has taken bribes when awarding city contracts

Comparing responses across these three conditions to a follow-up question about the likelihood of voting for the mayor will provide some insight as to whether respondents assume (in the absence of any information about corruption) that mayors are corrupt – in which case the explicit mention of cleanliness will provide a boost to the levels of support for the mayor – or not.

The table below shows that respondents view mayors in the pure control and not corrupt conditions in the same way. The estimated levels of support for these two mayors is almost exactly the same and statistically indistinguishable. On the other hand, the estimated level of support for a corrupt mayor is a full point less than the support for both the pure control and not corrupt conditions and is statistically significant ($p < 0.00$). This suggests that – at least in the presence of positive performance information – the voters in our sample generally assume that mayors are *not* corrupt unless they are explicitly told that they are.

Pure Control	Not Corrupt	Corrupt
3.38	3.39	2.18
(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
N=280	N=280	N=278

Point estimates, standard errors, and numbers of observations for the follow-up question "How likely are you to vote to reelect Mayor Carlos? 'Not at all likely' (1), 'a little likely' (2), 'somewhat likely' (3), or 'very likely' (4)?"

Multinomial Probit Analysis

To increase the efficiency of the estimation of our treatment effects, we run multinomial probit models (which unlike multinomial logit models do not require the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption) with an indicator variable for respondents in the corrupt condition and an interaction between that indicator variable and an indicator for whether or not respondents are in our highly educated category. We control for age, gender, and social class, which are variables that might predict respondents' likelihood of declaring certain political party allegiances, and look at selection into the three outcome categories.

The model below shows the results of the analyses for (i) the overall data, (ii) the PT vignettes only, and (iii) the PSDB vignettes. In each case, the omitted category is nonpartisan, such that the tables show the effect of each variable on the probability of being either a copartisan or a partisan of another party relative to the probability of being nonpartisan.

When the PT and PSDB vignettes are combined (as in Table 2 in the text), we see that high education respondents who receive the corrupt treatment are significantly more likely to declare other partisanship relative to nonpartisanship. The coefficient for the treatment among less educated respondents has a relatively small point estimate for both the copartisan and other partisan outcomes, reinforcing the idea that we see relatively little movement in this group in response to the treatment. There is a positively estimated treatment effect for members of the highly educated group in terms of their likelihood of expressing copartisanship in the treatment condition – this is surprising, but the effect is estimated with significant uncertainty.

Looking only at respondents hearing about PT mayors, the point estimates reinforce this overall pattern: they are quite small for the less educated respondents when looking at the relative probability of declaring either copartisanship or other partisanship and for highly educated respondents when looking at the relative probability of declaring copartisanship, whereas highly educated respondents in the treatment condition are more likely to identify with a party that is not the PT when they have been told about a PT mayor. Although the individual coefficient on the interaction does not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels, the total treatment effect for the highly educated groups (i.e., the linear combination of the coefficients for the indicators of the treatment effect of the corrupt vignette and the conditional treatment effect for highly educated respondents) is significant at the 90 percent confidence level ($p < 0.07$).

Among the PSDB vignettes, the highly educated respondents are, as in the PT vignettes, significantly more likely to declare identification with another party when they hear about a corrupt PSDB mayor. The point estimate appears to indicate that they also – and surprisingly – are more likely to declare PSDB partisanship in the corrupt treatment condition; however, the total treatment effect among this group described by the linear combination of the treatment variable and the conditional treatment variable is not statistically distinguishable from zero ($p < 0.23$), although it clearly is still positive.

	All		PT Vignettes		PSDB Vignettes	
	Coparti-san	Other Party	Copar-tisan	Other Party	Coparti-san	Other Party
Corrupt Vignette	-0.04	0.00	0.05	0.07	-0.28	-0.06
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.12)
Corrupt Vignette * High Education	0.20	0.63***	-0.02	0.51	0.77*	0.75**
	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.34)
Age	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.01***	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Male	0.24**	0.35***	0.13	0.21	0.42**	0.47***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Social Class	0.17***	0.19***	0.08	0.32***	0.44***	0.13
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.08)
High Education	-0.10	-0.29	-0.04	-0.10	-0.32	-0.44*
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.25)
Constant	-0.56***	-0.54***	0.04	-1.20***	-1.83***	-0.13
	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.24)
p-value for χ^2 test on H_0: No Difference High-Education and Low-Education Treatment for Other Party Outcome	0.03		0.31		0.05	
Observations	1,957	1,957	976	976	981	981

Coefficient estimates and standard errors from multinomial probit models where "nonpartisanship" is the base category. *** - p < 0.01; ** - p < 0.05; * - p < 0.10

Distribution of Partisan Declarations under Different Experimental Conditions and across Different Subgroups by Partisan Condition and with a Fuller Partisan Choice Set

In Table 2 in the text, we combine data from both the PT and PSDB treatments and look at copartisanship as a choice variable (which means the selection of PT in the PT treatments and the selection of PSDB in the PSDB treatments). In addition, we combine all other parties (including the

PT in the PSDB treatments and the PSDB in the PT treatments) into the category of "other partisanship."

Here we get closer to the raw data, displaying the partisanship distributions for the PT vignettes and the PSDB vignettes and showing the specific numbers for the PT, PSDB, PMDB, and PV in each case. Because the chi-squared test becomes less reliable when cells have an expected value of less than 5, we group together the many other minor parties that respondents could have selected into an "other" category.

In both the PT and PSDB vignettes, we see the behavior among the highly educated respondents that is summarized in Table 2: nonpartisanship decreases (by 14.5 percentage points in the PSDB vignettes and by 8 percentage points in the PT vignettes), and other partisanship increases (particularly for the PV, which gains by 10 percentage points in the PSDB vignettes and 8.5 percentage points in the PT vignettes). With the data separated between the PT and PSDB vignettes, the chi-squared statistics decrease in size and are not significant at conventional levels for the highly educated. Nonetheless, these results are consistent with those presented in the text and offer further support for the claim that information about corruption actually increases partisan engagement among the most educated.

For the remainder of the sample, the patterns in the data are somewhat more complex than the overall results in Table 2 suggest. In the PT conditions, information about corruption leads to basically no change in the distribution of partisanship, which is consistent with the overall results reported in the text. In contrast, in the PSDB condition among the less educated respondents, the proportion of respondents declaring themselves to be PSDB partisans drops by 2.5 percentage points (or 30 percent), while the proportion of respondents declaring PT partisanship drops by 7.5 percentage points (or 20 percent). The PMDB is the winner for less educated respondents in the PSDB conditions; the proportion of respondents declaring PMDB partisanship doubles for this group. The differences in these distributions are statistically significant.

We did not have a priori hypotheses about how responses among the less educated might vary across the PSDB and PT conditions. We find the loss of PT support under the corrupt-PSDB condition particularly interesting and worthy of further exploration in future research. It is worth noting that PSDB identification is much lower than PT identification in the population as a whole and within this group, which might make it more difficult for less educated respondents to quickly interpret this vignette and might increase the volatility of responses.

PT Vignettes

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.34 (169)	0.06 (29)	0.07 (37)	0.02 (10)	0.07 (34)	0.44 (215)
Corrupt	0.34 (164)	0.07 (35)	0.07 (34)	0.04 (18)	0.07 (36)	0.40 (195)

Panel A: PT Vignettes; All Respondents.

N = 976; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 3.94 ($p < 0.56$).

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.34 (140)	0.06 (24)	0.08 (34)	0.01 (5)	0.06 (26)	0.44 (182)
Corrupt	0.35 (145)	0.07 (28)	0.07 (30)	0.02 (8)	0.07 (29)	0.42 (173)

Panel B: PT Vignettes; Respondents with Completed Secondary Education or Less.

N = 824; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 1.72 ($p < 0.89$).

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.35 (29)	0.06 (5)	0.04 (3)	0.06 (5)	0.10 (8)	0.40 (33)
Corrupt	0.28 (19)	0.10 (7)	0.06 (4)	0.14 (10)	0.10 (7)	0.32 (22)

Panel C: PT Vignettes; Respondents with Some Tertiary Education or More.

N = 152; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 5.25 ($p < 0.39$).

PSDB Vignettes

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.35 (171)	0.09 (45)	0.05 (26)	0.02 (12)	0.04 (21)	0.44 (218)
Corrupt	0.28 (138)	0.07 (33)	0.10 (49)	0.04 (20)	0.06 (31)	0.44 (217)

Panel A: PSDB Vignettes; All Respondents.

N = 981; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 16.32 ($p < 0.01$).

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.36 (151)	0.08 (36)	0.05 (23)	0.02 (10)	0.04 (19)	0.44 (185)
Corrupt	0.28 (120)	0.06 (25)	0.11 (46)	0.03 (12)	0.06 (26)	0.46 (196)

Panel B: PSDB Vignettes; Respondents with Completed Secondary Education or Less.

N = 849; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 14.78 ($p < 0.02$).

	PT	PSDB	PMDB	PV	Other	None
Not Corrupt	0.29	0.13	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.48
	(20)	(9)	(3)	(2)	(2)	(33)
Corrupt	0.29	0.13	0.05	0.13	0.08	0.33
	(18)	(8)	(3)	(8)	(5)	(21)

Panel C: PSDB Vignettes; Respondents with Some Tertiary Education or More.

N = 132; table reports proportion of respondents with number in parentheses.

χ^2 statistic for independence of rows and columns: 7.46 (p < 0.19).

Corrupção Política e Engajamento Partidário: Evidências do Brasil

Abstrato: Em democracias consolidadas, as afiliações partidárias da maior parte dos cidadãos são estáveis e não são afetadas por eventos políticos de curto prazo. No entanto, pesquisas recentes em democracias jovens sugerem que a adesão partidária pode ser mais volúvel nesses contextos. No presente estudo, desenvolvemos hipóteses sobre como a corrupção política pode afetar a afiliação do eleitor aos partidos dos agentes políticos corruptos ou ao sistema partidário por inteiro. Com base em dados colhidos em pesquisa original feita no Brasil, demonstramos que perguntas com cenários de corrupção política mudam os padrões de afiliação partidária dos entrevistados com maior nível de escolaridade. Especificamente, coletamos evidências de que corrupção associada a um partido reduz o apartidarismo e aumenta significativamente a identificação com outros partidos políticos. Por outro lado, concluímos que informações sobre corrupção não têm um efeito mensurável consistente na adesão partidária dos entrevistados com menos educação. Ao final, discutimos sobre as implicações de um partidarismo mais maleável na *accountability* democrática.

Palavras-chaves: Brasil, adesão partidária, corrupção

Journal of Politics in Latin America

Rethinking Democratic Governance: State Building, Autonomy, and Accountability in Correa's Ecuador

James David Bowen

Abstract: This paper argues that rather than theorize state building and democracy separately, we should direct our attention to studying the dual construction of democratic states. To do so, we must understand the contradictory relationship between the concentration of power needed to build state institutions and the constraints on this power dictated by the norms of liberal democracy. I present an outline for studying state building and democratic governance and illustrate my argument with a study of Ecuador. I argue that stable democracy must rest on three pillars: effective state institutions, the autonomy of these institutions from other powerful actors, and the existence of meaningful institutions of accountability. The challenge is that efforts to strengthen one or more of these pillars are likely to undermine the others. I argue that Ecuador, particularly under the Correa administration, has experienced substantial achievements in the area of institution building, has a mixed record with regards to autonomy, and offers little in the way of accountability.

Dr. James David Bowen (PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008) is an assistant professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University, USA. His current research focuses on economic policy and state building, particularly in the Andean region.
E-mail: <jbowen5@slu.edu>

Introduction

In his classic 1968 work Samuel Huntington described a simple but underappreciated phenomenon: when levels of political participation outpace the ability of institutions to channel that participation, societies are in danger of political instability, and political life takes on a more Machiavellian tone (Huntington 1968). Huntington has been widely criticized for providing a theoretical justification of authoritarian regimes that offer some level of political stability. We now know, however, that authoritarianism does not necessarily or easily lead to the institutionalization of political life or to stable patterns of rule. More commonly, authoritarianism simply buries conflict under a layer of state-sponsored violence, which serves as a substitute for political authority, not as an example of it.

More recently, Mainwaring (2006) has extended this argument to explain the poor functioning of democratic institutions in the Andean region of South America. He argues that Andean states are actually quite democratic in the sense that their formal institutions of political representation are open to nearly all citizens on an equal basis. The challenge lies in the deficiencies of Andean states. State deficiency, he argues, "implies more than merely poor government performance – it means that the state fails to fulfill some of its basic governance, legal, and security functions" (Mainwaring 2006: 20). While Mainwaring focuses on courts, police, and the military, there are numerous other arenas in which we can analyze state deficiencies. Analytically, the task is to devote sufficient attention to the institutionalization of political representation and not just to the expansion and deepening of participation.

> Political reforms should focus first and foremost on making states more effective and only secondarily on making systems of representation more open. The formal systems of representation in these countries are already open. The grave deficiency is in state capacity (Mainwaring 2006: 23).

In this paper I present an outline for studying state building and democratic governance and illustrate my argument with a study of the challenges of democratic governance in Ecuador. I argue that stable democracy must rest on three pillars: capable state institutions, the autonomy of these institutions from powerful actors both within and outside the state, and the existence of meaningful institutions of accountability. The challenge is that efforts to strengthen one or more of these dimensions are likely to directly undermine the others. I argue that over the past decade in Ecuador and particularly under the Correa administration, govern-

ments have produced substantial achievements in the area of institution building, have had a mixed record with regards to autonomy, and have offered little in the way of accountability. Rather than merely celebrate the successes of state building while bemoaning the lack of accountability, I show why the latter is a predictable result of the former and why meaningful strengthening of state institutions is unlikely to go hand in hand with improving processes of accountability, at least in the short run.

I focus on Ecuador for several reasons. First, according to the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index, Ecuador ranks 69th out of 177 countries (the lower the number, the more likely a state is to "fail"), which places it in the company of diverse and problematic (but hardly "failing") states like Indonesia, Belarus, Tanzania, Russia, and Venezuela.[1] It thus approximates a middling case of a developing world state in the early twenty-first century. Ecuador is also an attractive case because it has long historical roots compared to much of the postcolonial world, having been an independent state since 1830. This avoids the pitfalls of selecting a relatively "new" state with little independence history. Ecuador has an ethnically diverse population and has high levels of economic inequality (potential sources of state weakness), but its GDP per capita puts it near the global norm (the International Monetary Fund places Ecuador 92nd out of 185 countries).[2] Ecuador has also experienced repeated bouts of political instability since independence, including the extraconstitutional removal of three of the last four elected presidents. In many regards, then, Ecuador is representative of the problems we often associate with weak states in the developing world. It is neither a strong, cohesive state with an effective set of governing institutions, nor a state that has descended into violence, pillage, and misrule.

The State and Democracy

There are a wealth of historical studies concerning state-building projects in Latin America. The most relevant is Centeno's (2002) work on the origins of weak states throughout the region. He argues that most Latin American states were born weak because they had easy access to revenue (via natural resources and debt), which obviated the need to build effective state institutions to extract wealth (via taxation) from their citizens. I begin from this starting point because it ties up with my interest in ex-

---

1   See <www.fundforpeace.org>.
2   See <www.imf.org>.

ploring contemporary states not principally in terms of their security functions (which are increasingly well developed, if not always democratically constrained) but in terms of their ability to manage their societies' inclusion within a globalized economy. More recently, Weyland (2009) has built on the concept of "rentier states" to argue that contemporary states with vast reserves of natural resources (like Ecuador) are likely to behave differently than those lacking such resources. In the cases of recent "left turns" in Latin American politics, Weyland argues that those experiencing windfall rents from price or production spikes (most notably Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) are likely to chart a more radical (i.e., less politically and economically liberal) course than those countries (such as Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil) that did not experience the same bonanza.

Weyland's argument is driven by the looser constraints that windfall rents place on national governments.

> These rents discredit the neoliberal insistence on constraints, suggest the availability of great opportunities, and stimulate radicalism and voluntarist attacks on the established socioeconomic and political order (Weyland 2009: 146).

Resource abundance or scarcity, however, is only one of possibly many constraints. In Ecuador, I will argue, the dollarized economy places real constraints on the ability of state leaders. To the extent heads of state attempt to move beyond such constraints, they do so in much the same way as leaders in resource-poor states: by attempting to build effective state institutions that can collect revenue and regulate economic activity.

An additional constraint, in contrast to earlier periods of state formation, is that state building today is intimately tied up in norms of democracy and human rights. Political democracy has become increasingly important over the past several decades as the primary means of legitimating political authority. However, following Mainwaring (2006), democracy without effective and autonomous state institutions is a recipe for instability and misrule. By contrast, state building without the constraints of binding norms of democracy and human rights is a recipe for violence and authoritarianism. In Latin America norms of liberal democracy have been institutionalized at the international level through the Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States, which requires member states to refuse diplomatic recognition of governments that seize power by nonelectoral means. Though far from being ironclad, the norms and institutional teeth of the Democratic Charter have had a strong influence on transitions to, and the longevity of, democracy in Latin America (Pevehouse 2005).

Much of the critique of democracy in contemporary Latin America has been couched in terms of institutional weakness or the frequently invoked "crisis of governability" (Coppedge 1997). The following section outlines the links between problems of governability (i.e., state weakness and lack of autonomy) and problems of democracy (i.e., lack of effective institutions of accountability). Only by simultaneously considering these three overlapping dimensions can we effectively grapple with the inter-woven challenges of democratic governance.

Dimensions of Democratic State Capacity: Institutions, Autonomy, and Accountability

Many of the problems of democratic governance can be summarized as weaknesses in at least one of three overlapping arenas: institutional capacity, autonomy, and/or accountability. In short, democratic governance is often found wanting because (a) states lack the institutional capacity to carry out some or all of their basic functions such as security, collection of revenue, and/or administration of law; (b) states lack autonomy from important societal actors such as business elites, the military, and/or organized social movements; and/or (c) institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability are undermined by powerful actors within the political system. My contribution in this article is to show, both theoretically and empirically, the challenges inherent in 'addressing' this tripartite dilemma.

There is a vast swath of literature dating back decades that explores various aspects of state building and state strengthening by focusing on particular states' institutional qualities, relative autonomy from particular domestic-based groups, or territorial reach. As Soifer and vom Hau (2008: 220) have argued, however, this conceptual balkanization obscures the fact that most scholars have, in fact, been studying a common object: infrastructural power (Mann 1986: 4) – that is, "the institutional capability to exercise control and implement policy choices within the territory it claims to govern."

Giraudy (2012) has expanded on this definition and made it more empirically tractable by focusing on "diminished subtypes" of strong and weak states. Since very few states in the world can be unequivocally described as either strong or weak, a set of middle-ground concepts is useful. She does this by dividing state strength into three component parts that encompass Mann's concept of infrastructural power: territorial reach, autonomy from nonstate actors, and bureaucratic capacity. Using these three criteria, she then outlines a typology of states based on how

well they meet these three criteria. At the extremes, a weak state would score poorly on all three measures, whereas a strong state would score well on each. Between these extremes she identifies categories such as "crony states" (which possess reach and capacity, but lack autonomy) and "nonreaching states" (which score well on capacity and autonomy, but lack reach), among others.

Although this is a useful contribution to debates on states and state building, neither Giraudy nor most other state-building scholars say much about how state leaders are chosen or to what ends they exercise whatever infrastructural power the state may have. With good reason, scholars have tended *not* to include aspects of regime type (such as democracy) in their conceptualization of state strength, arguing that regime characteristics (e.g., respect for property rights, vertical and horizontal accountability, quality of political parties and electoral procedures) must be treated as conceptually separate from state characteristics (Soifer and vom Hau 2008; Kurtz and Schrank 2012). Although conceptually defensible, this analytical separation of democracy and stateness strength makes little practical sense when norms of democracy and human rights have become increasingly entrenched across the hemisphere. The idea that one can engage in the types of overtly violent statecraft that were plausible and frequently used during periods of state building in Europe and North America is unrealistic.

For that reason, here enters the second key concept in this article: democracy. While a state's infrastructural power defines its 'ability' to act, democracy put limits on who controls those capacities and how they can be used. Whereas state building usually entails efforts to centralize power within a set of national institutions, democracy often works at cross-purposes to this goal by limiting the ability of state leaders to exercise power they might potentially possess. This is particularly true in twenty-first century Latin America, where – as Eaton (2012) has argued – three related structural processes have transformed the nature of the state: democratization, liberalization, and decentralization. According to Eaton,

> by changing what the state does relative to the market (liberalization), which level of the state provides which services (decentralization), and how those who control the state come to occupy those positions (democratization), the three overlapping transitions have introduced a tumultuous period for the state (Eaton 2012: 646).

This tumult has been most obvious in states where moves toward greater democracy have coincided with insurgencies (such as Colombia and Peru

in the 1990s) that threaten the very existence of the state (Mauceri 2004) or where powerful organized crime networks, often linked to the international narcotics trade (e.g., Mexico and much of Central America), undermine the authority and legitimacy of the state.

Moving from very weak states like Colombia and Peru in the 1990s to the less drastic cases throughout much of twenty-first century Latin America (including Ecuador), we can find numerous other normative and practical trade-offs that scholars of the state must confront. From a historical perspective, there is ample evidence that effective state institutions are crucial to fostering economic development, independent of the specific economic policies being pursued (Coatsworth 1998; Mahoney 2010). However, the relationship between democracy and economic growth is causally complex and mediated by many intervening factors (Przeworski and Limongi 1993; Gerring et al. 2005; Fukuyama and Colby 2011).

Rather than theorize the state *and* democracy in Latin America, my task is to theorize the democratic state (and processes of democratic state building). Building from an ideal type of the democratic state, I focus on three conceptual pillars that would support such a state: institutional capacity, political autonomy, and vertical and horizontal accountability. As the case of Ecuador will demonstrate, reforms that strengthen one pillar of democratic governance may directly undermine another. For example, the literature on state building is replete with arguments that link state formation to coercive behaviors that can only be described as antidemocratic (Tilly 1985; Lopez-Alves 2000; Centeno 2002). Norms of democracy and human rights, therefore, serve as an important – if imperfect – check on contemporary state formation that did not exist in previous eras. It would be misleading to expect reforms that strengthen the state to be naturally congruent with norms of democracy.

To move from the coercive politics associated with the formation and strengthening of state institutions to effective democratic governance, state institutions must achieve some level of autonomy from powerful groups both inside and outside the bounds of state institutions. Within the state, threats to autonomy most often come from the military, the bureaucracy, and political parties. Outside the state, such autonomy-threatening groups might include religious organizations, paramilitary groups, economic elites, and organized social movements. States that lack sufficient autonomy from one or more of these groups regularly produce outcomes that are at odds with norms of democratic governance by skewing the policy-making process to such an extent that a small

group of elites can reliably manipulate state institutions for their own benefit.

The possibilities for state autonomy are strengthened by effective institutions of accountability. O'Donnell (1994) usefully distinguished between horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability exists when different state institutions are empowered to check the power of other parts of the state. Independent courts are classic institutions of horizontal accountability, as are the concurrent powers of legislative and executive branches (in presidential systems). Vertical accountability occurs when citizens have the ability to influence the behavior of their representatives, primarily by electing individuals to occupy important public offices and removing officials whose performance is judged to be subpar. Political parties are the classic institutions of vertical accountability. By providing voters with competing alternatives, parties present citizens with the information and organizational capacity to select and remove candidates from public office.

The ideal democratic state would perform well in each of these areas. It would possess a coherent bureaucracy with material and institutional resources that have equal and uniform reach throughout the entire geographic span of the state. These institutions would be able to carry out their duties independent of other centers of economic and political power (such as the military, economic elites, or unelected civil society leaders). And in our ideal-type state, leaders would be held accountable both vertically (by the country's citizens) and horizontally (through effective institutional checks and balances).

Immediately, contradictions and vagaries jump to the fore. How do political leaders achieve the autonomy to make and implement policy without trampling institutions of accountability? In states that have historically lacked institutional capacity and (sometimes) territorial reach and where subnational elites of various stripes have been the direct beneficiaries of these weaknesses, how do leaders attempt to strengthen the capacity of state institutions without succumbing to the autonomy-threatening demands of local power brokers who can potentially block state-building attempts (see Eaton 2011)?

Given my focus on democratic governance, I have deliberately side-stepped the question of elections. There is an extensive literature on the importance of elections for democratic governance, and my analysis of political parties implicitly acknowledges the important role elections play. However, I wish to focus on how governments behave, rather than on how they are selected. Therefore, I treat reasonably competitive elections

as an assumption. In the case of Ecuador I contend that elections, while imperfect, sufficiently meet basic standards of fairness (Bowen 2012).

Following the logic described above, my empirical argument consists of three steps. First, I explore institutional reforms designed to strengthen the capacity of the Ecuadorian state. I use the areas of taxation and economic policy to illustrate how the capacity of key state institutions has improved over the past decade. Studying state formation in today's world means examining not only coercive institutions but also state institutions designed to manage a society's relationship to the capitalist world economy (Schneider 2012). The ability to intervene effectively in the market is, after security functions, arguably any state's most important characteristic; in this respect, developing world states have demonstrated diverse capacities for such interventions (Kohli 2004). Accordingly, I focus on reforms that enhance the state's ability to collect taxes from difficult-to-tax constituencies and the ability of the state to formulate and implement economic regulations.

Second, I explore the question of state autonomy. Here I describe efforts by president Rafael Correa to make policy choices independent of important organized groups in society (namely, business groups and the country's indigenous movement). Finally, in the area of accountability, I discuss the collapse of Ecuador's party system and Correa's efforts to build an effective political party. This effort has largely failed and, accordingly, accountability now appears to be the weakest of Ecuador's three "democratic legs." The specific aspects of institutional capacity, autonomy, and accountability I have chosen to explore are intended to be illustrative and not comprehensive. They provide a useful way of analyzing and understanding the competing imperatives of democratic governance in contemporary Ecuador and other developing world states.

Background

State institutions historically have been weak in Ecuador. The country's tortuous geography meant that until well into the twentieth century the coast and highland regions of the country were effectively cut off from one another. In this context, local political and economic power mattered far more than state policy. For most of its first century, the Ecuadorian state could not reliably put currency into circulation given rampant counterfeiting and alternative currencies emitted by private banks. A viable central bank was not established until 1925 (Miño 2008). The national military fared little better, repeatedly bested by its neighbors and eventually losing over half of the country's original territory. It was also

routinely unable to defend the government in power from domestic unrest (Henderson 2008). The entire Amazonian region of the country was generally ungoverned by state authorities in Quito.

The current political situation, however, differs from the institutional weakness of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in important ways. Most importantly, the technical tools of state building are now more widely available to would-be institution builders. Roads and communication networks (not to mention more recent technologies such as mobile telephones and the Internet) connect the vast majority of Ecuador's population. At least some state institutions exist even in the most remote regions of the country. Regional divisions, though still stark, are less politically salient now that economic, political, and family relationships increasingly tie the country's major regions together. Simply ignoring the state is much less viable than it was during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The ongoing struggle of Guayaquil's powerful mayor, Jaime Nebot, to assert his city's autonomy from the central government attests to the increasing ability of the state to exert its authority in the face of local opposition (Eaton 2011; Interview, Jaime Nebot).

Although a full analysis of the sources of institutional weakness is beyond the scope of this paper, one key factor was the restructuring of the state that occurred throughout Latin America as a result of the debt crisis of the 1980s. Andean states, already precarious, were further weakened by repeated attempts to "modernize" or "rationalize" state institutions in ways consistent with market reforms in vogue at the time. While these reforms advanced further in some states than in others, the statecraft required to promote such reforms resulted in the gutting of state institutions precisely at a time when political democratization and the expansion of citizenship rights meant that more citizens were permitted to make demands on the political system (Conaghan and Malloy 1994; Yashar 2005; Silva 2009).

Although not at the forefront of the neoliberal wave of the 1980s and 1990s, Ecuador underwent a significant process of state retrenchment beginning in the 1980s (Andrade 2009; Montúfar 2000). As O'Donnell (1993) presciently noted, however, reducing the scope of state action without taking into account its impact on the ability of state institutions to perform some of their most basic functions (e.g., administration of justice, tax collection, and maintenance of a stable currency) created states that were smaller and weaker rather than leaner and more efficient. In Ecuador this became most apparent over the course of the 1990s as privatizations led to the plunder of state assets; a largely unregulated financial sector cannibalized itself (taking a large chunk of the

country's economy with it); and business elites competed for privileged access to key state institutions (such as the Central Bank), which could provide crucial information about coming devaluations (North 2004). By the end of the 1990s the economy was prostrate, the currency had collapsed (replaced in 2000 by complete dollarization), the financial sector lay in ruins, and the political system was widely discredited and unstable. Three consecutive elected presidents would fail to finish their terms between 1996 and 2005.

The weakness of Andean states has also been reflected in the weakness of the region's political parties. In 1995 Mainwaring and Scully qualified the party systems of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru as "inchoate." Since then the traditional political parties in each country have virtually collapsed, leaving a representational vacuum that has been filled largely by social movements. In Ecuador the four major political parties that had together dominated electoral politics since the return to democracy in 1978 (accounting for about 75 percent of all presidential and congressional votes cast during the period 1978–2005)[3] won only 26.55 percent in the first round of presidential voting in 2006 and did not run candidates for president in 2008 (although some of them did support candidates from other parties).[4] In voting for representatives to the National Assembly (which replaced the old National Congress following approval of a new constitution in 2008), the traditional parties won 19.96 percent of valid votes (and nearly two-thirds of that total was won by the PSC). Traditional parties even fared poorly in their historic strongholds. The ID won only 4.06 percent of the congressional vote in the highland province of Pichincha (where the capital, Quito, is located), which it once dominated. The PSC fared better in its traditional stronghold, Guayas province, winning 35.48 percent of valid congressional votes in its renewed form as the PSC-Madera de Guerrero Movement under the leadership of Jaime Nebot, the popular mayor of Guayaquil. The 2013 presidential and legislative elections reinforced the trend toward party system disintegration – for instance, the Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), Partido Renovador Institucional de Acción Nacional (PRIAN), and PRE all saw their levels of legislative representation significantly reduced, while two long-standing parties (the DP and the ID) disappeared entirely.

---

3   These parties are Democracia Popular (DP, later renamed the Unión Demócrata Cristiana (UDC)), the Izquierda Democrática (ID), the Partido Roldocista Ecuatoriano (PRE), and the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC).

4   All electoral data come from the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) website: <www.cne.gob.ec>.

After winning a third presidential term in February 2013, Correa and his allies have now convincingly won six consecutive electoral contests (his first presidential election in 2006, the *consulta* to call for a constitutional assembly in 2007, the election of delegates to the constitutional assembly in 2007, the national referendum approving the new constitution in 2008, his second presidential election in 2009, and his third presidential election in 2013). The remainder of this paper traces some of Correa's more important accomplishments and failures since 2006, focusing on efforts to reconstruct state authority and its implications for democratic governance.

Twenty-First Century Institution Building

Correa arrived at the presidency with the clear intention of reasserting state influence over numerous areas of economic and social life in Ecuador. Leaving aside the wisdom or ethics of any particular set of policies, my interest here is in the process of (re)constituting the state in ways that may or may not be consistent with democratic practices. In this section I explore some of the more significant political, economic, and legal reforms made during the Correa administration (although some have their roots in previous administrations) and ask how these reforms have contributed – or not – to state building and democratic governance. I focus on three specific areas that correspond to my interest in reforms that impact or demonstrate institutional capacity, autonomy, and accountability: economic and tax policy, state-society relations, and political party building. I have chosen these areas because they are areas where the Ecuadorian state has historically been "deficient." Economic policy (to the extent that, in the past, one can speak of a coherent national economic policy) has been driven largely by business elites and international financial institutions (IFIs). Tax policy has at times been progressive, but the state has rarely had the capacity to implement tax rules on the upper class. In the absence of strong parties that link citizens to the state, civil society organizations and social movements have intervened directly in the political process, which has resulted in high levels of political instability and policy discontinuity.

Institutional Capacity and Economic Policy

In his first year in office, Correa moved to exert greater control over the country's banking and financial sector. By late 2008 the government had approved the Financial Security Law (*Ley de Seguridad Financiera*), which

among other things required banks to place 0.25 percent of their deposits (plus an initial contribution of 3 percent of deposits) in a liquidity fund that serves as a lender of last resort for troubled banks. This percentage has been raised gradually to 5 percent in 2012 and is scheduled to rise 1 percent annually until reaching 10 percent in 2017 (Weisbrot, Johnston, and Lefebvre 2013: 7). By early 2013 the liquidity fund had reached USD 1.2 billion, a strong indication of the institutional capacity to collect new revenues from some of the most powerful financial institutions in the country. Moreover, the law gave the government the authority to put ceilings on the interest banks can charge and reduced or eliminated common fees for a variety of banking services.

Reacting to the new rules, executives from three of the country's largest banks (Produbanco, Banco Pichincha, and MM Jaramillo Arteaga) sent an unambiguous letter to the president arguing that,

> by the way in which the government carries out economic policy it demonstrates its eagerness to control the country's financial system […] It is better to make the process more transparent by stating that the stockholders of the banking institutions are disposed to talk with government authorities in order to negotiate a fair sale price for these institutions if this is the government's interest (Ospina 2009).

This declaration from some of Ecuador's most powerful bankers shows how far their political power has fallen vis-à-vis the state. Not only has the Correa administration sought to regulate the banking sector, it has demonstrated the institutional capacity to make these regulations stick. As Guillermo Lasso, president of the country's second largest bank (Banco de Guayaquil) argued,

> The president [Correa] doesn't listen to me. Everything I tell him he doesn't do, and he makes laws that affect our business. Now we have to comply because laws are laws (*El Comercio* 2009a, Interview, Guillermo Lasso).

The fact that major bankers were offering their institutions for sale (at least rhetorically) is an important indicator that they doubt their capacity to evade the control of state authorities. Regardless of the economic wisdom of the government's policy, the imposition of prerogatives of some of the country's most powerful financial institutions on the individual and collective is an indication of rising state capacity.

While state authority has been reconstructed and reasserted under the Correa government, economic policy has begun to take on tones reminiscent of the period of import substituting industrialization (ISI) of

the 1960s and 1970s. The institutionalization of this new economic thinking is embodied in the National Secretariat for Planning and Development (SENPLADES), which is tasked with planning long-term development strategies at both the national and local levels. In 2009 SENPLADES began publicly developing a long-term development plan with the explicit goal of moving Ecuador away from its historical dependence on the export of primary products such as cacao, bananas, and petroleum. The strategy has four phases to be carried out over 16 years. The first phase (lasting through 2013) relied on the aggressive export of oil, other minerals, and agricultural products alongside the government's promotion of technology transfer in these fields and selective import substitution. The second phase seeks to develop a new energy matrix, converting Ecuador into an exporter of non-carbon-based energy resources, particularly hydroelectric energy. This phase depends on the relatively rapid development of Ecuador's scientific and technological knowledge base, which is being driven by a significant expansion of funding for postsecondary scholarships in strategic areas through the Secretary of Higher Education, Science, Technology, and Innovation (SENESCYT). The final two phases (scheduled to end in 2025) aim at substituting most of Ecuador's traditional exports (in agriculture and mineral extraction) and developing biotechnology and alternative tourism that both respects and capitalizes on Ecuador's vast biodiversity (Ospina 2009: 8).

Phases three and four are too far in the future to comment on with any level of certainty, so I restrict myself to the plans and specific policies Correa has put in place regarding the first two phases of the SENPLADES plan. The first phase was obviously the easiest in that it was primarily an escalation of Ecuador's current primary export model and thus increased state control with the goal of generating the resources needed to fund the later stages of development. Correa has sought out greater investment (particularly from China) in copper and gold mining; although this should generate significant new revenues in the near future, it has also generated enormous social conflict, particularly with Ecuador's influential indigenous movement, which Correa has struggled to manage (Dosh and Kligerman 2010).

Given the important role that the agro-export sector played in this first stage of the SENPLADES development plan, it is not surprising that early talk of agrarian reform has come to relatively little. Of the major sectors of the Ecuadorian economy, agriculture remains the most untouched by the Correa administration. Laws regarding rural land redistribution (*ley de tierras*) and prioritization of access to water (*ley de aguas*)

remain stalled in the National Assembly. Competing interest groups and social movements have repeatedly mobilized both for and against these laws, but none have the political strength within the Correa administration to either push them through or definitively defeat them.

Moving beyond this first phase, Correa foresees transforming Ecuador into an energy-exporting (not just oil-exporting) power, particularly through the development of hydroelectric energy. If successful, this would reduce Ecuador's need to import fuel and could resolve many of the country's medium-term budget problems, freeing up funds to invest in priorities that feed the goals of the third and fourth phases of the development plan.[5]

During his second term, Correa continued to selectively move against concentrated economic power, especially within Ecuador's financial system. According to norms set in the 2009 Constitution, banks cannot legally own media outlets. In October 2010 the National Assembly approved, and President Correa signed, a law further strengthening this prohibition. The Antimonopoly Law (*Ley de Regulación y Control del Poder del Mercado*, better known as the *Ley Anti-monopolio*), forbids anyone who owns more than 6 percent of a bank or media outlet from holding an economic interest in any other sector. The idea is to deconcentrate ownership of politically powerful assets (banks and the media) in order to avoid a repeat of the scandals in the late 1990s, which saw several banks use their controlling stake in television channels and other media to advance their own political and economic agendas. The law also has a provision to ban the concentration of financial services within a single conglomerate by requiring that financial groups be made up of no more than one commercial bank or of no more than two different types of financial institutions such as investment banks, financial societies, or insurance firms. It also set up a regulatory body with responsibility for enforcing antitrust legislation (Weisbrot, Johnston, and Lefebvre 2013: 13).

The continuing increase in public spending (without recourse to independent monetary policy, given Ecuador's dollarized economy) has left Correa on a constant hunt for cash to fund his development model. Strengthening oil prices and a weakening dollar (relative to neighboring currencies) have provided welcome relief but have still left the government scrambling to ensure the medium- and long-term viability of its "Citizens' Revolution." In a positive sign of growing institutional capaci-

---

5   Although Ecuador exports oil, it lacks refining capacity and thus imports most of its fuel needs.

ty, much of this new revenue has come from various forms of taxation. The overall tax burden, which had been rising since dollarization in 2000, rose to 15.3 percent in 2012 (up from 11.2 percent a decade earlier) and is now in line with regional norms in Latin America.[6] Equally telling, in terms of institutional capacity in the area of taxation, is how and from whom these taxes are collected. The largest growth in tax revenue has come from direct taxes rather than indirect taxes (e.g., value-added taxes), which are usually easier to collect. In fact, Ecuador's value-added tax has declined to 12 percent (lower than neighboring Colombia's and Peru's). New tax revenue is being generated primarily from the wealthy, as indicated by significant growth in revenue from the capital export tax (*impuesto a la salida de divisas*), a windfall profits tax, and a tax on rural properties of more than 25 hectares (Weisbrot, Johnston, and Lefebvre 2013: 14). By 2012 taxes were generating more revenue for the government than oil, which is surprising given the relatively high price of oil and growing governmental control over the industry (*El Universo* 2013).

A less auspicious sign for institutional capacity (or government spending priorities) is that Correa's government continues to borrow aggressively from regional development banks (such as the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)) and to seek direct loans from China. According to the most recently released budget (2014), the government is projecting a deficit of USD 4.943 billion (approximately 5 percent of GDP), which is to be financed through borrowing and the "presale" of oil to China. This indicates an impending need to either restrain government spending (a political choice) or further consolidate the state's taxing capacity in order to generate additional revenues.

In addition to improving the collection rate of existing taxes, the Correa administration has passed a series of "green taxes" designed to produce new revenue, stimulate domestic production, protect the local environment, and improve the health of Ecuadorian citizens. These taxes have been controversial, with various private-sector representatives labeling them desperate money grabs, designed to sustain the government's spending machine (Interview, Inés Manzano). So far, the government has levied new taxes on vehicle contamination (via a tax on older vehicles), plastic bottles, cigarettes, and alcohol. Other taxes (including one on plastic bags) have been considered and shelved. Beyond the potential environmental and health benefits of the new taxes, this new tax stream

---

6   All tax data in this section come from Ecuador's *Servicio de Rentas Internas* and are available at: <www.sri.gob.ec>.

has generated significant revenue and is an area where the government is interested in pursuing further action because of the multiple benefits it provides (Interview, Carola Borja).

Voters also indirectly provided the government with a new source of revenue through a May 2011 referendum in which they approved penalizing employers who do not formally register their workers for the country's social security program. Not only has this resulted in many informal workers being registered and becoming eligible for social security benefits, it also provides the government with a centralized source of domestic savings that it can mobilize to fund various development projects via the Banco del Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social (BIESS, the Bank of the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute) – in particular low-interest home loans that have fed an ongoing construction boom.

Although representatives of the private sector have complained loudly about the policies and confrontational rhetoric of the Correa administration, my research suggests that most businesspeople quietly acquiesce to and benefit from a series of probusiness policies. In the banking sector, for example, despite tighter regulations in recent years, bank profits have remained respectable, with return on equity varying from a low of 10.15 percent (in 2013) to a high of 18.91 percent (in 2011) (Alvaro 2014). Additionally, in August 2009 the government announced plans to repatriate 7 percent of the country's social security funds that had been invested overseas. The money (approximately USD 300 million) was used to provide affordable credit to Ecuadorian businesses, particularly in the agricultural, industrial, and tourism sectors (*El Comercio* 2009b). Furthermore, banks are now required to hold at least 45 percent of their deposits in Ecuador. This measure opens up greater opportunities for affordable credit to Ecuadorian businesses, which are mostly locked out of international credit markets at affordable rates (due in part to the government's decision to default on a significant portion of debts it deemed "illegitimate"). Although politically minded Ecuadorian business leaders have protested vehemently against the president's "antibusiness" policies, it is instructive that most US companies operating in Ecuador, with the possible exception of those involved in the extraction of natural resources, have found the Correa administration to be a reasonably reliable business partner (Interview, Jorge Farah).

Autonomy and State-Society Relations

In the previous sections I analyzed various components of the capacity of the state to design and implement economic and tax policies. However, if we are interested in democracy in addition to institution building,

we must also inquire into the autonomy of the state. Part of the result of institutional weakness in Ecuador has been the very significant role that civil society organizations and social movements have had in making (and unmaking) government policy. As Mejía Acosta et al. (2008) have argued, Ecuadorian civil society groups have served as "last-ditch veto players" given their capacity to overturn government policy that impacts their constituents and interests. The challenge of democratic institution builders is to assert the ability of the state apparatus to design and implement policies without crushing the autonomous organizing capacity of civil society groups. The question, then, is whether the state can assert its autonomy from a variety of interested groups while remaining accountable to its citizens. This points to the complicated relationship between the concepts of autonomy and accountability. Democratic theorists agree that the state should be accountable to its citizens, but when does accountability turn into capture of the state by particular groups? This is a conceptual dilemma that I cannot resolve in this paper, but it demonstrates the thin line that would-be state builders must walk.

Under Correa the state has achieved a degree of autonomy that it has not had since at least the era of military rule in the 1970s. This is partially due to the political stability induced by Correa's series of electoral victories as well as high oil prices, which have bought the government some extra room to maneuver. Without the constant fear of coming under attack from any number of mobilized social forces (and then having to fend off relentless attacks from opposition politicians who sense a weakened president), the government has been more able to challenge the privileges that these organizations extracted from previous governments and that have become cemented in state institutions.

Two particular cases help illustrate this point. In May 2009 the president issued a presidential decree permitting the Ministry of Education to evaluate the country's roughly 118,000 public primary and secondary school teachers with the stated goal of improving the quality of instruction. Those teachers who did not pass the evaluation would be given a year of mandatory (and free) training and would then be reassessed. Those who failed a second time would lose their teaching positions. The evaluations consisted of both an internal evaluation (where teachers evaluated themselves and each other) and an external evaluation (where teachers were evaluated by representatives from the Ministry of Education).

The Unión Nacional de Educadores (UNE, the National Teachers' Union) declared its opposition to the evaluation, arguing that it was merely a pretext for the government to remove public school teachers

and use those jobs to reward government supporters. UNE declared various strikes and work stoppages throughout the summer and announced that its members would not participate in the government-run evaluation (but would agree to evaluations run by the UNE itself). Despite the protests of this powerful union, which had long maintained a stranglehold on public education policy through its alliance with the Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD), the government moved ahead with evaluations. The figures show that the government was reasonably successful in evaluating teachers despite the objections of the UNE. In the coastal provinces (where experts expected the highest level of opposition to the government-run evaluations) 64.6 percent of teachers were evaluated (Ministerio de Educación 2009). Even though these numbers are far from perfect, they reflect the government's willingness and reasonable capacity to distance itself from a powerful civil society organization (that had previously supported Correa) in order to implement policy (*The Economist* 2009).

There was a similar situation regarding Ecuador's most influential social movements, the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). Despite falling on hard times following its ill-fated participation in the indigenous uprising/ military coup that brought Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez to power briefly in 2001, CONAIE put up strong opposition to several of Correa's policies including the Mining Law (*Ley Minera*) which allowed for an expansion of mining and oil exploration, often on indigenous lands. At the parochial level, CONAIE has resisted the government's decision to strip CONAIE of its authority to manage development funds earmarked for indigenous peoples. The funds, allocated by the Council for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities and Peoples (CODENPE), had been administered by CONAIE since the fund was created in 1998 and totaled over USD 12 million in 2009. Correa decided to fold those funds into the broader National Council for Equality (Consejo Nacional por la Igualdad), run in part by presidential appointees (Ospina 2009). CONAIE's attempts to mobilize a national protest quickly fizzled out and it ultimately lost its control over the CODENPE funds. CONAIE has also been divested of its administrative authority over the country's bilingual education program (which sees indigenous students learn in both Spanish and their ancestral language), which is once again being overseen by the Ministry of Education. So far, CONAIE has been unable to muster the political muscle to challenge these changes.

The Correa administration has demonstrated a level of political autonomy uncommon among recent Ecuadorian governments. Many of

Correa's critics, however, see this autonomy as a sign of the president's authoritarian predilections rather than of greater democracy within Ecuador. This perfectly illustrates the challenges of state building in a formally democratic context. Many scholars and human rights observers have denounced the criminalization of protest activities in Ecuador, particularly surrounding antimining protests (Bowen 2012; Amnesty International 2012). Autonomy is a necessary condition for democracy, but is clearly insufficient. To think about strengthening democracy, we must move to a third set of issues that revolve around political accountability. Only in cases where we have effective state institutions with autonomous yet accountable leaders can we speak of democratic governance in substantive terms.

Accountability and Political Parties

One can find numerous examples of nondemocratic governments leading states that have a reasonably high degree of both capacity and autonomy. Within Latin America the case of Chile under General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990) readily comes to mind. The sine qua non of democratic governance, therefore, is public accountability to a broad (preferably universal) segment of citizens. In contemporary democracies this is accomplished through competition between programmatic political parties. Theoretically, political parties serve the dual function of representing citizens' diverse preferences and, through competitive elections, holding governments accountable for their actions. Political parties are certainly not the only institutions of accountability (e.g., independent courts play a crucial role in providing effective "horizontal" accountability), but they stand out as independent organizations that can both proactively represent citizen desires and reactively enforce accountability on those in power.

Historically, Ecuadorian parties have been weak instruments, often managed by populist political leaders. Despite their many shortcomings, however, the major political parties largely endured from Ecuador's transition to democratic rule in 1978 into the twenty-first century. During the past decade, however, the party system has gradually disintegrated into what Sánchez (2009) has called a party nonsystem, whereby parties, movements, and candidates from outside the existing party system win elections and displace the existing party system without forming a new and relatively stable new system.

As mentioned earlier, the four major parties that formed the backbone of Ecuador's inchoate party system since the return to democratic rule have been decimated in the last five years, with the partial exception

of the PSC in Guayas province. The sweeping electoral success of Correa and his allies likely has as much to do with a popular rejection of *partidocracia* as with genuine support for Correa and candidates from his party.[7] This makes the task of party building all the more imperative since, in an economically volatile country like Ecuador, the president's high personal approval rating is unlikely to provide a basis for long-term political stability. Political authority, if it is to endure, must be institutionalized.

Since Alianza País (AP) was created originally as an electoral vehicle to support Correa's 2006 presidential candidacy (and it ran no candidates for Congress in those elections), the party has certainly become susceptible to the criticism of being yet another unrepresentative electoral machine feeding the aspirations of its leader but with little capacity to aggregate and represent the interests of voters. Perhaps the most important action AP leaders have taken in order to broaden the party base (beyond just Correa supporters), strengthen its presence throughout the country, and build a durable institutional structure was to hold primary elections in November 2008. This marked the first time in Ecuador's history that a political party held primary elections to choose all of its candidates for executive and legislative office.[8]

The 2008 primaries revealed some of the challenges facing AP, but also gave the party the opportunity to start addressing these problems. The most glaring issue facing AP leaders is that the party is much weaker at the local level than at the national level. The primaries drew far fewer voters than the government had hoped for (approximately 300,000 voters compared to Correa's goal of 1 million primary voters), but the elections were relatively successful in creating links between the national party and local candidates. Although there were accusations of fraud in various parts of the country, Ospina (2009) argues that these accusations are more an indication of local power struggles than of widespread electoral malfeasance. Local power struggles were most visible (in terms of accusations of election irregularities) in the coastal provinces of Guayas, Los Rios, and Manabí (where Correa's core ideological support is weakest), where local power brokers remain influential. The primary election process brought these conflicts to the fore as both types of candidates fought for the AP nomination for local, provincial, and national offices.

---

7   The term *partidocracia* ("partyocracy") is a derogatory term used widely in Ecuador and many other Latin American countries to denote the oligarchic tendencies of many traditional political parties and party systems.

8   The Izquierda Democrática held primary elections in the 1980s, but only to choose its presidential candidate.

The primaries thus provided a relatively clear picture of AP's institutional strengths and weaknesses (e.g., there were relatively fewer conflicts and fraud accusations in the highlands) while also providing a potential mechanism for party strengthening in areas where citizens' and candidates' links to the party remain tenuous.

In part due to the challenges of controlling the outcomes of primary elections, AP has not repeated the exercise in subsequent elections, as Correa has continued to concentrate power within the party. Although AP has a near stranglehold on the most important national-level political institutions (including a legislative supermajority), party competition is much more lively at the local level. In the most recent round of subnational elections (February 2014), AP lost control of Quito and Cuenca (the country's capital and its third largest city) and failed to win any of the 10 largest cities. While this was certainly a political setback for Correa and his party, it also represents the ongoing fragmentation of Ecuador's party system, since most of the newly elected mayors (with the major exception of Jaime Nebot in Guayaquil) do not represent long-standing political parties but rather local and regional political movements designed to advance a single candidate. The tradition of political parties with weak societal roots continues to shape Ecuador's political landscape.

If AP is able to consolidate itself as a strong, representative leftist party, this may provide strong incentives for right-wing actors to renovate their forms of political representation (Duverger 1954; Conaghan 1987). Despite being well served by the old *partidocracia* for nearly two decades, conservative elites are now facing their own crisis of representation. This crisis may well lead to a regeneration of right-wing parties (the PSC seems to be the most likely candidate for a revival) that can compete with AP. The field of parties for the 2013 national elections and 2014 subnational elections suggests that the largest centrist and right-wing parties remain disorganized, clientelistic, and populist. This is infertile ground for transforming democratic elections into democratic governance.

Other institutional changes put in place in the new constitution may contribute to stabilizing a new party system and improving accountability. One particular reform merits attention for its potential role in "normalizing" both the party system and legislative-executive relations. The concept of *muerte cruzada* (mutual death), which forms part of the new constitution, allows the executive branch to dissolve the National Assembly and for the National Assembly to dismiss the president. In exercising this option, however, the branch that dissolves or dismisses the

other also ends its own mandate. The idea is to force the two branches into a less confrontational stance given the past tendency of Congress (which was almost always controlled by the president's partisan opponents) to seek to undermine the sitting president with little accountability of its own. This new quasi-parliamentary arrangement will ensure that such a strategy creates serious political risks for all parties and will thus, it is hoped, help to establish effective norms of horizontal accountability. Theoretically, one can expect that new rules designed to stabilize legislative-executive relations will also stabilize the political parties represented in the legislative branch. Adequately evaluating this proposition, however, is currently not possible given the lack of time that has passed since the concept's introduction and the fact that the AP's supermajority in the National Assembly means there is relatively little discord between the executive and legislative branches.

Conclusion: Building the Postliberal State?

As Linz and Stepan (1996) noted nearly two decades ago, the sine qua non of liberal democracy is a functioning state. This points to the tension, inherent in building liberal polities, between the needs of state building (e.g., centralization of power) and the dictates of democracy (e.g., state autonomy, individual freedom, and political accountability). The construction of effective state institutions is empirically prior to the liberalization of politics. The difficulty that Latin American states have faced in building effective democratic governments is not the lack of democratic traditions (Drake 2009), but precisely the fact that leaders both within and outside the region have tried to advance the formal institutions of democracy without the edifice of effective state institutions.

In this article I have attempted to refocus the debate on democratization and institution building in Ecuador. Theories of democracy and democratization that do not seriously engage the diverse institutional challenges that exist in weak states risk misdiagnosing what ails many regions of the developing world. The three pillars of the democratic state described in this article (institutional capacity, autonomy, and accountability) do not flow obviously and easily from any single political or economic philosophy, but must be built, pragmatically, on the ground in often difficult political and economic environments. And although all three pillars may be normatively desirable, efforts to strengthen one pillar may undermine (intentionally or not) the others. This type of analysis suggests the need for greater attention to the relationship between sys-

tems of representation and participation (i.e., democracy) and systems of order and domination (i.e., state building).

The economic, political, and social reforms initiated in recent years will not resolve many of Ecuador's long-standing problems. As a small, dependent country, Ecuador will remain susceptible to political and economic volatility in other regions of the world. However, the types of institution building discussed in this paper give the country at least a fighting chance of achieving the elusive goal of political stability that would allow actors to pursue new agendas that have been blocked in the past by a series of political and economic crises. Correa's "Citizens' Revolution" will be enduring and meaningful to the extent it can build a functioning and autonomous state apparatus. It will be democratic to the extent that it finds a way to channel political representation through representative and accountable political parties without crushing everything in its path.

References

Alvaro, Mercedes (2014), Ecuador's Banks Face Tougher Regulations, in: *Wall Street Journal*, 24 January.

Amnesty International (2012), *'So that No One Can Demand Anything': Criminalizing the Right to Protest in Ecuador*, London: Amnesty International.

Andrade, Pablo (2009), *La era neoliberal y el proyecto republicano: La recreación del Estado en el Ecuador contemporáneo: 1992-2006*, Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.

Bowen, James (2012), Ecuador, in: Freedom House (ed.), *Countries at the Crossroads, 2011*, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 179–198.

Centeno, Miguel (2002), *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Coatsworth, John (1998), Economic and Institutional Trajectories in Nineteenth-Century Latin America, in: John Coatsworth and Alan Taylor (eds), *Latin America and the World Economy Since 1800*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 23–54.

Conaghan, Catherine (1987), Party Politics and Democratization in Ecuador, in: James Malloy and Mitchell Seligson (eds), *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 145–163.

Conaghan, Catherine, and James Malloy (1994), *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Coppedge, Michael (1997), El concepto de la gobernabilidad: Modelos positivos y negativos, in: Esteban Vega (ed.), *Ecuador: Un problema de gobernabilidad*, Quito: Corporación de Estudios para el Desarrollo, 1–27.

Dosh, Paul, and Nicole Kligerman (2010), Correa vs. Social Movements: Showdown in Ecuador, in: *NACLA: Report on the Americas*, 42, 5, 21–24.

Drake, Paul (2009), *Between Tyranny and Anarchy: A History of Democracy in Latin America, 1800–2006*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Duverger, Maurice (1954), *Political Parties*, New York: Wiley.

Eaton, Kent (2012), The State of the State in Latin America: Challenges, Challengers, Responses and Deficits, in: *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32, 3, 643–657.

Eaton, Kent (2011), Conservative Autonomy Movements: Territorial Dimensions of Ideological Conflict in Bolivia and Ecuador, in: *Comparative Politics*, 43, 3, 291–301.

El Comercio (2009a), La fractura banca – Gobierno se ahonda, 21 June.

El Comercio (2009b), 300 millones de la reserve van al crédito*,* 19 August.

El Universo (2013), La recaudación de impuestos supera a ingresos petroleros, 6 January.

Fukuyama, Francis, and Seth Colby (2011), Half a Miracle, in: *Foreign Policy*, May/June, 4–8.

Gerring, John, Phillip J. Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno (2005), Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective, in: *World Politics*, 57, 3, 323–364.

Giraudy, Agustina (2012), Conceptualizing State Strength: Moving Beyond Strong and Weak States, in: *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32, 3, 599–611.

Henderson, Peter (2008), *Gabriel García Moreno and Conservative State Formation in the Andes*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Huntington, Samuel (1968), *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kohli, Atul (2004), *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kurtz, Marcus, and Andrew Schrank (2012), Capturing State Strength: Experimental and Econometric Approaches, in: *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 32, 3, 613–621.

Linz, Juan, and Alfred Stepan (1996), *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lopez-Alves, Fernando (2000), *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Mahoney, James (2010), *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott (2006), The Crisis of Representation in the Andes, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 17, 3, 13–27.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully (eds) (1995), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mann, Michael (1986), *The Sources of Social Power, Volume One: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mauceri, Philip (2004), States, Elites, and the Response to Insurgency: Some Preliminary Comparisons between Colombia and Peru, in: Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri (eds), *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 146–163.

Mejía Acosta, Andrés, María Caridad Araujo, Aníbal Pérez Liñán, and Sebastian M. Saiegh (2008), Veto Players, Fickle Institutions, and Low-Quality Policies: The Policymaking Process in Ecuador, in: Ernesto Stein and Mariano Tommasi (eds), *Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies*, Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 243–286.

Miño Grijalva, Wilson (2008), *Breve Historia Bancaria del Ecuador*, Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.

Montúfar, César (2000), *La reconstrucción neoliberal: Febres Cordero o la estatización del neoliberalismo en el Ecuador, 1984–1988*, Quito: Abya-Yala.

North, Lisa (2004), State Building, State Dismantling, and Financial Crises in Ecuador, in: Jo-Marie Burt and Philip Mauceri (eds), *Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 187–206.

O'Donnell, Guillermo (1994), Delegative Democracy, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 5, 1, 55–69.

O'Donnell, Guillermo (1993), On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems, in: *World Development*, 21, 8, 1355–1369.

Ospina, Pablo (2009), *Transiciones: Ecuador después del referendum*, Comité Ecuménico de Proyectos.

Ospina, Pablo (2008), Ecuador: Entresijos de una encrucijada, in: *Nueva Sociedad*, 213 (January–February), 4–16.

Pevehouse, Jon (2005), *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi (1993), Political Regimes and Economic Growth, in: *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 7, 3, 51–69.

Sánchez, Omar (2009), Party Non-Systems: A Conceptual Innovation, in: *Party Politics*, 15, 4, 487–520.

Schneider, Aaron (2012), *State-building and Tax Regimes in Central America*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Silva, Eduardo (2009), *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Soifer, Hillel, and Matthias vom Hau (2008), Unpacking the *Strength* of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power, in: *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 43, 219–230.

The Economist (2009), Ecuador's Education Reforms: Correa's Curriculum, 22 August.

Tilly, Charles (1985), War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 169–191.

Weisbrot, Mark, Jake Johnston, and Stephan Lefebvre (2013), *Ecuador's New Deal: Reforming and Regulating the Financial Sector*, Washington: Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Weyland, Kurt (2009), The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts: Insights from Rentier State Theory, in: *Comparative Politics*, 41, 2, 145–164.

Yashar, Deborah (2005), *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Repensando la gobernanza democrática: construcción estatal, autonomía y *accountability* en el Ecuador de Correa

Resumen: Este ensayo propone que, mejor que teorizar la construcción del estado y la democracia como fenómenos distintos, deberíamos enfocarnos en el proceso dual de construcción de estados democráticos. Para hacerlo necesitamos entender la relación contradictoria entre la concentración de poder que se requiere para forjar instituciones estatales y las restricciones del mismo poder que demandan las normas de la democracia liberal. Este artículo ofrece un marco para

estudiar la construcción del estado y la gobernanza democrática, to-
mando como ejemplo el caso de Ecuador. Se argumenta que la de-
mocracia estable se apoya sobre tres pilares fundamentales: institu-
ciones estatales eficaces, la autonomía de estas instituciones respecto
de otros actores poderosos y la existencia de instituciones viables de
rendición de cuentas. El reto es que los esfuerzos para fortalecer uno
o dos de estos pilares suelen debilitar a los otros. Sostengo que en
Ecuador, en particular desde la elección de Rafael Correa, el país ha
sostenido logros importantes en cuanto la construcción de institucio-
nes estatales más fuertes pero tiene una trayectoria mixta en relación
con la autonomía de dichas instituciones y ha logrado muy poco en
términos de rendición de cuentas.

Palabras clave: Ecuador, construcción de estado, democracia, Rafael
Correa

Journal of Politics in Latin America

To subscribe to the print edition: <ilas@giga-hamburg.de>
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.jpla.org>

The *Journal of Politics in Latin America* is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also includes *Africa Spectrum*, *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* and *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*: <www.giga-journal-family.org>.

Presidential Elections and Corruption Perceptions in Latin America

Joel W. Johnson

Abstract: This paper argues that perceptions of corruption in Latin America exhibit predictable fluctuations in the wake of presidential turnover. Specifically, presidential elections that result in the partisan transfer of power are normally followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in perceived corruption control, with initial improvements that fade with time. The causes are multiple and stem from the removal of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm about administrative change, and the relative lack of high-level corruption scandals in the early phases of new governments. A statistical analysis of two widely used corruption perceptions indices demonstrates the pattern for eighteen Latin American democracies from 1996 to 2010. Both indices exhibit a temporary surge (of about two years) after turnover elections, while no such change follows reelections of incumbent presidents or parties. The theory and results are relevant for understanding public opinion in Latin America and for the analysis of corruption perceptions indices.

Dr. Joel W. Johnson is an assistant professor of Political Science at Colorado State University, Pueblo. His research focuses on political institutions and political economy in developed and developing democracies. His work has appeared in *Comparative Political Studies*, *Electoral Studies*, and *Election Law Journal*.

E-mail: <joel.johnson@csupueblo.edu>

Introduction

Although democracy offers regular opportunities for citizens to hold their public officials accountable, it is clear that political corruption – the misuse of governmental power for personal or political profit – can persist in democratic systems. By themselves, elections are weak controls on corruption because politicians seek to keep their corruption out of public view and because electoral defeats due to (exposed) corruption are neither certain enough nor costly enough to serve as a strong deterrent. Nevertheless, elections often generate considerable enthusiasm about corruption control, especially when they result in a partisan transfer of presidential power. Sometimes this is because the outgoing administration was notably corrupt and its removal provides some relief. Other times, buoyant perceptions of corruption control may stem from the public's enthusiasm for the new president or the relative lack of high-level corruption scandals in the early stages of new governments. In any case, however, the enthusiasm seldom lasts: presidential honeymoons end, governments once untainted become implicated in scandals both small and large, and beliefs that new officials are less corrupt than their predecessors are often abandoned. In other words, presidential turnover is frequently followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in public perceptions of corruption control, with initial improvements fading over time.

This paper[1] develops this argument about corruption perceptions cycles and demonstrates that a surge-and-decline pattern does follow partisan turnover in Latin American presidencies. A statistical analysis of two widely used corruption perceptions indices – the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index – for eighteen Latin American democracies over the period 1996–2010 shows there is an improvement in perceived corruption control in the wake of turnover elections but not after elections that result in the return of the incumbent president or party. The "turnover surge" typically lasts for two years before corruption perceptions shed some or all of their gains. The pattern is robust to various controls, including changing rates of economic growth and major corruption scandals.

The theory and results are relevant for understanding public opinion, support for democratic institutions (Canache and Allison 2005; Seligson 2006), and the politics of anticorruption reforms in Latin America. They also have important implications for the analysis of corruption

---

perceptions indices by scholars, by organizations such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (which allocates its foreign aid according to country performance in such indices), and by anticorruption NGOs and the media. Consider, for example, the interpretation of Costa Rica's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) offered by Transparency International (TI) and reprinted by the *Latin Business Chronicle* (2007):

> The case of Costa Rica may serve to illustrate the importance of having autonomous and respected institutions in place that can help to adequately fight corruption. Just a few years ago the country experienced a decrease in its CPI score, which could be attributed mainly to the fact that former presidents and high level officials have been found to be involved in bribery scandals. The independence and actions of the justice system in taking up the cases possibly contributed to an improved image of the government and politicians in the eyes of the expert community responsible for rating the countries listed in the CPI.[2]

TI's guess for why Costa Rica's CPI score surged in 2007 may be as good as one that points to the previous year's turnover election or to some other development. However, that the surge immediately followed the 2006 turnover election means that it fits a pattern that is observed throughout Latin America and thus could have been predicted by that event alone. Furthermore, the election was exactly the type that this paper argues is likely to improve corruption perceptions because a major cause of the voters' rejection of the ruling party's candidate – who received less than 5 percent of the vote – was the bribery scandals that damaged the outgoing government. Indeed, from this paper's perspective, what is distinctive about Costa Rica's post-2006 CPI is not that it increased markedly in 2007 and again (to a lesser degree) in 2008 but that it did not reverse course in the second half of the presidential term. This may be because the country's score was still rebounding from its decline in the late 1990s, when various scandals tarnished the presidency. Or it could be because at the midpoint of the term, around the time that the turnover surge tends to ebb, Costa Rica implemented the Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Or it may be because the government, led by an unusual politician (Nobel Peace laureate Óscar Arias), actually oversaw a significant reduction in the country's corruption. Whatever the reason, the recognition that corruption perceptions tend to surge and decline follow-

---

2   TI's report was titled 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index Regional Highlights: Americas.

ing turnover elections reorients our understanding of corruption percep-
tions and their change over time.

This paper is organized as follows: The first section considers the
temporal analysis of corruption perceptions indices. The second section
presents the argument for corruption perceptions change in the wake of
partisan turnover in the presidency.[3] The remaining three sections de-
scribe the data, provide the empirical analysis, and discuss implications.

1   On Temporal Changes in Corruption Perceptions Indices

After hypothesizing corruption perceptions change in the wake of cer-
tain elections, this study examines temporal changes in two corruption
perceptions indices. Most other analyses of these measures differ in two
respects: they aim to study corruption – not perceptions – and analyze
the data cross-sectionally.[4] The first difference is important because the
controversy about the indices centers on whether they are good or poor
proxies for corruption (see Morris 2008; Olken 2009). There are various
reasons why a survey of corruption perceptions (P) may misrepresent the
amount of corruption (C) in one or more political systems. So to mini-
mize measurement error, corruption perceptions indices (I) are con-
structed by combining various surveys, including both "international"
surveys of professional analysts and "domestic" surveys of households.
Consequently, the indices are (i) only likely to be sensitive to trends and
events that similarly affect the perceptions of both types of respondents
and (ii) not likely to be colored by respondents' partisan or ideological
leanings. However, there are still phenomena that may lead the various
audiences to subscribe to overly optimistic or pessimistic perceptions of
corruption control. For example, a corruption scandal that receives
widespread media attention can worsen P while C remains unchanged or
even diminishes.[5] Economic conditions can also color perceptions of

---

3   Throughout, "turnover" is used interchangeably with "government defeat" and
     "partisan turnover." The use of the latter is not meant to imply that all turnover
     elections must defeat or elect a member of a consolidated party; it is used mere-
     ly to help distinguish elections that result in a total transfer of power from elec-
     tions that install a successor (designated or de facto) to a term-limited or retired
     president, which are considered "reelections." Sections 2 and 3 discuss these
     distinctions further.
4   This literature is reviewed by Treisman (2007) and Lambsdorff (2006).
5   Although scandals can sometimes reveal information about the amount of
     corruption in a political system – and thus it may be rational to update one's

corruption, even though the index producers intend for their measures to be independent of "halo effects" – whereby evaluations of a country's politics or economics falsely tinge corruption perceptions.[6] These phenomena can be problematic for analyses that use perceptions data to study corruption; however, they are not problematic for studies that focus on perceptions.

The key difference between a temporal and a cross-sectional analysis of a perceptions index lies in the type of measurement error that it confronts: while a survey's mismeasure of differences across countries affects cross-sectional inference, the mismeasure of a country's change over time affects temporal inference. Although index producers pay more attention to intrasurvey error than they do to comparability across years, intrasurvey error remains. Cross-sectional studies confront this in the same way as the temporal analysis below: by examining index differences in the aggregate.[7] No individual index difference – between two countries or between two years – is given serious attention.[8]

2　Presidential Turnover and Corruption Perceptions

The course and outcome of presidential elections are of sufficient importance and interest to influence public beliefs about a country's governance, including its corruption control. There are multiple ways for turnover elections to influence corruption beliefs, including indirect effects that occur via the influence of turnover on actual political corruption. A mechanism of this type occurs when voters dismiss a government for its corruption and elect in its place an administration that engages in less corruption. In such cases, the direction of causality between turnover and corruption is largely in reverse because it is a government's corruption that contributes to both its ouster and the behavior of the

corruption beliefs when they occur – they may also be poor indicators of corruption and/or its change over time.

6　Kurtz and Schrank (2007a, b) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007a, b) debate the presence of halo effects.

7　Index values (as opposed to differences) are also ignored because they are not meaningful by themselves.

8　Because the World Bank's index includes measures of uncertainty, some individual index differences can be treated as meaningful (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004, 2006).

next administration.[9] Turnover can also reduce corruption exogenously – that is, even when corruption is not a reason for the election result. More importantly, an exogenous turnover effect is more likely to reduce corruption than increase it because it is common for corruption to grow with government tenure, especially in countries without robust anticorruption institutions. This may occur because the government's priorities shift from reshaping public policy to simply maintaining power, because officeholders become increasingly audacious and believe that they can get away with (more) corruption, or because elected and administrative positions can increasingly attract rent seekers rather than policy advocates.[10] In any case, a change of administration can reverse the trend, at least temporarily.

Notwithstanding the potential for turnover to decrease corruption, it is easy for the public to overestimate the difference that turnover makes. One potential cause of misperception is that the early stages of new governments tend to feature relatively few corruption scandals that implicate high-level incumbents. In large measure, this is because corruption is conducted so as to foil discovery. Therefore, and also because the whistleblower or journalist may deliberate before exposing corruption, there is usually a considerable delay between the inception of a corrupt scheme and its public revelation. The lack of executive branch corruption scandals during the early stages of new governments may also have something to do with a lack of within-government power struggles (see Balán 2011). Although Balán does not identify postturnover periods (or any other part of the election cycle) as particularly lacking in power struggles, it is possible that they are relatively lacking in such feuds – in which case his theory would predict few scandals. Either way, major corruption scandals in Latin America seem uncommon during the first year or so after a transfer of power. As regards the influence-peddling scheme under Fernando Collor de Mello, the *mensalão* under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, *MOP-Gate* and the *Caso Coimas* in Ricardo Lagos's Chile,

---

9   The improvement that accompanies the removal of a corrupt administration may occasionally be augmented by anticorruption reforms that are enacted by the new administration. Both mechanisms – the election-motivated provision of public goods and the electoral defeat of corrupt governments – are familiar. They are key reasons why democratic systems are believed to outperform non-democratic systems in corruption control (Rose-Ackerman 1978; Montinola and Jackman 2002).

10 Of course, these are also reasons why corruption is said to become more commonplace with long-standing rule by a party or government. The notion that corruption may often ebb with turnover complements the idea that corruption often grows with government entrenchment.

the bribery scandal that precipitated Alberto Fujimori's resignation, the 2004 bribery revelations that implicated Costa Rica's Miguel Ángel Rodríguez and Rafael Ángel Calderón, and the *Caso Skanska*, which raised questions about Néstor Kirchner's government, not one of these well-known scandals broke during the respective president's first year in office. Dilma Rousseff's inaugural year provides a contrast as at least six of her ministers were implicated in corruption scandals. But Rousseff's election also differed from Lula's, Menem's, and Fujimori's in that it represented continuity, not a partisan transfer of power. Indeed, like Rousseff herself, four of the six officials that she deposed for corruption during her first year as president had been ministers in Lula's government.

A second reason why a public might overestimate a new government's control of corruption relates to its enthusiasm for the new president and the change of political direction. Of course, it is not unusual for opposition candidates to claim that their administrations will reduce corruption; nor is it unusual for the public to believe such claims, especially when they are made by candidates who have not yet held elected office at the national level. However, corruption need not be a salient campaign issue for enthusiasm to color the public's perceptions of corruption control – whenever there is widespread excitement for a new president the public is likely to subscribe to sanguine beliefs and expectations about government.

The various ways that turnover can improve corruption perceptions are not mutually exclusive; in fact, it is likely that they often occur simultaneously.[11] This complicates any attempt to ascertain the degree to which changes in perceptions stem from reduced corruption, a lack of corruption scandals, and/or public enthusiasm for new presidents. The difficulty is not eased by the rather temporary nature of each effect – at least, none is destined to buoy perceptions for long. However, the combination does increase the likelihood that corruption perceptions will improve with any given turnover election.

---

11   Each mechanism is more pertinent to "high-level" corruption – including influence peddling, "pay-to-play" schemes, and other types of malfeasance by high-level officeholders – than to "petty" types of corruption, such as bribes demanded by bureaucrats or police. Turnover elections are hypothesized to primarily affect the former type, which throughout this paper is referred to as "political" corruption. The indices analyzed below aim to account for both types of corruption, but they seem to emphasize political corruption (e.g., see footnote 12). Other measures, such as Transparency International's Bribe Payers' Index, are more focused on routine corruption.

At the same time, there are not strong reasons to expect a similar change after the reelection of an incumbent president or government. The public expects more continuity than change whenever a government is reelected, even when it is headed by a successor to a term-limited or resigned president. Reelections are also less likely to either disrupt corrupt practices or to introduce a period of scandal scarcity. So, the mechanisms that foster improved perceptions with turnover elections do not accompany reelections, at least not to the same degree or frequency. Therefore, I consider two testable hypotheses about presidential elections and corruption perceptions – one for turnover elections and one for reelections:

> H1: Following presidential elections in which the incumbent government or ruling party is defeated, perceptions of corruption control will improve (i.e., register less corruption); however, it will be common for some or all of those gains to be reversed as the new president's term progresses.
> H2: Following presidential elections that are won by the incumbent government or ruling party, perceptions of corruption will not change.

Both hypotheses predict tendencies, not what will necessarily occur after every election. Indeed, contrary to H2, it is possible for perceptions to worsen after a government "steals" reelection or after a campaign in which allegations of government corruption have surfaced. And, contra H1, corruption perceptions can fail to improve with a transfer of power if the new president's early decisions about personnel or policies undermine public confidence or if the change returns to government a president or party with a reputation for corruption. Typically, however, corruption perceptions will improve with turnover, not with reelection.

3   Data

To test H1 and H2, I examine one-year and multiyear changes in two annual corruption perceptions indices, one from the World Bank and the other from TI. Both are produced by combining corruption surveys and measures from various independent organizations, including risk management firms, NGOs, governments, and academic institutions. In 2010 TI relied on seventeen sources to compute the Corruption Perceptions Index (hereafter TICPI) and the World Bank used thirty-one sources to

construct the Control of Corruption Index (hereafter WBCCI).[12] The reason these organizations "average" various surveys together is that any one survey may contain bias, measurement error, or an overemphasis on a particular type of corruption.

The indices use different methods to aggregate the underlying data. TI's method computes percentile ranks for each country on each survey and then averages those ranks together to obtain an average score and rank for each country (see Transparency International 2011). The scores range between zero and ten, with higher numbers corresponding to less perceived corruption. To construct the WBCCI, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi use an "unobserved components model" to map each of the k surveys onto a common unobserved measure of corruption perceptions, which is taken to have a cross-national mean of zero and unit standard deviation. In this process, some surveys map more "neatly" to the measure than others, exhibiting smaller variance in the error term. The WBCCI is the weighted average of the k estimates of the unobserved measure, each weighted inversely to the size of its error variance (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010 for additional details). This method is more complicated than the TI method, but Kauffman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi note that it has several benefits when compared to other methods – one being the precision that comes from "maintaining some of the cardinal information in the underlying data" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010: 16). They also note that the index can be meaningfully compared across time, barring two potential methodological issues. First, because the weighting of the various indicators changes from year to year, it is possible for across-year differences in the index to result from different weighting schemes rather than different survey responses. Second, because the method fixes each year's mean cross-national score at zero, across-year changes in the index for a particular country could stem from the average country becoming either more or less corrupt. Nonetheless, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004, 2007a, 2010) demonstrate that these two issues are of little concern.

Because both the TICPI and WBCCI aggregate data from various surveys, neither measures perceptions on a particular date. It can be assumed that major events that occur early in the year will influence

---

12   The WBCCI is one of the six World Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2004, 2007a, b, 2010). They describe the WBCCI as "captur[ing] perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests" (see <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/cc.pdf> (1 August 2012).

most of that year's surveys and thus that year's indices, while events that happen later in the year are more likely to influence the indices in the subsequent calendar year. It is, however, impossible to be any more precise about whether a particular event (e.g., turnover election) will have a greater impact on that year's or the following year's index. This imprecision means that any relationship between events and indices is likely to be "noisy." It thus challenges the present paper's main hypothesis (H1), which expects index change in the calendar year that follows a turnover election year.

The WBCCI years analyzed here are 1996–2010.[13] Before 2002, the index was only produced biennially. For some of the analysis below, the missing data for 1997, 1999, and 2001 are imputed by using the mean of the surrounding two years. This is useful to expand the number of years available for analysis, but it could introduce autocorrelation in regression models that analyze annual changes. For this reason, the analysis of one-year WBCCI changes uses only the post-2002 data. When multiyear changes are examined, pre-2002 data are included. Although the TICPI has been issued annually since 1996, it did not cover all Latin American countries in its early years – small countries, in particular, were left out. I do not impute TICPI scores because most missing observations are not preceded by an observation year.

3.1   Coding Elections

Four variables are used to account for presidential elections. Their coding for each country-year is shown in Table 1. Additional variables are described later.

Reelection$_{it}$ =1 if country i held a presidential election in year t that resulted in the incumbent party retaining control of the presidency; =0 otherwise.

Turnover$_{it}$ =1 if there was partisan change in control of the presidency in country i in year t; =0 otherwise. Not all instances of Turnover=1 have electoral origins, which necessitates the next variable.

Irregular Change$_{it}$ =1 if the presidency in country i in year t was vacated under irregular circumstances, meaning a coup or early

---

13   Since this study began, the 2011 and 2012 versions have been released.

resignation. Irregular Change=1 for Argentina 2001; Bolivia 2003; Ecuador 1997, 2000, and 2005; Peru 2000; and Honduras 2009.[14]

The coding of these variables requires some comment in particular cases. In Honduras 2009 there was both a presidential election and a partisan transfer of power; but the November election occurred after the June military coup that ousted Manuel Zelaya. The country-year is coded Irregular Change=1 and Turnover=1 to reflect the coup and the change in administration, but given the short time between the coup and the election the year is not coded Reelection=1.

Peru 2000 is coded Reelection=1 for Alberto Fujimori's reelection and Irregular Change=1 for his resignation several months later. The subsequent year (when Alejandro Toledo was elected president) is coded Turnover=1. In other words, the 2000 installation of interim president Valentín Paniagua is not coded as a turnover event. This and the previous decision prevent the same country-year from being both Reelection=1 and Turnover=1.

Argentina 2001 is coded Turnover=1 and Irregular Change=1 because of the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa of the Radical Civil Union party and the installation of the Peronist Eduardo Duhalde as interim president. Argentina 2003 is coded Reelection=1 due to the election of Peronist Néstor Kírchner; even though Kirchner was not Duhalde's preferred successor, it seems appropriate to mark the election as continuity rather than change and to reserve Turnover=1 for transfers of power between Peronists and Radicals.

A similar question surrounds the 1999/2000 victory of Ricardo Lagos in Chile.[15] Because Lagos was a member of the incumbent coalition and had been a minister in the outgoing administration, Chile 1999 is coded Reelection=1 and Turnover=0. However, the election of a socialist president did mark something of an ideological change from the previous Christian democrat. Perhaps more significantly, it was a milestone in the post-Pinochet era – one with enough significance to influence opinions about the state of Chilean democracy.

---

14   Although the briefly successful coup of Hugo Chávez in 2002 was a noteworthy event, it was not sufficiently long-lasting to be considered a transfer of power or an irregular change of administration.

15   I code Chilean presidential elections in the year of the first-round elections, which are held in December. The 1999, 2005, and 2009 elections had a second round in January.

Table 1: Coding of Presidential Election Variables, 1996–2010

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Argentina				X		XI	
Bolivia		X					XO
Brazil			R				X
Chile				R			
Colombia			X				X
Costa Rica			X				R
Dominican Republic	X				X		
Ecuador	X	I	X		I		X
El Salvador				R			
Guatemala	X			X			
Honduras		R				X	
Mexico					X		
Nicaragua	X					R	
Panama				X			
Paraguay			R				
Peru					RI	X	
Uruguay				R			
Venezuela			XA		R		

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Argentina	R				R			
Bolivia	I		XA				R	
Brazil				R				R
Chile			R				X	
Colombia				R				R
Costa Rica				XO				R
Dominican Republic		XO				R		
Ecuador			I	XA			R	
El Salvador		R					X	
Guatemala	X				X			
Honduras			X				XI	
Mexico				R				
Nicaragua				XOA				
Panama		X					X	
Paraguay	R					X		
Peru				XO				
Uruguay		X					R	
Venezuela		R		R				

Note: R denotes Reelection$_{(t)}$=1. X denotes Turnover$_{(t)}$=1. I denotes Irregular
         Change$_{(t)}$=1. A denotes ALBA$_{(t)}$=1. See text for a description of these variables.
         O represents a nonconsecutive reelection (i.e., the election of a nonincumbent
         who once had been president).

Source: Author's own compilation.

Other events to note include Paraguay 2000 and Mexico 1997, which saw historic defeats of long-ruling parties – the former in a vice-presidential election and the latter in midterm elections. Tellingly, the corruption perceptions indices for both countries improved in the following year. However, so as not to appear ad hoc, the coding scheme does not account for these events.

Lastly, I code Venezuela 2000 as Reelection=1. Though not a regular election year, Hugo Chávez's victory in the recall election was an event of enough significance to demand parity with regular presidential reelections.

The fourth election variable, ALBA, provides a way to differentiate turnover elections by the ideological stance or populism of the president-elect.

$ALBA_{it}$ =1 if $Turnover_{it}$=1 and the new administration subsequently joined Chávez's Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), a counter to the United States and its proposal to create an Americas-wide free trade agreement; = 0 otherwise.

Latin America had seen many leftist presidents during the previous fifteen years, and many observers argue that the difference between left and right in the region has been less stark than the difference between the "two lefts" – one a moderate, centrist camp (typified by Lula and Michelle Bachelet) and the other a more statist, nationalist, or populist camp that is more ideologically opposed to the United States (typified by Chávez).[16] Despite how often this type of distinction is made, there is no clear, accepted method to identify particular governments as belonging to one camp or the other. ALBA may not perfectly identify what many consider to be the more statist left, but it is a useful operationalization because ALBA includes governments that are commonly said to be in that camp and because it provides an unambiguous coding criterion. ALBA=1 for Ecuador 2006 (Rafael Correa), Nicaragua 2006 (Daniel Ortega), Bolivia 2005 (Evo Morales), and Venezuela 1998 (Chávez). Including this variable in the analysis helps control for the possibility that the indices are influenced by the ideological stance or populism of the president-elect. In particular, it could be that many of the foreign surveys used to make the indices negatively viewed these elections, thus resulting in a smaller-than-average turnover surge.

16   See Weyland's (1998) discussion of populist presidents and corruption.

4   Analysis

The first step in the analysis is to answer the following question: Are one-year index changes positive following turnover elections? The answer is yes. The average one-year index change ($\Delta Y1_{it} = \text{index}_{it} - \text{index}_{i(t-1)}$) that occurs in years that immediately follow turnover election years is larger than zero in one-tailed t-tests with both indices – and this is despite a very small number of observations. With the post-2002 WBCCI, the mean $\Delta Y1 = .06$ ($p < .05$, $N = 19$); with the TICPI, the mean $\Delta Y1 = .13$ ($p < .05$, $N = 28$).[17]

    The trend is illustrated by Figure 1 and Figure 2, which show the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of $\Delta Y1$ on several dummy variables for the WBCCI and TICPI, respectively. The dummies differ according to the number of years that have passed since a particular event. For example, Turnover$_{(t)}$ equals one if the observation (country-year) included a turnover election, while Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ equals one if the observation is one year after a turnover election (for the same country). The regressions exclude a constant term and include instead a dummy variable for excluded category years. Thus, each coefficient estimate is the mean for a group of observations, and the confidence intervals indicate how those changes compare to zero. At the bottom of each figure, the excluded group ("Other years") is shown to have a mean change that is close to zero. By contrast, Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years exhibit a mean change that is both statistically positive and larger than the change of any other group – that is, the indices show unusually large increases in the years that immediately follow turnover elections.

---

17   These tests exclude Irregular Change$_{(t-1)} = 1$ observations.

Figure 1: One-Year WBCCI Changes (Post-2002) Regressed on Nine
Year Indicators

Mean change in WBCCI since previous year

Note: Results of an OLS regression (N=215) with nine dummy variables and no
           constant term. The coefficient estimates (markers) and 90 percent confidence
           intervals (horizontal bars) indicate how each group mean compares to zero.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

Figure 2: One-Year TICPI Changes Regressed on Nine Year Indicators

Note: Results of an OLS regression (N=215) with nine dummy variables and no constant term. The coefficient estimates (markers) and 90 percent confidence intervals (horizontal bars) indicate how each group mean compares to zero.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

Figures 1 and 2 show several other patterns. First, mean WBCCI change in Reelection$_{(t-1)}$ years is zero, as H2 anticipates; however, mean TICPI change in Reelection$_{(t-1)}$ years is markedly positive. Second, the coefficient on Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ is positive in both figures, suggesting that many countries exhibit two consecutive years of index gains after turnover. Third, Figure 1 shows evidence of a postsurge decline in corruption perceptions: in Turnover$_{(t-3)}$ years the $\Delta Y1$ is negative and of such magnitude as to erase the improvement that comes in the previous year. With the TICPI, however, there is no clear indication of a postsurge decline – except perhaps in turnover election years, which raises the possibility that the increase in Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years is not something unusual but instead a more routine regression to the mean. While this paper's theory would predict some mean regression – because worsening corruption perceptions before an election can contribute to turnover – it begs the question of whether the $\Delta Y1 < 0$ in Turnover$_{(t)}$ years should be emphasized instead of the $\Delta Y1 > 0$ in Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years. This question is

answered in the next subsection, where the regression includes a lagged dependent variable.

Finally, Figure 2 shows that the TICPI decreases after irregular transfers of power, while Figure 1 shows that the effect of irregular transfers on the WBCCI is mixed. Either result might have been expected. While a coup or unexpected resignation may often heighten political anxieties and thus prompt perceptions downgrades, it can also be taken to signal the end of a troublesome period.

4.1   A Dynamic Model

While Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide some indication of how index changes following turnover elections compare with index changes in other years, the comparison can be improved by adding control variables and accounting for serial correlation. Equation (1) includes a lagged dependent variable as well as control variables (X_j) and is estimated with OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE) to account for serial correlation (see Beck and Katz 1995):

$$\Delta Y1_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta Y1_{i(t-1)} + \beta_2 \text{Turnover}_{i(t-1)} +$$
$$\beta_3 \text{Reelection}_{i(t-1)} + \sum \varphi_j X_{jit} + e_{it} \qquad (1)$$

Coefficients β_2 and β_3 estimate how index changes in the years that follow turnover elections and reelections compare with index changes that occur in other years. If mean change in excluded category years is zero, then H1 and H2 predict $\beta_2 > 0$ and $\beta_3 = 0$, respectively. The model does not provide a clear test of the "decline" part of H1; that is tested with a different model below.

It is reasonable to expect a negative coefficient on the lag ($\beta_1 < 0$) because of regression to the mean.[18] Figures 1 and 2, however, suggested that index changes following turnover elections are often positive for two consecutive years, which would decrease the chance of $\beta_1 < 0$. This is not a concern, but it does mean that the model could be improved by including a $\text{Turnover}_{(t-2)}$ dummy to account for how those years differ from other years.[19] If it is common to observe index gains in both the first and second years after a turnover election and if it is otherwise atyp-

---

18   Few countries exhibit a clear long-term trend in either index. The closest instance would be Uruguay's TICPI, which increased in eight of eleven years.

19   As explained, the inclusion of $\text{Turnover}_{(t-2)}$ is not to "control" for countries that experienced turnover in back-to-back years. No country had such an experience.

ical to observe back-to-back years of a $\Delta Y1>0$, Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ will receive a positive estimate and its inclusion will make the coefficient on the lag more negative.

Control variables include Irregular Change$_{i(t-1)}$, ALBA$_{i(t-1)}$, and the following:[20]

GDP Growth Rate$_{it}$ = the (mean-centered) percent change in real GDP per capita since the previous year. This variable is likely to receive a positive coefficient estimate, indicating that economic growth is correlated with less perceived corruption.

Scandal$_{it}$ =1 if a major corruption scandal implicating the executive branch broke during the year; =0 otherwise. This variable is meant to account for scandals that have the potential to significantly alter corruption perceptions. It therefore ignores "minor" scandals or scandals in countries already perceived to be highly corrupt and only accounts for scandals that are particularly egregious or highly unusual for the country in which it occurs. Because there is no simple way to operationalize this variable for all Latin American countries over 15 years, the coding is impressionistic. Four cases are deemed sufficiently important to be coded Scandal$_{it}$=1: the 2004 corruption allegations that implicated former presidents Rodríguez and Calderón in Costa Rica; the MOP-GATE and Caso Coimas scandals that implicated Chile's government in 2002; the bribery revelations in Peru 2000 that prompted Alberto Fujimori's resignation; and the *mensalão* in Brazil 2005 – a corruption scandal that was attention-grabbing even by Brazilian standards.[21] Of course, one could make a case to exclude one of these scandals or to include other scandals, but wrestling with various coding schemes for this type of control variable is not worthwhile in this con-

---

20   Other variables that were analyzed include whether the president was elected nonconsecutively, whether there was reported fraud or violence surrounding the election, and whether the country signed or implemented a trade agreement with the United States. None of these variables affected the results.

21   The *mensalão*, or "big monthly stipend," was furnished to lawmakers so that they would support the government's agenda.

text, as there are no strong reasons to suspect that any coding scheme will dramatically alter how the key variables of interest (i.e., Turnover and Reelection) behave in the statistical model. Scandal is expected to receive a negative coefficient estimate.

Nationalization$_{it}$ =1 if the government nationalized a sector of the hydrocarbon industry; =0 otherwise. Nationalization=1 for Argentina 2004, Bolivia 2006, Ecuador 2006, and Venezuela 2001. The variable serves as an additional measure of "leftward" policy change, at least among countries that have significant hydrocarbon resources to nationalize. It is included because nationalizations, even when partial, receive considerable attention at home and abroad. If corruption perceptions indices are heavily influenced by risk consultants and other foreign analysts, the variable is likely to receive a negative estimate.

Table 2 reports OLS-PCSE estimates of (1). The first two regressions use the post-2002 WBCCI; the second two, the TICPI.[22] The results of the first and third regressions indicate that Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years exhibit a statistically positive $\Delta Y1$ relative to excluded years (p<.10 in both regressions) and that Reelection$_{(t-1)}$ years do not. Because the model includes a lagged dependent variable, we can conclude that the increase in Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years is not simply regression to the mean. Regressions two and four add Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ to the model. As expected, the variable receives a positive estimate and makes the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable more negative. Also, the predicted changes in Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ years, after taking into account the increase in Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years and the coefficient on the lag, are .04 (WBCCI) and .025 (TICPI). This suggests again that most countries experience two years of index gains after turnover.

Unlike with turnover elections, significant changes in the corruption indices do not follow hydrocarbon nationalizations. Also, the turnover surge is not significantly lower for those presidents who joined ALBA. Note also that the estimates on GDP Growth Rate and Scandal are always in the anticipated direction, and that the latter is significant with the TICPI.

---

22   Estimates were obtained with the xtpcse command in Stata 12.

Table 2: One-Year Changes in Corruption Perceptions Indices, OLS-PCSE Estimates

Variable	ΔY1 WBCCI		ΔY1 TICPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Turnover (t-1)	0.054*	0.065**	0.095*	0.098*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.057)
(t-2)		0.059**		0.018
		(0.030)		(0.046)
Reelection (t-1)	-0.009	0.002	0.071	0.074
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Irregular Change (t-1)	-0.007	-0.022	-0.278**	-0.280**
	(0.071)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.069)
ALBA (t-1)	-0.005	-0.004	-0.031	-0.031
	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.109)	(0.108)
Nationalization (t-1)	0.018	0.007	-0.026	-0.029
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Scandal (t-1)	-0.095	-0.088	-0.336**	-0.333**
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.135)	(0.135)
GDP growth rate (t)	0.428*	0.343	0.336	0.319
	(0.236)	(0.221)	(0.310)	(0.304)
ΔY1 (t-1)	-0.276*	-0.293**	-0.079	-0.080
	(0.141)	(0.139)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Constant	0.004	-0.006	0.019	0.016
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Observations	144	144	192	192
R-squared	0.12	0.14	0.10	0.10

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. Positive values of the dependent variables indicate less perceived corruption.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

4.2   How Common Are "Surges"?

The analysis has shown that the average turnover election is followed by one-year increase of roughly .06 WBCCI units and .1 TICPI units. These changes are not large, with each being about one-twentieth of the standard deviation in the global index. A turnover election does not make Nicaragua look like Costa Rica or Argentina like Chile. Still, the change is large enough to move most countries up a spot in the ranking of Latin American states.[23]

Of course, some increases are larger than average, while others are smaller (see Table 3). Thus, we might ask how common it is for a turno-

---

23   In the post-2002 data, .06 WBCCI units is sufficient to move 67 percent of countries up a rank, while .1 TICPI units would move 69 percent of countries up a rank.

ver election to be followed by a "large" increase. If (say) a large increase exceeds .15 WBCCI units or .3 TICPI units, then the answer is 25 percent and 20 percent of the time, respectively. These frequencies are twice what are observed in the dataset, as only 12.5 percent of WBCCI changes and 9.8 percent of TICPI changes are so large. Additionally, the correlation between a dummy variable that is unity for changes that exceed these thresholds and Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ is significant with both indices (WBCCI: $p<.07$, N=144; TICPI: $p<.05$, N=215). There is thus a disproportionate chance of observing large index gains in Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ years.

At the same time, large gains are not likely to follow reelections. While five Turnover$_{(t-1)}$ observations have a $\Delta Y1 > .15$ WBCCI units, that occurs after only one reelection – Bolivia 2009. Similarly, eight elections are followed by TICPI gains of .4 or more, but only two are reelections, and one of those (Chile 2000) could arguably have been coded as a turnover election.[24]

4.3   Two-Year Index Changes

The examination of two-year changes permits use of the pre-2002 WBCCI, allows a test of whether the two-year surge is statistically significant, and allows a reasonable test of the "decline" portion of H1. Because H1 does not predict an exact timing of the postsurge decline – its starting year can vary – it would be overly restrictive to test for it in any particular year. This section studies the size and frequency of index declines during the second two-year period after turnover elections.[25]

Table 3 lists the first four years of index changes that followed turnover elections, excluding those that immediately followed or preceded an irregular change. It shows that most countries' scores increased over the first two years (Y12) (though some of the gains were larger after only one year) and that many of the improvements decreased over years three and four (Y34). With regard to turnover elections before 2009, 73 percent (WBCCI) and 67 percent (TICPI) saw a $\Delta Y12 > 0$. Of those that occurred before 2007 and had a $\Delta Y12 > 0$, 67 percent (WBCCI) and 40 percent (TIPCI) saw a $\Delta Y34 < 0$.

These figures do not account for other determinants of index change, and it is clear from Table 3 that economic conditions matter

---

24   The other instance is Paraguay 1999.
25   Of course, the second two-year period may not capture all "declines." Mexico 2000–2006 is an example. After Fox's election, both indices increased over Y12 and both ended the six-year term about where they started in 2000. However, only the WBCCI declined during Y34. The TICPI declined during Y56.

considerably. In particular, countries that experienced either rapid eco-
nomic growth during Y34 (second-to-last column) or a marked accelera-
tion in the growth rate from Y12 to Y34 (final column) were less likely to
see a ΔY34<0. Indeed, the Pearson correlation (r) between Y34 index
changes and growth rates is .61 when using the WBCCI (p<.01, N=20)
and .51 when using the TICPI (p<.02, N=18).[26] Interestingly, the oppo-
site relationship is observed during Y12, when r=-.41 with the WBCCI
and r=-.31 with the TICPI. This may occur because worse economic
conditions at the time of the turnover election solicit greater relief with
the change of administration. Regardless, it is unsurprising that the in-
dex-economic growth relationship is more strongly positive during Y34.
A poorly performing economy is less likely to damage perceptions of
governmental performance when the government is brand new than
when the government has been in office for a few years. Anyway, the
empirical connection between index changes and growth rates during
Y34 implies that the entries that are most informative about postsurge
declines are in the middle of Table 3 – that is, they are administrations
that did not experience either rapid economic growth or an economic
contraction during Y34. Tellingly, these cases were exceedingly likely to
exhibit index downgrades during Y34.

To provide a statistical assessment of the two-year surge and two-
year decline while controlling for economic conditions and other varia-
bles, I use OLS-PCSE and a model similar to (1) but which focuses on
two-year index changes, ΔY2$_{it}$ = index$_{it}$ – index$_{i(t-2)}$. The regressions
compare only a few types of observations: (a) those that are two years
after an election (turnover or reelection), excluding those that are one
year after either an irregular transfer or another election, and (b) those
that are four years after a turnover election, excluding those that are
three or fewer years after an irregular transfer or another election. As
before, the syntax refers to these the other way around, as Turnover$_{(t-2)}$=1, Reelection$_{(t-2)}$=1, or Turnover$_{(t-4)}$=1. The restriction to only these
observations ensures the model is unencumbered by observations that
straddle elections or that cover overlapping two-year periods.[27]

---

26 These relationships are much stronger than those with annual change data; in
    other words, when examined over longer periods of time, corruption indices
    are more strongly related to economic growth rates.
27 The restriction makes for an unbalanced WBCCI panel. (The TICPI panel was
    already unbalanced due to "missing" data.) The regressions in Table 4 use the
    "pairwise" option in Stata's xtpcse, which allows estimation of the interpanel
    covariance matrix to be based on the years that are common to any two panels,
    rather than the years that are common to all panels.

Table 3: Index Changes Following Turnover Elections

Country	Election year	WBCCI			TICPI			GDP per capita	
		$\Delta Y1$	$\Delta Y12$	$\Delta Y34$	$\Delta Y1$	$\Delta Y12$	$\Delta Y34$	$\Delta Y34$	$\Delta Y34 - \Delta Y12$
Venezuela	1998		0.42	-0.5		0.4	-0.2	-9%	-3%
Dom. Rep.	2000		0.26	-0.07			-0.6	-2%	-6%
Costa Rica	2006	0.08	0.12	0.23	0.9	1.0	0.2	0%	-7%
Costa Rica	1998		-0.03	-0.17	-0.5	-0.2	-0.9	0%	-5%
Bolivia	1997		0.27	-0.38	0.75	0.5	-0.5	0%	-1%
Guatemala	1999		0.17	-0.08		-0.3	-0.5	1%	0%
Colombia	1998		0.03	0.16	0.7	1.0	0.4	1%	4%
Panama	1999		-0.08	-0.01			-0.3	3%	3%
Mexico	2000		0.04	-0.09	0.4	0.3	0	3%	5%
Brazil	2002	0.10	0.02	-0.17	-0.1	-0.1	-0.6	5%	1%
Bolivia	2005	0.34	0.40	-0.31	0.2	0.4	-0.2	6%	0%
Peru	2006	-0.04	0.02	-0.03	0.2	0.3	-0.1	7%	-10%
Guatemala	2003	0.17	0.03	-0.04	-0.2	0.1	0.3	7%	5%
Colombia	2002	0.07	0.14	0	0.1	0.2	0.1	8%	2%
Nicaragua	1996		-0.38	-0.12				8%	4%
Honduras	2001		0.08	0.10	0	-0.4	0.3	8%	4%
Dom. Rep.	1996		-0.62	0.09				9%	-3%
Dom. Rep.	2004	-0.16	-0.19	-0.04	0.1	-0.1	0.2	11%	-6%
Uruguay	2004	0.23	0.18	0.25	-0.3	0.2	0.5	14%	2%
Panama	2004	-0.06	-0.14	0.27	-0.2	-0.6	0.3	20%	8%
Guatemala	2007	0.06	0.13	†	0.3	0.6	-0.7†		
Paraguay	2008	0.15	0.24	†	-0.3	-0.2			
El Salvador	2009	-0.03			0.2				
Panama	2009	-0.06			0.2				
Chile	2009	0.13			0.5				

Note: Turnover elections that precede or follow an irregular transfer of power are
excluded. † Post-2010 releases of the indices show declines during Y34.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

A dummy variable for each group is included in each regression, and
each regression excludes a constant term. Therefore, each coefficient

compares a group mean to zero rather than to an excluded category of observations. The model also includes (i) a two-year lag of the dependent variable ($\Delta 2y_{i(t-2)}$), (ii) the Two-Year GDP Growth Rate$_{it}$, which is the mean-centered change in real GDP per capita over the previous two years, (iii) this last variable interacted with Turnover$_{(t-4)}$, which allows the model to account for differing relationships between index change and GDP growth throughout the electoral cycle, and (iv) Irregular Change$_{(t-2)}$.

Table 4: Two-Year Changes in Corruption Perceptions Indices, OLS-PCSE Estimates

Variable	$\Delta 2y$ WBCCI		$\Delta 2y$ TICPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Turnover (t-2)	0.093**	0.093**	0.172**	0.173**
	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.064)
(t-4)	-0.061**	-0.056*	-0.046	-0.017
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.057)	(0.062)
Reelection (t-2)	-0.034	-0.034	0.114	0.111
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Two-Year Scandal (t)		-0.12		-0.58**
		(0.11)		(0.22)
Irregular Change (t-2)	0.01	0.01	-0.39**	-0.41**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Two-Year GDP growth rate (t)	-0.34	-0.34	-2.83**	-2.83**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Turnover (t-4) x Two-Year GDP growth rate (t)	2.01**	2.00**	5.68**	5.62**
	(0.50)	(0.51)	(0.80)	(0.96)
$\Delta 2y$ (t-2)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Observations	68	68	57	57
R-squared	0.28	0.29	0.37	0.4
Wald X^2 of Turnover dummies and $\Delta 2y_{(t-2)}$	27.99**	23.61**	12.77**	9.22**

Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$. The model excludes a constant term. Positive values of the dependent variables indicate less perceived corruption.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

The regression results are provided in Table 4. The first WBCCI estimates (regression one) are consistent with H1: there is a positive estimate on Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ and a negative estimate on both Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ and the lagged dependent variable. Both dummies are statistically significant, and a joint test of them with the lagged dependent variable shows all three to

be highly significant (p<.001 in the X^2 at the bottom of the table).[28] The estimates suggest that at mean levels of GDP growth, the average turnover election is followed by a .09 unit increase over Y12 and a .06 unit reversal over Y34.

The second regression includes Two-Year Scandal$_{it}$, a dummy that is unity if Scandal$_{(t-1)}$=1 or Scandal$_{(t-2)}$=1. The variable is excluded from the first regression because this paper's theory anticipates its collinearity with Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ – that is, if one of the reasons for the decline is the increased frequency of high-level corruption scandals, then the statistical model does not require both Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ and Two-Year Scandal$_{it}$. The way that the results change in regression three conforms with this line of thinking, as the scandal variable causes the estimate on Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ to move toward zero.

Regression three indicates that at mean levels of GDP growth the average TICPI increase over Y12 is .17 units and the decline over Y34 is one-third as large. About two-thirds of the decline is attributed to the Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ coefficient; the remaining third, to the lagged dependent variable. Although neither estimate is statistically significant, a joint test of them plus Turnover$_{(t-2)}$ rejects the null hypothesis. As with the WBCCI, the addition of the scandal variable causes the Turnover$_{(t-4)}$ coefficient to move toward zero (regression four), which suggests anew that the decline is partly due to corruption scandals. In short, all four regressions in Table 4 provide evidence of a surge-and-decline pattern. The data also support H2, as not one regression suggests a significant reelection effect.

Lastly, I illustrate the results of regressions that are similar to those in columns one and three of Table 4 except for their inclusion of Reelection$_{(t-4)}$ observations and their exclusion of observations not in four-year terms.[29] Because this model is unencumbered by terms of varying length, it facilitates plots of predicted index changes over whole presidential terms. Holding GDP change at its mean and setting the lagged dependent variable to zero for the first two-year period, Figure 3 provides this plot for the WBCCI.[30] The figure shows that the average two-year surge is roughly one-tenth of the standard deviation in the global index and that it declines by about one-third over Y34. The pattern repeats if the

---

28   After xtpcse, a test of multiple coefficient estimates is given by a chi-squared statistic.

29   The results are not shown for considerations of space; they are available from the author's website.

30   The figures exclude confidence intervals because post-xtpcse tests of multiple coefficients are provided by a chi-square statistic.

president loses his reelection bid and a new government is installed.[31] If the government wins reelection, however, the WBCCI decreases over each of the next two-year periods to the point that the predicted change at the end of the term is close to where it was eight years before. The TICPI pattern is similar (Figure 4), the only differences being that the postsurge decline is less dramatic and that there is some improvement with reelections. Yet, the difference associated with a two-term president is about the same and much more modest than the change that accompanies a president's first two years in office.

Figure 3: Predicted Change in WBCCI Following a Turnover Election

Note: See text for description. Vertical lines indicate election years.

Source: Author's own calculation and compilation.

31   The second-term surge differs slightly because the lagged change is not zero.

Figure 4: Predicted Change in TICPI Following a Turnover Election

5   Discussion

The main conclusion of this study is that to understand perceptions of
corruption in Latin American countries one must attend to the presiden-
tial election cycle and particularly the changes that follow turnover elec-
tions. However, the results and theory have other implications. For ex-
ample, the temporary boost in perceived corruption control that follows
partisan turnover in the executive branch will tend to strengthen public
support for democratic institutions (see Canache and Allison 2005; Selig-
son 2006; Bohn 2012) as well as soften the demand for political reforms
to counter corruption. The timing of the latter is important because it
occurs when governments typically have the most political capital to
spend on a reform effort.[32]

---

32   The ebb and flow of corruption scandals and corruption perceptions may also
     matter for nonconcurrent elections, with those that occur shortly after turnover

Other implications depend on the specific reasons for perceptions change. I have argued that in any given case one or more of several mechanisms are responsible for the turnover surge. One is that turnover will tend to decrease political corruption whenever the outgoing government is unusually corrupt or wherever corruption tends to grow with government tenure. Separately, a public that is sanguine about a change of political leadership can overestimate the degree to which the new administration improves corruption control. The relative lack of high-level corruption scandals during the early stages of a new government is a third way that turnover can buoy perceptions of corruption control. Although this study does not test these mechanisms, it provides some evidence that high-level corruption scandals in Latin America have rarely occurred during a new government's first couple of years. Furthermore, its quantitative analysis suggests that scandals are at least part of the reason for the postsurge decline in perceived corruption control. Future research could seek to ascertain the relative contributions of scandals and presidential approval ratings to the surge and decline, though it will remain difficult to determine the degree to which high-level corruption varies and influences perceptions over such periods of time. Measuring corruption (rather than perceptions) is only part of the challenge; another is dealing with the issue of corruption affecting the other two explanatory variables (the likelihood of corruption scandals and public opinion about the government) (cf. Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013).

A priori, however, the turnover surge should be viewed as more rooted in perception than reality. This is not because there are not good reasons to think that political corruption might often decline (even if only temporarily) after an election has brought a partisan transfer of power. Rather, it is because the perceptions surge occurs precisely when public optimism is high and corruption scandals are few, and because there is already much evidence to suggest that corruption perceptions diverge from corruption realities (e.g., Morris 2008, 2009; Olken 2009). For the surge to reflect (rather than merely coincide with) a change in actual corruption, it must be the case that observers perceive that change and that their perceptions are little influenced by expectations or hopes that the new administration will resist and restrain corruption better than its predecessor. To the extent that this does occur, the perceptions surge documents the longevity of transition politics in presidential democracies, and the data would suggest that turnover results in cleaner politics

---

tending to be more favorable to the government than those that occur later. Cf. Shugart (1995).

for about two years. However, it is more likely that the importance of the perceptions surge lies in the realm of public opinion and the political consequences thereof.

The empirical findings of this paper have still broader relevance that stems from corruption perceptions indices being so widely used. A considerable amount of cross-national research on the causes and consequences of corruption employs these indices, and the results presented here suggest that in such applications it may be necessary to account for the regular fluctuations that appear after turnover elections. While this study cannot say whether turnover will have the same importance for index rankings in models that include parliamentary systems or nondemocracies (though that is a worthwhile avenue for future research), it demonstrates that turnover has an important effect on index values in Latin America.

The pattern also matters for organizations that utilize perceptions indices to gauge countries' strides against corruption. This includes the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which allocates foreign aid according to how countries perform over time in the WBCCI (and other governance indicators). For instance, Honduras received a grant of USD 205 million from the MCC in 2004, not long after the turnover election of November 2001. The WBCCI was not compiled in 2001, but Honduras' WBCCI increased markedly from 2002 to 2003. In fact, Honduras' largest one-year improvement in the WBCCI for the period examined for this study was in 2003. That change may have accompanied real headway against corruption, and the turnover election may have contributed to such a development. However, the ability of turnover to independently improve corruption perceptions should be an important consideration for the MCC and other organizations that use perceptions indices to evaluate corruption control. Postturnover periods may demand special scrutiny to ensure that any index gains relate to significant developments in corruption control and not merely to public optimism about government turnover.

It similarly matters how indices are interpreted by the media, not least because it can influence diagnoses and reform agendas. It is also possible for foreign discourse about a country's index rank to influence domestic perceptions of corruption (Brinegar 2009). Of course, this study emphasizes the reverse process (i.e., that perceptions affect the indices), but feedback effects are possible. In any case, a worthwhile question for future research concerns the relative contributions of foreign and domestic perceptions to postturnover index change. Because the indices combine data from both types of audiences, we may suppose

that events and trends that affect the indices do so via both audiences. However, the possibility remains that the turnover surge is driven predominantly by one audience or the other. Any such divergence would beg another question about which audience more accurately perceives the amount of corruption in a political system. The answer to that question would help us better understand the degree to which corruption perceptions reflect corruption realities.

References

Balán, Manuel (2011), Competition by Denunciation: The Political Dynamics of Corruption Scandals in Argentina and Chile, in: *Comparative Politics*, 43, 4, 459–478.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz (1995), What To Do (and Not To Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data, in: *American Political Science Review*, 89, 3, 634–647.

Bohn, Simone R. (2012), Corruption in Latin America: Understanding the Perception–Exposure Gap, in: *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 4, 3, 67–95.

Brinegar, Adam (2009), Evaluating Citizen Attitudes about Corruption in Chile, in: Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (eds), *Corruption and Democracy in Latin America*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 150–168.

Canache, Damarys, and Michael E. Allison (2005), Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 47, 3, 91–111.

Carroll, Rory (2013), *Comandante: Hugo Chávez's Venezuela*, New York, NY: Penguin.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010), *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430, Washington, DC: World Bank, online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1682130> (31 March 2014).

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007a), *The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project: Answering the Critics*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4149, Washington, DC: World Bank, online: <www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/02/23/000016406_20070223093027/Rendered/PDF/wps4149.pdf> (17 March 2015).

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007b), Growth and Governance: A Reply/Rejoinder, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 2, 555–562.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006), Measuring Governance using Cross-Country Perceptions Data, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 52–104.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004), Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, in: *World Bank Economic Review*, 18, 253–287.

Kurtz, Marcus J., and Andrew Schrank (2007a), Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 2, 538–554.

Kurtz, Marcus J., and Andrew Schrank (2007b), Growth and Governance: A Defense, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 2, 563–569.

Lambsdorff, Johann Graf (2006), Causes and Consequences of Corruption: What Do We Know from a Cross-Section of Countries?, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), *International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 3–51.

Latin Business Chronicle (2007), Corruption: Latin America Improves, online: <www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=1684> (1 October 2014).

Montinola, Gabriella R., and Robert W. Jackman (2002), Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study, in: *British Journal of Political Science*, 32, 1, 147–170.

Morris, Stephen D. (2009), Corruption and Democracy at the State Level in Mexico, in: Charles H. Blake and Stephen D. Morris (eds), *Corruption & Democracy in Latin America*, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 193–204.

Morris, Stephen D. (2008), Disaggregating Corruption: A Comparison of Participation and Perceptions in Latin America with Special Focus on Mexico, in: *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 27, 3, 388–409.

Olken, Benjamin A. (2009), Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, in: *Journal of Public Economics*, 93, 7, 950–964.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1978), *Corruption: A Study in Political Economy*, New York: Academic Press.

Seligson, Mitchell A. (2006), The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey Evidence from Latin America, in: *World Development*, 34, 2, 381–404.

Shugart, Matthew S. (1995), The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government, in: *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, 327–343.

Transparency International (2011), *Corruption Perceptions Index 2011: Long Methodological Brief*, online: <http://transparency.ee/cm/files/lisad/pikk_metoodika.pdf> (15 June 2012).

Treisman, Daniel (2007), What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 211–244.

Weyland, Kurt (1998), The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary Latin America, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 9, 108–121.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth J., and Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga (2013), The Varying Political Toll of Concerns about Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic Times, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 46, 10, 1190–1218.

Elecciones presidenciales y percepciones de corrupción en América Latina

Resumen: Este artículo sostiene que la percepción de la corrupción en América Latina exhibe fluctuaciones previsibles después de un cambio presidencial. Específicamente, las elecciones presidenciales que dan lugar a una transferencia del poder partidista normalmente son seguidas por un patrón de aumento-y-disminución de control percibido de la corrupción, con mejoras iniciales que se desvanecen con el tiempo. Las causas son múltiples y se conectan con la destitución de las administraciones corruptas, el entusiasmo del público sobre el cambio de administración, y la falta relativa de escándalos de corrupción de alto nivel en las primeras fases de los nuevos gobiernos. Un análisis estadístico de dos índices de percepción de la corrupción frecuentemente utilizados muestra el patrón en dieciocho democracias latinoamericanas durante 1996-2010. Ambos índices muestran un aumento temporal (de aproximadamente dos años) después de las elecciones que resultan en una transferencia del poder, mientras no se nota tal cambio después de las reelecciones del presidentes o su partidos. La teoría y los resultados son relevantes para la comprensión de la opinión pública en América Latina y para el análisis de los índices de percepción de la corrupción.

Palabras claves: América Latina, elecciones presidenciales, corrupción

Journal of Politics in Latin America

Analytical Essay

The Evolution of Theories about the Brazilian Multiparty Presidential System

Arnaldo Mauerberg Junior, Carlos Pereira, and
Ciro Biderman

Abstract: In recent years, four approaches about executive–legislative relations in Brazil have emerged: i) the perspective that points out limitations and constraints of multiparty presidential systems; ii) the building of government coalitions; iii) coalition management; and iv) the role played by institutions including the prerogatives of party leadership inside the House. In this paper, we review the literature on these approaches, offering a guide for studies about the Brazilian multiparty presidential system.

Arnaldo Mauerberg Junior is currently a PhD candidate in the subject of government at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV – Brazil) and a guest PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He has held positions as a fellow researcher at the MIT-Brazil Center and assistant researcher at the Center for Study of Politics and Economics of the Public Sector (CEPESP-FGV). He has also held positions as a professor of undergraduate courses in two Brazilian universities, UNESP and UFSCar.
E-mail: <arnaldomauerberg@hotmail.com> <amauer@mit.edu>

Dr. Carlos Pereira is a professor of political science and public policy at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV – Brazil). He has held visiting research fellowship positions at the Brookings Institution and Oxford University, and was an assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University. He is a co-author of *Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System and of Beliefs, Development and Critical Transitions, Brazil 1964–2014*. His articles have appeared in scholarly journals

including the *Journal of Democracy*, *The Journal of Comparative Economics*, *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, *International Political Science Review*, and *Comparative Political Studies*.
E-mail: <carlos.pereira@fgv.br>

Dr. Ciro Biderman is a professor in the graduate and undergraduate programs in public administration and in economics at Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV – Brazil). He is also an associate researcher at the Center for the Study of the Politics and Economics of the Public Sector (CEPESP – FGV) and a researcher affiliated with the department of urban studies and planning (DUSP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), as well as a short-term consultant for the World Bank in the economics and politics of local development. Biderman obtained his PhD in economics at FGV/EAESP in 2001 and his post-doc at MIT in 2007. His research interests include urban and regional economics focused on public policies at the sub-national level, with particular emphasis on land policies and their interaction with real estate markets and transport costs. He is currently the chief of staff of the São Paulo Transit Company (SPTrans).
E-mail: <ciro.biderman@fgv.br>

Introduction

The generic problem facing a president in a fragmented multiparty setting is how to induce legislators, especially those who take part in the president's coalition in the congress, to act in a way that supports the president's interest? Of particular significance is if and to what extent the president has the capacity to offer the appropriate incentives to legislators in order to promote the government's interests.

Scholars of the largely disperse literature on presidential–congresssional relations have recognized and concurred that this is a problem faced by most presidents, especially those whose political party does not enjoy a majority of seats in congress and is obliged to build a post-electoral coalition majority in order to govern. However, scholars have offered different answers about the conditions under which legislators choose to strategically cooperate with or disregard the president's preferences in congress. More specifically, there is no consensus among the political scientists who study legislative behavior. On the other hand, there are also many theories about how presidents lead in congress. These theories offer differing explanations regarding which determinants (or independent variables) best explain the legislator's behavior inside the congress.

Each scholar, and each differing approach, has helped to elucidate the complex set of reasons that explain legislators' pattern of voting; specifically, why some presidents experience grater success than others and why presidents face more problems in approving certain issues than others. However, most of the literature has presented limited and partial explanations and has depicted an incomplete picture, by privileging one variable that they select as the most important to explain the legislator's voting behavior. In other words, these researchers have only used a single variable to explain this complex and certainly multivariate phenomenon.

With particular regard to the Brazilian political system, many studies have emerged from the 1988 Constitution. That document established a constitutionally strong presidential regime with an extremely factionalized multiparty system in Congress. In this institutional environment, it is essential that a president builds a post-electoral legislative coalition. The present review synthesizes the literature that has been published on this topic since 1988.[1] Because it would be impossible to critically analyze every single contribution regarding the Brazilian multiparty presi-

---

[1]   Abranches' 1988 work was the first to deal with the Brazilian issue in this way. It was he who first used the term "coalitional presidentialism" to describe the Brazilian political system.

dential system,[2] we decided to select a wide range of contributions on this intriguing subject.

Among the papers that gave a general overview of the system, Mainwaring (1990) compared the old institutionalism in Latin American politics with fresh contributions about presidentialism and democratic stability, and proposed a research agenda that emphasizes the conditions when executive power strengthened. Power (2010) noted that a research agenda that mainly looked at aspects related to the electoral system was skeptical about the future of democracy in Brazil, while the research on the internal functioning of legislature rules and the constitutional powers held by the executive reached an opposite conclusion. Recently, Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011) and Chaisty, Cheesman, and Power (2014) clarified the options available for presidents in what all these authors have termed the "executive toolbox".

Our main objective is to review why these studies' reservations about the system were unfounded. Section one covers studies that were critical of the future of Brazil's political system, while section two presents the main features of coalition building in presidential regimes. Next, we analyze the tool used to keep the coalition working sustainably, followed by an analysis of political institutional design. Finally, we present a section dealing with the role played by party leadership in executive–legislative relations.

1   Negative Views about the Working of Multiparty Presidentialism

The first wave of post-1988 studies to focus on presidentialism *versus* parliamentarism argued for the potential failure of the Brazilian new democracy. At that time, there were few consolidated multiparty presidential countries to be studied and comparing consolidated parliamentary regimes with nonstandard presidential systems created the worst possible forecasts for the 'difficult combination' of presidentialism with multipartism. Experts expected multipartism to exacerbate the "perils of presidentialism" by increasing the probability of deadlock in executive–legislative relations, by promoting ideological polarization, and by making coalition building among multiple parties difficult to achieve (Mainwaring 1993; see also Stepan and Skach 1993). It was argued that the best chances for the survival of presidential democracies lay in the adoption of a U.S.-style two-party format. Experts believed that such systems

---

2   Also known as coalitional presidentialism.

would reduce polarization, obviate coalitional politics, and promote governability.

Abranches (1988) was the first to take the unique Brazilian political system of organizing its executive power with coalitions and compare it with consolidated democracies around the world. He concluded that the main difference was the kind of government. In Abranches' view, the main problem with Brazil's system lay in its emphasis on the government's performance.

Linz (1990) argued in favor of parliamentary regimes, noting the contradictions in presidential systems that create a position with huge political powers – the president – and institutions responsible for limiting those powers (auditing courts, for example). In Linz's opinion, another problem is the internal conflict of the president: acting as a politician inside a party and also being the executive chief of a nation are mutually exclusive options. In addition, the fixed term is an impediment for quick solutions in the case of a corruption crisis involving the president because it is more difficult to implement an impeachment process for a president than to dissolve a parliamentary cabinet.

Scholars also have concerns regarding the Brazilian electoral rules, which combine an open list and proportional representation. It has been argued that this combination allows citizens to select their candidates instead of parties. They can base their selections on candidates' personal qualities, their activities, and personal records. This provides a strong incentive for candidates to develop direct links with their constituency groups rather than to mediate such relations through political parties. These constituency groups may include local government, local business elites, and professional groups, among others. Thus, the personification of the vote is highly influenced by the way that citizens elect individual legislators (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Haggard 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Lima Junior 1993; Ames 1995a and 1995b; Lamounier 1994).

Papers from the 1990s focused on how individual behavior incentives – such as open-list proportional representation,[3] incumbents with guaranteed re-election rights,[4] the possibility of having more candidates than there are contested seats, and the right of a member of congress

---

[3]   Problems associated with open list proportional representation were extensively debated in Ames (2002a, 2002b).

[4]   The possessor of a particular political position had direct access to the party list in the upcoming elections. This rule was suspended by the Supreme Court in 2002.

(MC) to change from one party to another one without any penalty[5] – have created system weaknesses, spawning catch-all parties with consequent legislative disciplinary problems (Mainwaring 1991 and 1997; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 1997).

A few incentives for representatives to follow party directives include whether the party leadership list access control is weak, whether the vote is nominal and not on the list, and whether there is a high proportion of candidates in relation to the magnitude of the district. All of these features weaken the bargain between Brazilian legislative parties and the executive (Shugart and Carey 1992; Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997).

As noted earlier, many authors have attested that electoral rules resulting in multiparty systems and the impossibility of a majority government would lead this kind of presidential system to failure. However, this was not observed in Brazil or in other Latin American countries. Nonetheless, as Pereira and Melo (2012) claimed, multiparty presidentialism appears to be here for good. They argued that multiparty presidential regimes must be seen as special cases that do not function like parliamentary political systems or like two-party presidential models. In other words, the literature does not fully grasp the operational nuances of coalition-based presidential regimes. Scholars have been misestimating the outcomes of these regimes because they have been using theoretical and analytical tools designed to analyze either European multiparty parliamentary regimes or the American two-party presidential system. It is only recently that scholars have started to examine the relevance of coalitions in multiparty presidential regimes. This newer research has addressed topics such as coalition voting discipline (Amorim Neto 2002), the relationship between coalition type and legislative success (Cheibub 2007), the flexibility that executive appointment powers provide presidents (Martinez-Gallardo 2005), the impact of cabinet formation on presidential survival in times of crisis (Negretto 2006), the relationship between presidential policymaking strategies and cabinet formation (Amorim Neto 2004), and the use of 'pork' and other tradable political currencies for political bargaining and coalition management (Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011).

---

5   Opportunity extinguished by the Supreme Court in 2007.

2   Cabinet Composition as Coalition Building

Primary presidential support from MCs stems from offering jobs in the federal bureaucracy. Since we can observe cohesiveness inside the group of patronage recipients created, support for the president will be effective (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). A new cabinet is formed whenever a new president is inaugurated, when there is a change in its party composition, or when more than five percent of the ministers are changed (Amorim Neto 1994).

Figueiredo, Salles, and Vieira (2010) noted that 67 percent of presidents without an electoral majority in Latin America, including Brazil, had built government coalitions using their cabinets. For Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011), the cabinet is a way of coalition building, with the presidential party's share inside the House and the president's popularity being inversely proportional to the number of departments (or ministries) given to other parties.

Comparing the 1946–1964 period with the post-1985 years in Brazil it is concluded that, in both periods, the bigger the job offering inside the federal bureaucracy, the higher the legislative discipline (Amorim Neto 1994; Amorim Neto and Santos 2001; Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003; Figueiredo 2007).

Vis-à-vis cabinet proportionality, the ratio between departments offered to a certain party and its share inside the coalition is called the coalescence degree. Empirically, coalescence has a positive legislative submission relationship; it also negatively correlates with the number of decrees[6] issued by the president, with the supposition that weak executive–legislative relations that are a by-product of a low coalescence degree stimulate a higher number of executive decrees (Amorim Neto 2000 and 2002; Amorim Neto and Tafner 2002; Amorim Neto, Cox, and McCubbins 2003).[7]

---

6   Known as *medidas provisórias* in Portuguese, they must be countersigned by Congress by a certain time or re-launched by the executive.
7   Research about cabinet-building in Europe (Amorim Neto and Strom 2006; Amorim Neto and Samuels 2010) showed that the share of independent ministers inside the cabinet is a positive function of the following: electoral volatility; semi-presidential regimes; minority governments; and from the president's legislative powers, being negatively related with congress fragmentation.

3   Pork Barreling and Coalition Adjustment

The studies considered here, mainly based on econometric analysis, have shown the process of budget amendment from proposition through to execution as being vital for executive–legislative relations. In this scenario, representatives can amend the annual budget sent every year by the president to congress for 'pork barrel' projects. Executive bargaining power over this process is expressed first in authorizing the money, and second, in effectively giving it to deputies as patronage.

Budget amendments can influence deputies' electoral ambitions. Ames' explanation of the spatial patterns in Brazil's 1990 House elections found that candidates in 1989 and 1990 had looked to strongholds in vulnerable cities to solve their electoral weaknesses by offering patronage (1995a). Mayoral candidates who had previous experience as representatives allocated more patronage to the city where they were running for local executive. Those who tried a higher-level position, but also had earlier been representatives, allocated more money for their states than deputies who did not run for those jobs, although incumbents seeking re-election had a similar performance in terms of implementing their budget amendments to those who were running for higher office (Samuels 2002; Leoni, Pereira, and Rennó 2003). In the 1998 House elections, patronage had a more positive electoral effect than legislative propositions (Pereira and Rennó 2002 and 2003; Pereira and Mueller 2003).

The following studies have viewed patronage as a coalition maintenance tool that is highly valued by congressional representatives.[8] Knowing this, the president uses it as a currency to deal with the legislative coalition, as well as using the approval or execution of budget amendments to get *ad hoc* support from outside coalition representatives.

Usually, dominant-concentrated elected deputies give more support to presidential bills than to congressional bills. The same trend could also be observed in MCs who receive higher amounts of money from budget amendments (Ames 1995b; Pereira and Mueller 2002). Pereira and Mueller (2004) pointed out that patronage is very low-cost. Also, the number of executed individual budget amendments in the 1990s was a direct function of the support for executive bills (Alston and Mueller 2005; Pereira and Orellana 2009).

Refining the executive support mechanism concept, Raile, Pereira, and Power (2011) stated that budget amendments also serve to attract

---

8   A different point of view in favor of the collective feature of budget amendments can be seen in Limongi and Figueiredo (2007).

some representatives from opposition parties, as was observed in the 2003 Pension Reform, when coalition members who already had allies inside the bureaucracy saw the execution of many amendments proposed by representatives from oppositional parties. While approving opposition amendments is not the rule, it can be used occasionally as a powerful weapon.

4   The Executive–Legislative Game and Institutions

Many institutionalist characteristics have emerged from studies that view institutions as a kind of government, while others focus on electoral issues, or prioritize the legislative powers of the president, etc.[9]

For instance, scholars have emphasized the institutional rules and structures that organize the legislative process itself. That is, the set of rules and internal procedures that define the level of centralization in terms of prerogatives of initiating the decision-making process (agenda setting) in the hands of deputies or in the hands of parties and/or executive. This literature has attempted to explain how institutional variables internal to the decision making process (the distribution of power inside congress) and the institutional legislative powers held by the president work as key variables in the definition of the legislator's behavior. Figueiredo and Limongi asserted:

> electoral laws and lack of party control over candidacy may give politicians room for cultivating personal votes and defying party line. But individualistic behavior does not encounter a milieu to develop in Congress. The institutional powers held by the executive, on the one hand, and the centralized decision making system in the legislature, on the other, impose restrictive agendas and limit legislators' role in policy outcome (Figueiredo and Limongi 1997a: 3).

According to Melo (1998), national constitutions reduce transactional costs when they stipulate the role played by each party in electoral and governmental processes. When politicians limit their ability to act, this could be interpreted as an attempt to avoid future irrational behavior.

---

9   The focus relies on formal institutions, but we cannot neglect the role played by the informal ones. The latter approach has few analyses. For example, Desposato (2006), based on São Paulo and Piauí, stated that clientelism as an informal institution creates minor party cohesion and makes governance more difficult.

Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2011) argued that the huge powers granted to Latin American executives do not occur in all cases at the expense of congress' powers, noting that Latin American legislatures have greater surveillance powers over the executive than those in other regions.

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution gave the president huge legislative powers, such as partial veto, decree power, bill urgency requests, and exclusive initiative on budgetary issues. Nevertheless, strong presidents have not been considered dangerous for presidential democracies (Cheibub and Limongi 2010). Checks and balances, such as an independent judiciary and congressional oversight, play an important role in Brazil, and include such executive counterweights as public prosecutors (*Ministério Público*), courts of accounts, etc. (Melo 2009; Melo, Pereira, and Figueiredo 2009; Pereira, Singh, and Mueller 2011).[10]

Regarding electoral rules, neither party fragmentation nor minor parties could affect political stability among the five biggest Brazilian political parties (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Cheibub 2002; Santos 2008). Also, Cheibub and Limongi (2002). Cheibub (2004) found that cooperation incentives are bigger in parliamentary regimes, but the probability of coalitions matches those of the president under certain circumstances. Therefore, it seems that party fragmentation is not a barrier for governability.

Another important threat coming from the president is his or her partial and full veto powers against congressional bills. Santos (1997) argued that current Brazilian presidents have seen their veto powers reduced; this is another institutional feature, which tries to limit some of the executive's prerogatives.

Executive decree power, which was viewed as a delegation of authority from the legislature to the executive in the 1980s National Constituent Assembly, was seen as an instrument that offered modernization and administrative action (Figueiredo and Limongi 1997b). This hypothesis was tested by Pereira, Power, and Rennó (2005), who assessed the extent to which delegation theory[11] and unilateral action[12] could be observed in Brazil from 1988 to 1998. They showed that no particular pat-

---

10   Another interesting point is that partisan fragmentation is considered beneficial because it increases transaction costs between parties for a joint attack on judiciary and other control agencies (Melo 2009).

11   Increasing number of provisional decrees on situations of high presidential popularity.

12   Increasing number of provisional decrees in periods of low indexes of presidential approval and less congressional support.

tern among the two mentioned above were perceived. In the whole peri-
od, unilateral action could be seen; however, regarding just Cardoso's
first term, delegation theory was observed thanks to the requirements of
the Real Plan.[13]

Figueiredo and Limongi's 1995 study detailed how, after 1988, the
executive proposed 88 percent of all federal laws in the country. Armijo,
Faucher, and Dembinska (2006) stated that neither the propensity to
political chaos nor the governance created from the sacrifice of repre-
sentatives, mayors, or governors in favor of the executive can be applied
to Brazil. Figueiredo and Limongi argued that all governments from
Sarney to Lula in his first term were based on a cooperation system in
which a strong president was supported by other political agents.[14]

5   Party Leadership and its Place in the Bargain

Party leadership is another institutional feature that affects Brazilian
governability. After 1988, party delegations were observed as being very
loyal to their leaders, allowing easy forecasts about future roll calls (Li-
mongi and Figueiredo 1995; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999).

Acting by himself or herself, a representative's bargaining power
against the federal executive tends to be too small. In order to get what
they want, MCs must cluster in a political party with a representative to
bargain with the executive on their behalf; the party leader plays this role
(Limongi and Figueiredo 1998 and 2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000;
Pereira and Mueller 2003).

In contrast to the American legislative decentralization, the Brazilian
system gives wide power to political parties inside congress. The role of
the leadership is important because there is no difference between repre-

---

13   The successful economic stabilization plan carried out by Cardoso when he was
     finance minister during Franco's presidency. Cardoso was subsequently elected
     president in 1994 and re-elected in 1998.
14   Another institutional design that is able to influence executive–legislative rela-
     tions, but has not been studied to the same extent as others, comes from the
     federalist issue. There are two streams regarding federalism. The first one, rep-
     resented by Carey and Reinhardt (2003), Arretche and Rodden (2004), and
     Cheibub, Figueiredo, and Limongi (2009), looks at the weaknesses of states and
     the strength of the federal executive branch acting over delegations. The other
     stream, led by Samuels (2000 and 2002) and Desposato (2004), argues the op-
     posite, advocating the power of state governors at the expense of federal execu-
     tive's power.

sentatives regarding rights in votes and other common procedures; since leadership determines nominations for important positions inside the house, a rational MC will follow his or her leader to make his or her future demands possible. Meanwhile, top-down leadership is not common due to potential party colleague rebellion. Thus, we expect cooperation between a delegation and its leader (Limongi and Figueiredo 1998).

According to Figueiredo, Limongi, and Valente (1999), another important feature of a leader is his or her ability to appoint and remove colleagues from committees. The appointment to be part of committees of great importance as the Committee of Constitution, Justice and Citizenship and the Committee of Finance are very desired by several MCs, leading them to subordinate themselves to their party leader.

6   Conclusion

This paper has reviewed the Brazilian multiparty presidential system literature. Linz, Mainwaring, Shugart and Carey led a first wave of studies and developed ideas focused on presidential regimes; forecasts about governance in Brazil were skeptical. Time has shown that such skepticism was misplaced because the studies had not considered the features that could induce governability.

Other studies have attempted to understand how such an unusual system could survive with a reasonable level of stability. Amorim Neto found that Brazilian presidents build their coalitions by giving jobs in the bureaucracy to political parties.

Pereira, who is considered an authority on 'pork barrel' politics, showed how this tool could help a president get an agenda approved at a low cost.

Authors like Cheibub, who dealt with the theme of institutions shaping the relations between the president and the congress, observed the impact of the strong legislative powers that the 1988 Constitution granted to the executive. However, checks and balances were also observed as a way to restrain a president's power.

Another source of thought regarding governability in Brazil comes from party leadership strength with regard to their delegations. Limongi and Figueiredo have made a particularly important contribution. They systematically demonstrated that representatives are highly obedient to party leaders and vote on the floor according to the leadership's wishes.

The rich literature on presidential–congressional relations critically reviewed in this paper has identified several aspects and variables as a source of presidential support in congress. Although all of these ap-

proaches try to answer the same question – that is, what are the conditions for presidential success in the legislative arena in a multiparty institutional setting? – they do so in different ways, offering conflictual and often partial explanations. In fact, each of those approaches illuminates one facet of the inherently complex relations between president and congress. There is no doubt that these approaches have offered a great deal of insightful explanation regarding the phenomenon of the executive–legislative relationship. Nevertheless, by working with models that deal with isolated variables instead of considering the influences of all variables simultaneously, those approaches have presented analytical limitations. The contribution of this literature review, then, is to demonstrate that executive–legislative relations in multiparty presidential regimes should assume that presidential, congressional, electoral, and institutional internal variables matter in constraining the bulk of legislators' options and coalition behavior.

References

Abranches, S. H. H. (1988), Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 31, 1, 5–34.

Alston, L. J., and B. Mueller (2005), Pork for Policy: Executive and Legislative in Brazil, in: *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 22, 1, 87–114.

Ames, B. (2002a), Party Discipline in the Chamber of Deputies, in: S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif (eds), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185–221.

Ames, B. (2002b), *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil: Interests, Identities and Institutions in Comparative Politics*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Ames, B. (1995a), Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 39, 2, 406–433.

Ames, B. (1995b), Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 57, 2, 324–343.

Amorim Neto, O. (2004), The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 39, 4, 415–440.

Amorim Neto, O. (2002), Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles and Coalition Discipline in Brazil, in: S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif (eds), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 48–78.

Amorim Neto, O. (2000), Gabinetes presidenciais, ciclos eleitorais e disciplina legislativa no Brasil, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 43, 3, 479–519.

Amorim Neto, O. (1994), Formação de gabinetes presidenciais no Brasil: coalizão versus cooptação, in: *Nova Economia*, 4, 1, 9–34.

Amorim Neto, O., and G. W. Cox (1997), Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties, in: *American Journal of Political Science*, 41, 1, 149–174.

Amorim Neto, O., and D. Samuels (2010), Democratic Regimes and Cabinet Politics: A Global Perspective, in: *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos*, 1, 1, 10–23.

Amorim Neto, O., and F. Santos (2001), The Executive Connection: Presidentially Defined Factions and Party Discipline in Brazil, in: *Party Politics*, 7, 2, 213–234.

Amorim Neto, O., and K. Strom (2006), Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, in: *British Journal of Political Science*, 36, 4, 619–643.

Amorim Neto, O., and P. Tafner (2002), Governos de coalizão e mecanismos de alarme de incêndio no controle legislativo das medidas provisórias, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45, 1, 5–38.

Amorim Neto, O., G. W. Cox, and M. D. McCubbins (2003), Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989–1998, in: *World Politics*, 55, 4, 550–578.

Armijo, L. E., P. Faucher, and M. Dembinska (2006), Compared to What? Assessing Brazil's Political Institutions, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 39, 6, 759–786.

Arretche, M., and J. Rodden (2004), Política distributiva na Federação: estratégias eleitorais, barganhas legislativas e coalizões de governo, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 47, 3, 549–576.

Carey, J. M., and G. Y. Reinhardt (2003), Impacto das instituições estaduais na unidade das coalizões parlamentares no Brasil, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 46, 4, 773–804.

Carey, J. M., and M. S. Shugart (1995), Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas, in: *Electoral Studies*, 14, 4, 417–439.

Chaisty, P., N. Cheesman, and T. Power (2014), Rethinking the 'Presidentialism Debate': Conceptualizing Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective, in: *Democratization*, 21, 1, 1–23.

Cheibub, J. A. (2007), *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cheibub, J. A. (2002), Minority Governments, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 284–312.

Cheibub, J. A., and F. Limongi (2010), From Conflict to Coordination: Perspectives on the Study of Executive–Legislative Relations, in: *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos*, 1, 1, 38–53.

Cheibub, J. A., and F. Limongi (2002), Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered, in: *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 151–179.

Cheibub, J. A., Z. Elkins, and T. Ginsburg (2011), Latin American Presidentialism in Comparative and Historical Perspective, in: *Texas Law Review*, 89, 7, 1707–1740.

Cheibub, J. A., A. Figueiredo, and F. Limongi (2009), Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 51, 1, 1–30.

Cheibub, J. A., A. Przeworski, and S. M. Saiegh (2004), Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, in: *British Journal of Political Science*, 34, 4, 565–587.

Desposato, S. W. (2006), How Informal Electoral Institutions Shape the Brazilian Legislative Arena, in: G. Helmke and S. Levitsky (eds), *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 56–68.

Desposato, S. W. (2004), The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil, in: *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XXIX, 2, 259–285.

Diaz, C. (2004), Old Hacks or New Blood? The Effects of Inter-Party Competition on PRI Candidates for the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997–2000, in: *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 10, 4, 107–128.

Figueiredo, A. C. (2007), Government Coalitions in Brazilian Democracy, in: *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 1, 2, 182–216.

Figueiredo, A. C., and F. Limongi (2000), Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil, in: *Comparative Politics*, 32, 2, 151–170.

Figueiredo, A. C., and F. Limongi (1999), Poder de agenda, disciplina e apoio partidário na Câmara dos Deputados, in: A. C. Figueiredo and F. Limongi (eds), *Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional*, Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 101–124.

Figueiredo, A. C., and F. Limongi (1997a), *Presidential Power and Party Behavior in the Legislature*, paper prepared for the Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, Mexico, 17–19 April,

online: <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/figueiredoli. pdf> (4 March 2015).

Figueiredo, A. C., and F. Limongi (1997b), O Congresso e as medidas provisórias: abdicação ou delegação?, in: *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 47, 127–154.

Figueiredo, A. C., F. Limongi, and A. L. Valente (1999), Governabilidade e concentração de poder institucional – o governo FHC, in: *Revista de Sociologia da USP*, 11, 2, 49–62.

Figueiredo, A. C., D. Salles, and M. M. Vieira (2010), Presidencialismo de coalizão na América Latina, in: *Insight Inteligência*, 12, 126–133.

Haggard, S. (1995), The Reform of the State in Latin America, in: S. J. Burki, S. Edwards, and S. R. Aiyer (eds), *Proceedings of the Annual World Bank Conference on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Rio de Janeiro: World Bank, 41–61.

Haggard, S., and R. Kaufman (1995), *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lamounier, B. (1994), A Democracia Brasileira de 1985 à Década de 1990: A Síndrome da Paralisia Hiperativa, in: J. P. Reis Velloso (ed.), *Governabilidade, Sistema Político e Violência Urbana*, Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio, 25–63.

Leoni, E., C. Pereira, and L. Rennó (2003), Estratégias para sobreviver politicamente: escolhas de carreiras na Câmara dos Deputados no Brasil, in: *Opinião Pública*, IX, 1, 44–67.

Lima Junior, O. B. (1993), *Democracia e Instituições Políticas no Brasil dos Anos 80*, São Paulo: Loyola.

Limongi, F., and A. C. Figueiredo (2007), The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual Amendments, Support for the Executive and Government Programs, in: *World Political Science Review*, 3, 3, 1–34.

Limongi, F., and A. C. Figueiredo (2002), Incentivos eleitorais, partidos e política orçamentária, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45, 2, 303–344.

Limongi, F., and A. C. Figueiredo (1998), Bases institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão, in: *Lua Nova*, 44, 81–98.

Limongi, F., and A. C. Figueiredo (1995), Partidos políticos na Câmara dos Deputados: 1989–1994, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 38, 3, 497–525.

Linz, J. (1990), The Perils of Presidentialism, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 1, 1, 51–69.

Mainwaring, S. (1997), Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil, in: S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart (eds), *Presiden-*

tialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 55–109.

Mainwaring, S. (1993), Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 26, 2, 198–228.

Mainwaring, S. (1991), Politicians, Parties and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective, in: *Comparative Politics*, 24, 1, 21–43.

Mainwaring, S. (1990), Presidentialism in Latin America, in: *Latin American Research Review*, 25, 1, 157–179.

Mainwaring, S., and A. Pérez-Liñán (1997), *Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress*, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper, No. 235, Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute, online: <http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/235.pdf> (18 February 2015).

Mainwaring, S., and T. Scully (1995), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, S., and M. S. Shugart (1997), *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2005), *Presidents, Posts, and Policy: Ministerial Appointments and Political Strategy in Presidential Regimes*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University.

Melo, M. A. (2009), Strong Presidents, Robust Democracies? Separation of Powers and Rule of Law in Latin America, in: *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 3, 2, 30–59.

Melo, M. A. (1998), Constitucionalismo e ação racional, in: *Lua Nova*, 44, 55–79.

Melo, M. A., C. Pereira, and C. M. Figueiredo (2009), Political and Institutional Checks on Corruption: Explaining the Performance of Brazilian Audit Institutions, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 42, 9, 1217–1244.

Melo, M. A., C. Pereira, and H. Werneck (2010), Delegation Dilemmas: Coalition Size, Electoral Risk and Regulatory Governance in New Democracies, in: *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 35, 1, 31–56.

Negretto, G. L. (2006), Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48, 3, 63–92.

Pereira, C., and M. A. Melo (2012), The Surprising Success of Multiparty Presidentialism, in: *Journal of Democracy*, 23, 3, 156–170.

Pereira, C., and B. Mueller (2004), The Cost of Governing: Strategic Behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil's Budgetary Process, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, 37, 7, 781–815.

Pereira, C., and B. Mueller (2003), Partidos fracos na arena eleitoral e partidos fortes na arena legislativa: a conexão eleitoral no Brasil, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 46, 4, 735–771.

Pereira, C., and B. Mueller (2002), Comportamento estratégico em presidencialismo de coalizão: as relações entre executivo e legislativo na elaboração do orçamento brasileiro, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45, 2, 265–301.

Pereira, C., and S. Orellana (2009), Hybrid Political Institutions and Governability: The Budgetary Process in Brazil, in: *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 1, 3, 57–79, online: <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/view/112/112> (12 March 2015).

Pereira, C., and L. Rennó (2001), O que é que o reeleito tem? Dinâmicas político-institucionais locais e nacionais nas eleições de 1998 para a Câmara dos Deputados, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 44, 2, 323–362.

Pereira, C., and L. Rennó (2003), Successful Re-election Strategies in Brazil: The Electoral Impact of Distinct Institutional Incentives, in: *Electoral Studies*, 22, 3, 425–448.

Pereira, C., T. Power, and L. Rennó (2005), Under What Conditions Do Presidents Resort to Decree Power? Theory and Evidence from the Brazilian Case, in: *The Journal of Politics*, 67, 1, 178–200.

Pereira, C., S. P. Singh, and B. Mueller (2011), Political Institutions, Policymaking, and Policy Stability in Latin America, in: *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53, 1, 59–89.

Power, T. J. (2010), Optimism, Pessimism, and Coalitional Presidentialism: Debating the Institutional Design of Brazilian Democracy, in: *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 29, 1, 18–33.

Raile, E. D., C. Pereira, and T. J. Power (2011), The Executive Toolbox: Building Legislative Support in a Multiparty Presidential Regime, in: *Political Research Quarterly*, 64, 323–334.

Samuels, D. (2002), Progressive Ambition, Federalism and Pork-barreling in Brazil, in: S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif (eds), *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 315–340.

Samuels, D. (2000), Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results – Presidentialism, Federalism and Governance in Brazil, in: *Comparative Politics*, 33, 1, 1–20.

Santos, F. (2008), Brazilian Democracy and the Power of "Old" Theories of Party Competition, in: *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 2, 1, 57–76.

Santos, F. (1997), Patronagem e poder de agenda na política brasileira, in: *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 40, 3, 465–492.

Shugart, M. S., and J. M. Carey (1992), *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Shugart, M. S., and S. Mainwaring (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate, in: S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart (eds), *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12–54.

Stepan, A., and C. Skach (1993), Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, in: *World Politics*, 46, 1, 1–22.

A Evolução das Teorias sobre o Presidencialismo Multipartidário Brasileiro

Resumo: Nos últimos anos quatro abordagens acerca das relações entre os poderes executivo e legislativo no Brasil surgiram: i) a perspectiva que indica para as limitações e restrições de sistema presidencialistas multipartidários; ii) a construção de coalizões de governo; iii) o gerenciamento das coalizões e iv) o papel desempenhado pelas instituições, incluindo aqui as prerrogativas exercidas pela liderança partidária na Câmara. Neste artigo realizamos uma revisão da literatura sobre os quatro tópicos mencionados de modo a oferecer um guia de estudos sobre o presidencialismo multipartidário brasileiro.

Palavras-chave: América Latina, Brasil, presidencialismo multipartidário, ferramentas de governabilidade, revisão